The core government responsibility of protecting lives should not have to come at the cost of illiberal privacy subversions, as represented by the data retention proposal.

Australians have been rightly appalled by the shocking images of depravity and mayhem caused by the jihadist military group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), now known as Islamic State, and of Australian citizens found combating in conflict‑torn parts of the Middle East.

But the vital question is what should be the appropriate response, if any, to combat such extremism?

Last month the Abbott government gave insight into its intentions by announcing additional funding for national security agencies, further tightening of existing security legislation, as well as a review of the existing public administrative structure surrounding counter‑terrorism responses.

A particularly controversial element of the government's proposals would require telephone companies and internet service providers to store the internet browsing and telephone call non‑content data, or 'metadata,' of all Australian residents for up to two years.

The suggestion is that the more lengthily stored metadata can be made accessible to intelligence and law enforcement agencies, such as ASIO, federal and state police departments, and without the issuing of a warrant to attain access.

According to a leaked consultation paper prepared by the Attorney‑General's Department, the coverage of the kinds of data the government wants to see retained is expansive in its nature.

Data proposed for retention include current and historical names and addresses of individual internet and telephone account holders, their date of birth, financial and billing information, the date and duration of communication, frequency of calls or internet downloads and uploads, and the type of communications devices used.

The one big shot in the argumentative locker favouring this proposal is that people should not be concerned about the prospect of more vigorous online surveillance if they have done nothing wrong.

This is a most seductive argument, which explains why it is frequently invoked by those demanding stronger security arrangements, but it is a highly misleading one.

There is a natural inclination to seek a modicum of privacy for certain aspects of our lives, and this desire to maintain a private realm, quarantined from the hustle and bustle of the public square, generally appears widespread.

The many practical, if not mundane, manifestations of privacy include clothing ourselves, seeking nightly refuge in our homes, sharing intimate information and moments with people we choose as partners and friends, and even many aspects of online communications.

Some argue in this social media age our threshold desire for privacy has lessened considerably, but this is debateable, not least because individuals exercise choices in using social media and in disclosing as much, or as little, information to their online friends or followers as they wish.

Other instances, such as the controversies surrounding the x‑raying and photographing of human bodies at airports, suggest that a demand to keep certain aspects of ourselves private, and away from the prying eyes of strangers, very much remains alive and well.

The other major problem seems to be that the proponents of more stringent government surveillance often confound the natural inclination to privacy with conceptions of wrongdoing, or at least suspicions of wrongdoing, which involve genuine harm inflicted by a person, or groups of people, upon others.

The idea that people exercising their right to privacy may be committing, or even planning to commit, wrongdoing, such as acts of terrorism, happens to dovetail rather neatly into the inherent tendency of political actors to seek evermore prescriptive controls over the population.

In his polemic, Privacy: A Manifesto, German sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky stated that 'for the security apparatus, an open society is ultimately a collection of shady figures, every brain is a fount of evil ideas, every private space a dark abyss whose furthest corners must be illuminated.'

Under this scenario, 'the subject is always suspect. Hence the task of the security services is never done.'

This risk of overreach into the private lives of individuals thereby calls for a need for strong checks and balances, but experience soberly appears to be at odds with any iron‑clad guarantees that the metadata retention regime would definitely not be at risk of being abused.

It has been suggested that ASIO has created files on about 500,000 Australians since its formation in 1949, including those for Communist Party of Australia members during the Cold War era, environmentalists, indigenous rights campaigners, gay activists, and others which governments of the day harboured vendettas against.

In recent years there have been circumstances in which staff at several government agencies, such as the Australian Taxation Office and Centrelink, had been found to have breached standards pertaining to the privacy of taxpayers and other clientele.

There have also been revelations that major internet service providers have even provided website browsing histories of certain individuals, incidentally not covered under the current metadata retention proposal, over to the government without a warrant.

The broader danger of continuous invasions of privacy by government upon the maintenance of a dynamic and open society cannot be ignored, either.

In essence, the inclination of individuals to act and express themselves in ways which deviate from convention, but which are nonetheless harmless, may diminish with the knowledge that those acts and expressions could arouse suspicion and punishment by surveillance agencies.

If one of the intents of terrorism waged by murderous extremists is to goad Western governments into policies which erode individual liberties at home across a broad scale, then the proposed Australian metadata retention scheme, for one, appears to neatly fit into that category.

And by no means should metadata retention be conceived in isolation, since the commonwealth government has aggressively expanded the size and scope of the national security and surveillance state since at least the time of the 9/11 terror attacks.

This is reflected in the inflated budgets and staffing for relevant security agencies, and the much greater ease with which those agencies can detain suspects and obtain information, as traditional due legal processes are watered down.

Terrorism is undoubtedly a threat to public safety, but it seems on far too many occasions that the prevention of reckless and destructive behaviour by the aberrant few is at the expense of the rest of us peacefully maintaining our inherent right to privacy.

Dr Julie Novak is Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs (www.ipa.org.au)

Metadata and the subversion of privacy