The activist group Palestine Action was designated a terrorist organization by by Parliament on July 2 after it splashed red paint on a British war plane in protest of it assisting Israel’s genocide in Gaza. The non-violent group is in court challenging its designation by a violent government. The author, a former British diplomat, was in the courthouse and filed this report. This is the second and last installment of his two-part article.

This is the second in a two part article. Part one is here. 

When we restarted at 2 p.m., Raza Husain noted that the secretary of state had submitted no argument as to why the proscription had to enter into force immediately.

He continued that the statutory instrument proscribing Palestine Action was not to be viewed as having the same authority as primary legislation, and had undergone a very truncated parliamentary procedure. Amendment had not been possible.

It was more properly characterised as an executive instrument subject to parliamentary veto.

Judge Chamberlain agreed, and noted it had also included the Maniac Murder Cult and it had not been possible for Parliament to separate the groups.

Ben Watson KC then rose to argue for the secretary of state. He stated that the proceedings amounted to a substantive challenge to the proscription itself. But it showed no serious issue to be heard.

Parliament’s intentions are very plain in the Terrorism Act. It sets out clear procedures to add organisations to the list. These had been followed.

The legislation sets out at section 5 the method for appeal against proscription, to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC). The route for appeal is, in the first instance, to the secretary of state, and in the second instance to POAC.

Judge Chamberlain intervened that when the legislation had been passed, there had been no mechanism by which a court could see secret intelligence. (The inference being this is why POAC was established). Such a mechanism now existed. At this stage, it was ambitious for Watson to argue that there is no serious issue to be tried by the court.

Watson responded that there is fundamental uncertainty as to whether the court can do this. 

Chamberlain responded that fundamental uncertainty means there is an issue to consider. The kernel to be addressed today was, are the grounds arguable? If so, what is the balance of convenience?

Watson responded that this case is still narrower than the PKK case. Here there are no fundamental grounds to claim that the order is wrong. Yet the court in the PKK case still concluded that proscription was an issue for Parliament.

This was a constitutional point. Any appeal must go to the secretary of state first. The issues are precisely the same as in the Tamil Tigers case. All of this is finally in the territory of POAC. If interim relief were granted, the organisation would not currently be proscribed, and so POAC would not be able to look at the case.

In instituting POAC as the route for appeal, Parliament had made no provision for interim relief pending appeal, so it plainly was not Parliament’s intention that such relief should be possible. This court has no power of judicial review of proscription. Parliament had provided an adequate route in POAC. The first appeal is to the secretary of state.

Judge Chamberlain asked Watson to confirm that his argument was that if an organisation that clearly does not fall within the definition of terrorism were to be proscribed, they would have no remedy other than to appeal through the secretary of state, and would remain proscribed while they appealed?

Watson concurred, and went on to argue that if there is an unassailable case that you are doing serious damage to property, then Article X freedom of speech protection is much diminished.

“Watson was working on the basis of boring the court into submission by repetition. He resembled an insufficiently trained yoga teacher.”

Judge Chamberlain asked whether the chilling effect on Article X and XI of proscription — including on people not involved in criminal damage — might be serious. 

Watson replied that in the Tamil Tigers case it was ruled that the chilling effect on speech on Tamil self-determination does not have substantial weight against the suppression of terrorism.

Watson said that it was difficult for Palestine Action to argue they were not trying to influence the government, when they had targeted an RAF base. There was no evidence that consultation with Israel and Elbit Systems by the secretary of state had amounted to improper influence.

Judge Chamberlain concurred, stating that it was necessary to consult with the victims to assess damage. 

Watson agreed: it was important to take into account the views of foreign governments in the fight against terrorism. Any argument that the public consultation provision had not been properly enacted could not be sufficiently strong to void the proscription.

Watson said that the fundamental kernel, that Palestine Action is engaged in terrorism as defined in the act, had not been challenged by the claimant. You cannot grant interim relief on the basis that the definition in the statute is too broad.

The secretary of state has no obligation to consider the interests of the organisation that is being proscribed. There are no rules on who can make representations to the secretary of state nor when they should be heard. Parliament did not put in any judicial controls on the secretary of state. This was deliberate.

Judge Chamberlain remarked that if the justification stands for not giving notice of proscription, that this would allow Palestine Action to make preparations to continue, then the same justification stands for not consulting on the question.

Watson replied that the grounds for objecting to proscription are not substantial anyway, so there could never have been any worthwhile representations on behalf of Palestine Action in any consultation.

Watson said that there was secret intelligence evidence about Palestine Action that could be tackled at a later stage through the special advocate process. In the meantime what they had was the secretary of state’s evidence and her statement to parliament.

The police need to be able to implement the law of the land. The courts must not trespass on the rights of parliament, nor appear to do so.

Judge Chamberlain, for the first time, seemed annoyed. “I am not going to worry about that” he said, “you have conceded that this court has jurisdiction”.

Watson said that this was a grave matter of national security, where the courts conceded to the judgment of the executive.

Judge Chamberlain backed down immediately. He said that national security consideration weighs heavily in the scale. “I cannot say that this does not impinge on national security if the secretary of state says so and that belief is rational.”

Watson continued that POAC is the statutory scheme for appeal,. The public interest represented by the secretary of state outweighs any private interest of groups or individuals.

Judge Chamberlain agreed. He said the order exists because the secretary of state believes it will provide the public with certain protections. If the order is suspended it will be denied that protection.

The secretary of state had said that people will be able to continue to oppose Israel’s actions; they will be able to continue to describe those actions as genocide or other breaches of international humanitarian law.

“Watson said that this was a grave matter of national security, where the courts conceded to the judgment of the executive. Judge Chamberlain backed down immediately.”

Judge Chamberlain then suggested that if someone who had once been a member of Palestine Action decided to spray paint on something, that would not make it any more or less lawful than it had been before.

This time Watson refused to agree. He asserted that there can be no private right to do something criminal.

Judge Chamberlain was now enthusiastically strolling around his own fantasy world where the police and prosecutors are kindly and reasonable. “There is no reason for anybody to regard somebody’s past association with a now proscribed organisation as blameworthy”, he suggested.

Watson replied that the government’s determination is that the organisation is terrorist. So the existence of stigma is irrelevant. It already exists. The priority is national security. In conclusion, Watson spoke the chilling words that made me jump in my chair.

Watson said precisely: “We accept of course that it is draconian and deliberately so.”

(Say that to yourself out loud, and consider what kind of state it is where the government can openly say this in court.)

“Judge Chamberlain was now enthusiastically strolling around his own fantasy world where the police and prosecutors are kindly and reasonable.”

Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh KC then rose to rebut. She quoted Andrew Feinstein, that the methods of Palestine Action were identical to those of anti-apartheid activists. Feinstein stated that the majority of Palestine Action activists he had encountered were not terrorists, but pacifists. All of the actions were capable of being protected under Article X and Article XI [of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)].

Not every act of damage to property is criminal. There are many examples of Palestine Action activists being acquitted. 

Judge Chamberlain interjected that they will only in future be illegal if under the aegis of Palestine Action. 

Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh 

Blinne retorted that Palestine Action protest outside arms factories regularly. If the same activists turn up to protest, they will be accused of being Palestine Action.

The case of the Tamil Tigers is not apposite, she continued. The Tamil Tigers were engaged in armed action. The secretary of state had said that all actions of the Tamil Tigers had an axis to violence. That is absolutely not the case here.

Statements in favour of Palestine Action before proscription would be interpreted by the police as giving suspicion of continuing support. What is Palestine Action, other than a loose network of people who want to see Elbit shut down?

The secretary of state says that somehow people’s Article X and XI rights will magically be protected. This will not be the case. Palestine Action is not being proscribed on the grounds that it rejects the tenets of a democratic society. It rather opposes corporate complicity in fundamental breaches of international law.

There is clear Strasbourg case law that you do not lose protection of the ECHR because of any violent act by another member of the same organisation.

“Palestine Action is not being proscribed on the grounds that it rejects the tenets of a democratic society. It rather opposes corporate complicity in fundamental breaches of international law.”

Timing and context are key. Palestine Action are attempting to prevent the most serious crime of all in the middle of a Genocide. In the case of the Christian Democrat Party of Moldova, the Strasbourg court had found it was wrong to ban them without notice just 21 days before an election. Context and timing are important.

People were today protesting outside this court. Those continuing to protest this proscription in the next two weeks would be branded as terrorists, were interim relief not given now.

Ben Watson now interjected – I am not sure on what basis – to say that the correct appeal against proscription was through POAC.

Raza Husain Closes 

Raza Husain then closed for the claimant. He stated that Palestine Action were a group of people who put their bodies on the line between genocide and its planes and weapons.

The secretary of state had been granted extra time to give evidence of what harm would arise if the interim relief were granted, and she had given nothing. The harm might be the deprivation of liberty to literally thousands of people.

Arrests were foreseeable. This was a civil disobedience movement. There will be an I Am Spartacuswave. Civil disobedience is not illegal but has a long and honourable history in British society. It will carry on.

The public interest is indeed engaged. It does not all fall on one side. Hundreds of thousands of people support Palestine Action. There was real and lasting damage to the right of the public to freedom of speech and to protest.

That closed the hearing. It was now 3.15 p.m. on Friday, July 4. Judge Chamberlain said that he would attempt to return with his decision by 5.30 pm.

Outside the drummers were still drumming and the dancers were still dancing. I gave a few more interviews. I really wasn’t feeling well at all at this stage.

At 5.30 p.m. we were back in the court for Chamberlain to give his decision. He started by saying he had considered the likelihood of success of the appeal for judicial review, and had decided that the only ground where there was arguably a strong case to be heard was that of disproportionate interference with Article X and Article XI rights under the ECHR.

Some of the other grounds may be plausible, but he was not in a position to judge that today.

However, he considered that the claimant had not demonstrated that irreversible harm would be caused if interim relief were not granted. Therefore he was not suspending the proscription, which would come into force at midnight according to the secretary of state’s order.

He assumed that the claimant would seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. He would not grant leave to appeal. However the claimants could try to ask the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, this evening before the proscription came into force.

Chamberlain then disappeared through the door behind his chair. The legal team were left staring at his detailed judgment.

His incredibly detailed judgment. It is 24 pages long, and runs to 104 paragraphs, many of which have sub-paragraphs.

Let me try to offer a perspective. I have a reasonable claim not to be stupid. I topped the civil service exams in my year and became the U.K.’s youngest ambassador. It has taken me eight solid hours to write this article to this point, not including probably twice that in thinking time.

Chamberlain’s judgment is over twice the length of this article so far. Produced in two hours, at the rate of almost one paragraph per minute? Plainly the bulk of it was written before the hearing – or written by somebody else. Just a thought.

With the disturbing insight that this was all a charade, I joined the Palestine Action legal team who were having to digest this judgment and work out how to launch an appeal to the Court of Appeal after 6pm on a Friday evening.

Otherwise the proscription took effect on the stroke of midnight.

Despite being extremely experienced, nobody on the team had ever been through a similar procedure. Judges are not given to hanging around the courts out of hours, and indeed are strongly inclined to find reasons to wrap up proceedings in trials and hearings early on a Friday. And this was in the middle of both Wimbledon and a Test Match…

Having such a large legal team finally made sense, as they all, including four barristers who had not spoken, scanned through the judgment looking to find grounds of appeal.

Raza gave instructions to telephone the duty clerk of the Court of Appeal and find out if the duty judge were available. The question then was whether the duty judge would be prepared to sit and hear an appeal as a single judge, or would want a panel of three.

The call was made, while we several times had to fend off security guards who were attempting to clear the building. Huda had been giving instructions via videolink, and it was only now that I discovered there was in fact someone from Palestine Action present with the team.

One of the legal team said to me mischievously “If they ask you to leave, we can ask Huda to say that you are with Palestine Action – pause – she had better add until 11.59 p.m.”.

Within five minutes of the call being made, a security guard came to us and told us we were to move to Court 4, the court of the lord chief Justice. We had to gather up all the files and move there, a long trek through the bowels of the building, and at one stage diving off on a shortcut up a staircase that nobody in the team knew existed (there are over 100 staircases in this extraordinary building).

We entered Court 4 at around 7 p.m. We were now in the grandest area of the building. Forgive me if I recycle a description of this courtroom I have used before:

“It is very high, and lit by heavy mock-medieval chandeliers hung by long cast iron chains from a ceiling so high you can’t really see it. You expect Robin Hood to suddenly leap from the balconied gallery and swing across on the chandelier above you. The room is very gloomy; the murky dusk hovers menacingly above the lights like a miasma of despair; below them you peer through the weak light to make out the participants.

A huge tiered oak dais occupies half the room, with the judges seated at its apex, their clerks at the next level down, and lower lateral wings reaching out, at one side to house journalists and at the other a huge dock for the prisoners, with a massy iron cage that looks left over from a production of The Hunchback of Notre Dame.

This is in fact the most modern part of the construction; caging defendants in medieval style is a Blair-era introduction to the so-called process of law – as indeed is the Terrorism Act.

All the walls are lined with high bookcases, housing thousands of leather-bound volumes of old cases. The stone floor peeks out for one yard between the judicial dais and the storied wooden pews, with six tiers of increasingly narrow seating. The back of each bench has a little ledge for those behind to place their papers. Watching people attempt to balance laptops on a five inch shelf is quite amusing.”

Gareth turned to me and said that we were honoured to be in such a historic spot, which had already witnessed some of the world’s greatest miscarriages of justice.

As we sat ourselves down, out of the door at the back of the dais appeared in all her majesty the lady justice of England and Wales, Lady Carr, who was flanked by Lord Justice Lewis and Lord Justice Edis.

Evidently these three had just been hanging around the court at 7 p.m. on a Friday evening, and happened to be available to hear the request for permission to appeal. I had a moment of crystal clarity. I had spent the whole day participating in a charade, and even the wonderful legal team around me were at base also just participants in that charade.

Lady Carr opened by grumbling loudly that there was very little time, they had not seen the supporting evidence, they had only just received Chamberlain’s judgment, and had no idea what were the purported grounds of appeal. She asked Raza Husain if he had grounds of appeal, and what were they?

“I had a moment of crystal clarity. I had spent the whole day participating in a charade, and even the wonderful legal team around me were at base also just participants in that charade.”

She reminded us that an appeal was not a rerun of the case but had to find specific errors in law by Judge Chamberlain. “Where do you say that he erred?”

Raza Husain evidently had not been expecting to present the grounds of appeal instantly, and the team had only just finished reading the judgment and started thinking about how to appeal it when we had been called to Court 4. He was now instantly standing in front of the Court of Appeal.

He extemporised that there were three grounds of appeal at least. The judge had erred in law in that he had failed to take into account the weight of mass arrests in assessing the balance of convenience argument. He had failed to insist upon evidence of the urgency of immediate imposition. He had failed to accord due weight to the failure of the secretary of state to consult before proscription.

Lady Carr said that the court would hear an application for permission to appeal. Skeleton argument for the appeal must be submitted in one hour, by 8:15 p.m., and the court would hear oral arguments at 9 p.m. and endeavour to deliver judgment before midnight.

This was somewhat confusing. They were granting a hearing for permission to appeal, not agreeing to hear an appeal. So if they granted permission, there would have to be a further stage of the actual appeal hearing. How could that be done if their decision on permission to appeal were not given much before midnight?

There being no time to retire anywhere else, the legal team started beavering away immediately on the benches. At 9 p.m. we were listening to the appeal.

Raza Husain said he would make five very brief points.

1) Civil disobedience had a long and honourable history in the U.K.

2) This was the first time a non-violent direct action group had been proscribed as terrorist.

3) Five U.N. special rapporteurs had written opposing the proscription.

4) Huda Ammori had been inspired by the suffragettes.

5) Andrew Feinstein compared the methods of Palestine Action to the liberation struggle against apartheid.

And there were five grounds of appeal.

1) The judge had erred in law in saying that there would not be substantial irreparable harm if the proscription were not delayed. There were undisputed consequences of arrest for expressing support for Palestine Action — this harm was deprivation of liberty, loss of employment and stigma.

2) The judge had afforded insufficient weight to the up to 14-year prison sentence for simply stating “I support Palestine Action”.

3) The judge had given undue weight to national security considerations, where no evidence of urgency had been given.

4) Blinne took over for Ground 4. Chamberlain had erred in law in failing to take proper account of the impact of Articles X and XI of ECHR.

Lady Carr interjected that Chamberlain did say there were Article X and XI grounds for the application for a judicial hearing against proscription. 

Blinne responded that however he had failed to give this sufficient weight against national security in the balance of convenience exercise, and that he had erred in saying that future evidence on this will be forthcoming from the secretary of state. He had to do the balance of convenience exercise on the evidence before him, today.

If the proscription order came into account, it would have a chilling effect on protests outside Elbit factories, even from people unrelated to Palestine Action. It would chill free speech on Palestine. Any action for Palestine might be claimed by the police to be support for Palestine Action, and people would be jailed on remand.

Palestine Action was an extremely loose organisation. What constituted support was extremely unclear in such a case, and there could be hundreds of arrests.

5) Raza Husain took over again for ground 5. 

The availability of an appeal to POAC does not oust judicial review. There were consequences for the common law right of free speech and for articles V and X of the ECHR.

Ben Watson stood to respond for the secretary of state. He said Chamberlain’s judgment was measured and detailed. The claimant in this appeal had not challenged Chamberlain’s finding that the secretary of state had rightly designated Palestine Action as concerned with terrorism.

They had not appealed against the crucial argument of the public interest in allowing the law of the land to take effect. Their criticism of the judge’s decision goes only to weight afforded to varying factors, on only one of the strands which the judge was balancing.

The court could not give weight to the threat of mass flouting of the law. The claimant was merely attempting to relitigate matters which had been properly considered by the court.

Chamberlain said that there was a serious issue to consider under Article X and XI. That is not the same as saying there was a strong case. The judge was not depending on future evidence, he was merely indicating that further evidence might come.

Lord Justice Edis asked Watson how he responded to the argument that not all members of an organisation should be held responsible for the actions of an individual. 

Watson replied that Palestine Action were responsible for a long pattern of criminal activity.

On rebuttal, Raza Husain said there had been no denial that the judge had failed to weigh the correct counterfactual against Article X and XI. Political speech on Palestine is protected speech. It attracts significant Article X protection and must continue to do so.

Blinne added that the appeal is not about what will happen to people engaging in unlawful conduct, it is about what will happen to people who are engaging in conduct which would be perfectly lawful were it not for the proscription. That is how the effect on Article X must be measured.

This was the first ever proscription of a non-violent movement. The harm was that it would criminalise the Article X protected actions of law-abiding people.

That concluded the appeal, at about 9:30 pm.

Judges’ Verdict

In less than an hour the judges were back with their verdict. Again it was available in writing, and despite Lady Carr making a point of fussing about typos due to the haste, I quite simply do not believe that it was produced in under an hour. It contains 52 paragraphs, some of which have many sub-paragraphs.

It is possible to make an argument that Judge Chamberlain had pre-written most of his judgment based on the documents and skeleton arguments that had been submitted in advance and only had to make some amendments to reflect the oral hearing.

But the Court of Appeal were supposed not to have known they even had a case until 10 minutes before they sat. I simply do not buy the speed with which these judgements were produced.

Lady Carr set about delivering the judgment. She said that these remarks were just for information; the written judgment was the actual judgment and anything she said did not vary that.

The proscription had followed an attack on RAF Brize Norton. The order had been passed by each House of Parliament.

Judge Chamberlain had refused to grant a stay of the proscription and had refused to give permission to appeal and had refused any stay pending an application to appeal.

The merits of the decision to proscribe are not a matter for the Court of Appeal. Nor is the court looking into the claims of Palestine Action. The Court of Appeal is only considering whether Judge Chamberlain erred in law.

On the principle of balance, Judge Chamberlain was right that the court must give great weight to national security and the executive’s approach to it.

Judge Chamberlain was entitled to the view that individuals must obey the order while it was in force.

It will remain lawful to express opposition to Israel or to Israel’s actions in Gaza.

“No person will be prosecuted in relation to conduct before proscription”.

There was no prospect of a successful appeal and permission to appeal was therefore refused.

Raza Ali rose to request permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. Lady Carr responded that plainly that could not happen before midnight. A written application should be submitted by 2pm on Monday.

There followed a horrible display by Lady Carr of sickly congratulation. In response to a correction by Blinne to the accents on her name in the judgment, Lady Carr gushed about her “lovely name.” She congratulated all the lawyers effusively on being brief and helpful, and said the case “upheld the best traditions of the bar”.

What it upheld, of course, was a further step into authoritarianism. This was the next morning: an 83-year-old priest arrested for supporting Palestine Action. 

Craig Murray is an author, broadcaster and human rights activist. He was British ambassador to Uzbekistan from August 2002 to October 2004 and rector of the University of Dundee from 2007 to 2010. His coverage is entirely dependent on reader support. Subscriptions to keep this blog going are gratefully received.

Subscriptions to keep Craig Murray’s blog going are gratefully received. Because some people wish an alternative to PayPal, Murray has set up new methods of payment including a GoFundMe appeal and a Patreon account.

This article is from CraigMurray.org.uk.

SEE ALSO: https://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2025/07/we-accept-of-course-that-it-is-draconian-and-deliberately-so/

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.