The way India manoeuvres reflects the key features of both the current global landscape and the ongoing process of its transformation. This process began almost immediately after the Cold War ended, but in recent years, it has accelerated at an unprecedented pace. In turn, the rapid transformation of the world order inevitably injects various factors of uncertainty into the political arena.

 

India Manoeuvres Amid Foreign Policy Uncertainties

BY Vladimir Terehov

 

This rules out any reasonable forecasting of how major world events may unfold, pushing global players to manoeuvre through trial and error — in other words, to proceed by feel. This is evident even in the policy of the world’s top player — the United States.

India, naturally, also finds itself in a foreign policy environment full of uncertainties, which can be divided into two sectors. The first, and most important, includes the countries of South Asia, where India is located. The second consists of key extra-regional players — such as the United States, leading European and Latin American nations, Japan, Australia, and Canada. These two sectors are functionally intertwined.

China: The Central Factor in India’s Relations with Its Neighbors

Among India’s neighbors, the most crucial — whose relationship with India significantly influences the behavior of others — is the People’s Republic of China. Yet it is difficult to adequately describe the extreme complexity of Sino-Indian relations. International conferences are often devoted to the question of what divides the two Asian giants, with participants diving into the deep and tangled history of the predecessor-states of modern-day India and China, as well as their respective entanglements with European colonizers — chiefly the British.

But apparently, someone bit the American president in a now world-famous spot 

At first glance, today’s stage of bilateral relations appears relatively straightforward: there are several disputed sections along a quasi-border almost 4,000 kilometers long. But what blocks resolution of these territorial questions are the ambitions of two of the world’s major powers. That said, the author’s view is that this territorial issue, while real, is more of an external symptom of much deeper and, historically speaking, more elusive factors — ones that obstruct the building of trust. Nearly every development in the surrounding areas, even those seemingly limited to socio-economic concerns, is viewed with suspicion.

That’s roughly how India reacted late last year to the Chinese government’s announced plans to build a hydroelectric complex on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet. On July 19 of this year, Premier Li Qiang officially launched construction.

The river is better known in India — and globally — as the Brahmaputra. Before emptying into the Bay of Bengal in Bangladesh, it flows through two Indian states, one of which is Arunachal Pradesh.

China, however, considers Arunachal Pradesh part of its territory, calling it “South Tibet.” It’s also worth noting that both of these Indian states are regularly and catastrophically flooded by the Brahmaputra. In theory, the planned Chinese hydro facilities could help regulate the river’s flow — something India should welcome. But the lack of mutual trust (the dam complex will be just 50 km from Arunachal Pradesh) makes such a positive interpretation impossible.

In this context, the October 2024 meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping — held in Kazan during the BRICS Summit — along with a series of subsequent ministerial-level meetings, has so far only managed to slow the decline of bilateral relations. Meanwhile, serious negative signals continue to accumulate.

Among the most telling: in early August, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visited New Delhi and met with Modi. During the talks, both sides reaffirmed the legitimacy of the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague concerning territorial disputes in the South China Sea — a ruling China does not recognize. During the same visit, three Indian Navy ships held joint exercises with the Philippine Navy in the South China Sea, right near the disputed islands. It’s easy to guess how all this was viewed in Beijing.

Meanwhile, New Delhi is alarmed by neighboring Bangladesh’s sudden pivot toward China and Pakistan — a result of the violent regime change in Dhaka a year ago. Even more troubling are the international media speculations about China’s “indirect involvement” on Pakistan’s side in the brief but intense armed conflict between India and Pakistan that broke out in early May this year, following a deadly terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir.

India’s Relations with Major Extra-Regional Powers

Under these circumstances, one might expect Washington to sit quietly with hands folded, waiting for India — a potentially vital ally in the fight against its chief geopolitical rival — to fall into its arms. But apparently, someone bit the American president in a now world-famous spot. Not only did Donald Trump refuse to overlook a relatively minor $45 billion trade deficit with India (some other partners “rob the U.S.” far more), but the rollout of tariff pressure on India was accompanied by several unpleasant and even humiliating remarks. Such rhetoric might make sense when aimed at an “uncooperative” Russia — but why offend India, a partner with whom relations have been steadily improving over the past three decades?

To make matters worse, the U.S. seems to be reviving ties with Pakistan — ties that were once strong during the Cold War — with special focus on defense cooperation. Pakistan, in turn, was the first to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. It’s unclear why a sitting U.S. president would want that kind of endorsement from an organization that has utterly discredited itself and is controlled by his political enemies. And on top of all that, some tentative positive signals are emerging even in the complex U.S.–China relationship.

No surprise, then, at the near-cry of despair from Nikki Haley — until recently Trump’s rival in the Republican primaries — who asked, “Dear father, why are you pushing away your most loyal friend and sending favorable signals to your main adversary?” We can only guess: the ways of someone who sees himself as a messiah in this sinful and seemingly insane world are mysterious indeed.

Naturally, all of this sets off alarm bells in New Delhi, where the long-standing search for alternative foreign policy partners is clearly gaining speed. Chief among these are Japan, the United Kingdom, and, of course, Russia. In this light, Modi’s late July visit to London took on symbolic significance. Britain and India have long been testing the waters for deeper cooperation — especially in the defense sector. One example: New Delhi could take interest in the sixth-generation fighter jet currently being developed by Japan, the UK, and Italy. Following the recent India–Pakistan conflict, the issue of modernizing the Indian Air Force has become especially urgent.

As for Russia’s own maneuvreing in today’s rapidly shifting world, the key priority should be to avoid becoming a pawn in a tug-of-war between two of Moscow’s most important partners. Rather than cling to the long-abandoned dream of a “Russia–India–China” triangle, Moscow should use its influence to raise the level of trust between Beijing and New Delhi.

To whatever extent that’s even possible.

https://journal-neo.su/2025/08/12/india-manoeuvres-amid-foreign-policy-uncertainties/

 

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         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.