Whether the investigations have been conducted appropriately in terms of relevant investigation standards and operating procedures
Having reviewed the process followed by FWA to undertake the HSU investigations, KPMG is of the view that the process incorporated many of the investigation assessment criteria set out in this report, but was deficient in a number of key aspects.
This report includes 38 findings in relation to the conduct of the HSU investigations which are summarised as follows:
• FWA did not have and did not refer to any relevant investigation standards and procedures;
• There is a lack of adequate documentation setting out the investigation process followed by FWA;
• FWA did not implement an adequate investigation case management system or process, which resulted in deficiencies in the planning, management and execution of the HSU investigations;
• FWA did not have sufficient appropriately qualified and experienced resources involved in the conduct of the HSU investigations;
• FWA did not consider all potential sources of information, particularly electronic information, and did not appear to fully understand its rights to access all potentially relevant sources of information;
• FWA did not have protocols in place for the collection and retention of documents; and
• The security arrangements over documents were inadequate.
The findings referred to above almost certainly contributed to the time taken to complete the HSU investigations. The following factors may also have played a contributory role to the timeframe:
• The Delegate and the Lead Investigator had ‘business as usual’ responsibilities, which they continued to perform throughout the HSU investigations, thereby potentially reducing the amount of time they could devote to the HSU investigations;
• The Delegate’s decision to remove resources from completing the Vic No. 1 Branch investigation so that there was more focus on completing the National Office investigation contributed to the report in relation to the Vic No.1 Branch taking eleven months to complete from the date at which the Lead Investigator provided it to the Delegate;
• The National Office matter could have been transitioned to an investigation sooner if more resources had been applied to the inquiry phase. With more resources applied to the analysis of information obtained, the conclusions reached by the Investigation team in deciding to move the inquiry to an investigation could have been reached at an earlier date;
• The former General Manager9 adopted the position that the progress of the investigations was the responsibility of the Delegate, which included ensuring the progression of the matters to completion, whereas the current General Manager10 took proactive steps after her appointment to ensure that the matters progressed in a timely fashion; and
• The analysis of credit card expenditure in the National Office investigation was conducted near the end of the investigation. This analysis could have been conducted at an earlier stage of the investigation, and may have led to the investigation being completed in a shorter timeframe, considering that alleged unauthorised credit card expenditure was a significant focus of this investigation.The following aspects of the HSU investigations were conducted appropriately in relation to the investigation assessment criteria set out in this report:
• Interviews conducted by the Investigations team;
• The process for the preparation and completion of the National Office report; and
• There was a formal process in place to ensure the accuracy of public statements made regarding the status of the HSU investigations.

Whether the investigations have considered all reasonable lines of inquiry
Within the scope of work, KPMG identified additional sources of information which may have led to lines of inquiry that could have been followed. The additional lines of inquiry that could have been followed include the review of:
• HSU restored email accounts (including electronic calendars);
• Images of HSU computer hard drives;
• Images of relevant HSU smart phones and hand held devices;
• Restored backups of HSU network drives;
• The electronic calendars of persons considered to be the subject of investigations;
• Other electronic information which may not be apparent on hard copy documents such as:
- dates and times of transactions occurring or being posted;
- merchant details including locations; and
- other identification information contained in electronic metadata (data identification properties).
• Documentation by specialist document examiners;
• Information obtained from relevant financial institutions; and
• Corporate intelligence inquiries.
However, without re-performing the HSU investigations, which is beyond the scope of this report, KPMG is unable to fully advise on all potential additional lines of inquiry in relation to the allegations which were the focus of the HSU investigations.

read more at http://www.fwa.gov.au/documents/organisations/reports/KPMG_review.pdf

Note I have quoted this document in good faith for the benefit of our democracy, despite the document being marked CONFIDENTIAL
See the whole series of jacksonville
at http://wixxy.wordpress.com/2012/08/20/electioneering/ 
or here:
http://www.independentaustralia.net/2012/politics/jacksonville-21-the-puppet-show/