by William Schryver

« Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you set out strike like lightning. » (Sun Tzu, The Art of War)

Note: the situation on the ground has changed since September, but the fundamentals presented in this article remain valid. Nobody knows Russia's strategic objectives in Ukraine, the date and location of the upcoming 'big offensive', or even its next tactical moves, all of which is speculation: this 'fog of war' deliberately maintained is a trademark of Russia.

Seventy-nine years ago, what was arguably the greatest battle of World War II was fought in much the same area where battles are again taking place today.

On a broad front in eastern Ukraine and southwestern Russia, stretching from Bryansk in the north to Izyum in the south, German and Soviet forces clashed in the summer of 1943, with a significant bulge of lines in the Kursk region. It was this bulge that was targeted by German commanders to be enveloped and destroyed.

The campaign began the first week of July with a massive German counteroffensive, which continued for several weeks. Several hundred thousand soldiers and thousands of tanks and armored vehicles took part, with massive maneuvers and counter-manoeuvres in an expansive landscape of forests, fields and hills.

Much has been and could be written about the conduct of this battle, but this essay will focus on an unprecedented aspect of the campaign: it is the first battle in which Soviet concepts of Maskirovka have been aggressively incorporated into every stage of the planning and execution of their operations.

Maskirovka is a Russian word that literally means "masking" or "disguise", but in the context of Russian military doctrine it encompasses a wide range of actions intended to deceive the enemy about their strengths, weaknesses, disposition of its strengths and intentions.

In its simplest expression, it echoes the famous saying of " The art of War by Sun Tzu:

« All war is based on deception. Thus, when we are able to attack, we must appear incapable; when we use our strengths, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far away; when we are far away, we must make him believe that we are near. »

During the summer of 1943, the Soviet Army was the strongest force compared to the Wehrmacht. For this reason, Stalin urges his generals to go on the offensive. But the Soviet commanders, aware of the German preparations for a vast counter-offensive, oppose this strategy. On April 8, 1943, Major General Georgy Zhukov wrote to Stalin:

« I consider it inappropriate for our troops to launch a preventive offensive in the near future. It would be better for us to wear down the enemy on our defences, neutralize their tanks, bring in fresh reserves, and finish off their main group with a general offensive. (Glantz, David M., Soviet Military Deception in World War II, p. 148.)

Top Soviet commanders rush to Moscow to plead their case to Stalin at a meeting on April 12. General Shtemenko, 1st Deputy of the Operations Department, later wrote:

« In the end, it was decided to concentrate our main forces in the Kursk region, bleed the enemy forces here in a defensive operation, and then go on the offensive and achieve their complete destruction. (Ibid, p. 148.)

The trick was to gather and conceal the forces of the intended counter-attack as part of the defensive preparations of the whole front – to give the Germans the impression that they had been considerably weakened and that they were adopting therefore a purely defensive position until their attacking potential can be replenished.

Remember that up to this point in the war the Soviets had never undertaken a summer offensive and therefore their apparent shift to the defensive in the summer of 1943 was entirely consistent to past practices.

Their use of Maskirovka would be of utmost importance in their preparations.

« … the staffs were preparing detailed maskirovka plans which included concealment of preparations, creation of fake troop concentrations, simulation of fake radio networks and fake communication centers, construction of fake air installations and fake planes, and spreading false rumors along the front and into the enemy rear area. These plans emphasized secret movements of reserves, hidden preparations for counter-attacks and counter-strikes, and concealed locations of command posts and communication sites.

To deceive the extensive German aerial reconnaissance, army commanders established 15 mock airfields, with model aircraft, runways, control towers and aircraft shelters, and set up numerous tank models to simulate armored assembly areas. German planes responded by bombing these fake airfields nine times. (Ibid, p. 152.)

Lieutenant General IS Konev described the situation:

« The enemy thought we were only preparing for a defensive battle. Possessing a huge number of tanks and guns of a new type, the Germans hoped that it was impossible to stop them.

So, as the enemy was preparing, we were preparing. The main thing was not to conceal the fact of our preparations, but rather the strength and means, the concept of the battle, the timing of our counter-offensive and the nature of our defense. It was most likely the only unprecedented occasion in military history, when the strong side, having the capabilities for offensive action, switched to defense. (Ibid, p. 154.)

Besides masking preparations and concentrations of forces, once the battle had begun the Soviets employed major offensive moves in other areas of the front to divert German forces from the main target of the major Soviet counter-offensive:

« The absence of any substantial detachment of these panzer forces would practically condition Soviet success. The Soviet solution was to attract these units to other sectors of the front. Experience has shown that simulations or mere feints cannot serve this purpose. What was needed were large-scale offensive preparations, if necessary in full view of German intelligence, and offensives powerful and credible enough to attract and tie up German operational reserves until that the necessary damage is done in the key strategic sector… (Ibid, p. 174.)

And what was this “key strategic sector”? Well, in an example of historical rhyme, the great armored battle that took place in the vicinity of Kursk developed as a diversion from the main Soviet objective: to defeat and relocate the main German power center in and around Kharkov.

« Surprise was essential for Soviet forces to achieve victory around Belgorod and Kharkov, and surprise had to be a product of maskirovka. The Soviets applied the maskirovka in all its forms to deceive the Germans as to the timing, strength, form, and location of the main Soviet counterattack. (Ibid, p. 174.)

A full description of the Maskirovka elaborate used in the Battle of Kursk is beyond the scope of this article. I just wanted to present and develop some of its fundamental aspects in order to suggest possible parallels between what was done then and what is currently happening in Ukraine.

Supporters of Ukraine rejoiced and supporters of Russia lamented that Russian forces had been "surprised" and "humiliated" by the recent Ukrainian counteroffensive near Kharkov.

So let me be perfectly clear: the idea that the Russian high command didn't see it coming is, in my opinion, utter nonsense.

They watched his preparations for many weeks. They knew that much of the NATO-supplied materiel shipped to Ukraine since the spring was not yet in combat use, but had been diverted and stockpiled to provide the backbone of firepower for an eventual counter attack.

They also knew that a significant number of Ukrainian professional soldiers had been withdrawn from the front lines to form the core of this attack, and that they were supplemented by a significant infusion of "foreign volunteers".

They knew that the cream of thousands of new Ukrainian conscripts had been sent to Poland and Britain for rapid training to NATO standards.

They knew that NATO commanders had effectively taken operational command of this force and that they were deciding when and where it would be deployed.

And they must have inferred from this, since this force was not present in the Kherson region for the limited counterattack that took place there in early August, that the operations in the south were most likely a diversion from the main objective, which was in the Kharkov region.

Indeed, as the true nature of the events of the past two weeks becomes clearer, I am now confident that the Russians acted deliberately to lure the NATO commanders out of this reconstituted Ukrainian force by offering them some low-hanging fruit. hand so they can bleed their untested army.

More importantly, from the Russian perspective, presenting NATO commanders with a temptation they could not resist would draw this new army into the open battlefield where it could be isolated and ultimately destroyed.

This is why the Russians began, several weeks ago, to withdraw all their forces, with the exception of a symbolic force, from the area containing the towns of Balakliya, Kupyansk and Izyum, thus offering the commanders of this force trained, equipped and led by NATO an irresistible opportunity to demonstrate, as they imagine, the superiority of Western combined arms warfare.

The ensuing attack achieved seemingly extraordinary success against the relative handful of Donbass militias and Rosgvardia troops that remained to defend Balakliya and Kupyansk. The Ukrainians and their shock troops made up of "foreign volunteers" advanced unopposed and occupied quite a large part of the territory which extends to the Oskol River.

Relatively little soldier-on-soldier combat took place. In fact, Ukrainian reports euphorically boasted that the Ukrainian advance could not even keep up with the speed of the Russian retreat!

The “glorious victory” of this NATO quasi-army has, at least for now, launched the Western media narrative into an unprecedented spasm of triumphalism.

Wild reports of hundreds of abandoned tanks, thousands of casualties and tens of thousands of captured Russian soldiers circulate widely, and are willingly believed by those whose biases make such fake news enjoyable.

Puppets of Western think tanks and retired generals go from one news studio to another spouting fantastic nonsense about the liberation of Donbass, then Crimea, followed by the overthrow of Putin and his translation before a court in The Hague.

And as if that weren't enough, many have even begun to openly discuss the eternal Western dream of completely dismantling Russia, carving it up into a dozen or more small republics that will then meekly align themselves with the rest of "the world". 'rules-based world order'.

It's all breathtakingly insanity.

Few seem to be aware that the triumphant army that advanced into the power vacuum the Russians created for them was continuously ravaged by long-range artillery fire and airstrikes, which have already inflicted nearly 20% loss to this relatively exposed force.

Few seem to realize that the pace of the initially rapid advance has now effectively halted, wedged between the Oskol River to the east and the Seversky-Donets to the south, and proved unable to to achieve appreciable success against the concentrations of Russian forces which he now encounters on the other side of these rivers.

And no one seems to be asking the most relevant question: What will be the next move of the Russians?

There seems to be a widespread idea that this apparent "victory" on the battlefield has been so humiliating that the Russians have been ruined, psychologically broken, that they are no longer capable of carrying out operations, that they are no longer more than a battered, quivering crowd of frightened "orcs" nervously waiting for the next train to take them back where they came from.

Those who applaud the victory parade through the streets of kyiv, London and Washington seem to have forgotten that Russia's "special military operation" has so far used only a minor fraction of its military capacity and that Russia's goal from the start has not been to conquer territory, per se, but to completely destroy Ukrainian military capabilities.

I believe the supporters of Ukraine are indulging in a premature orgy of exultation.

I am convinced that the events of the past few weeks have been largely orchestrated according to Russia's ultimate objectives.

I am convinced that the Russians remain masters in the art of Maskirovka and that the current masters of empire in Washington, London and Brussels, like their predecessors, grossly underestimate Russia's strategic acumen, operational capabilities and relentless resilience.

Even if NATO commanders in kyiv clink champagne flutes filled to the brim with stolen Dom Pérignon and congratulate each other on a brilliantly conceived and expertly executed plan, I'm confident the other shoe will eventually fall – and when it does, I expect it to fall like lightning.

source: The Cry of the Peoples

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