Fight by Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes review – scathing account of Biden, Harris and their election loss

Book details how Biden’s circle was reluctant to step down, Harris’s handling of a listing ship and a lack of faith in both

In their book Fight, Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes offer an account of the “Wildest Battle for the White House” – and a scathing indictment of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, the losers of that battle.

By 2023, a year before the campaign, Biden’s age and fitness to be president were the topic of conversation among senior aides. He had difficulty stringing together a coherent sentence, yet there was no serious discussion of his exiting the ticket until it was way, way too late. Harris, meanwhile, was isolated in her party and terrified of facing the press. She took the wheel of a badly listing ship. It sank.

Allen is a veteran political reporter, now at NBC. Parnes is a senior political correspondent for the Hill. Both were once with Politico. Together, they have written two books on Hillary Clinton, HRC and Shattered, and Lucky, an account of how Biden beat Donald Trump to win the White House in 2020. Parnes and Allen possess perspective. Their writing is sober, their sourcing solid.

Their message is clear: Biden should never have sought re-election and his selection of Harris as his running mate was a mistake from the start. By 2024, Biden was too old and too unpopular. He appeared feeble, if not outright addled. But his aides came to view Harris as a liability and so did those at the top of the party. The president’s wife, Jill Biden, opposed Harris’s place on the ticket. Barack Obama and Nancy Pelosi lacked faith too.

At the same time, Jill and Hunter Biden, the 46th president’s wayward surviving son, bolstered the president’s determination to cling on. They could not let go.

“Nobody walks away from this,” Mike Donilon, a longtime Biden adviser, purportedly told one prominent Democrat. “No one walks away from the house, the plane, the helicopter.”

Allen and Parnes add: “That was doubly true for the first lady.”

Pushback could be construed as disloyalty. Biden’s closest advisers were family members or dependent on him for their living. That proved to be a problem. There were no social peers with incomes and lives of their own, figures in the mold of James Baker, secretary of state and chief of staff to George HW Bush, or Valerie Jarrett, a senior adviser and confidante to Barack and Michelle Obama. Biden bristled at being challenged but was a schmoozer, not a leader. He owed his comeback to Covid-19.

On 27 June 2024, Biden faced Trump on the debate stage in Atlanta – and gave perhaps the most disastrous display in history. Allen and Parnes describe a reception hosted by Phil Murphy, the governor of New Jersey, two days later. The president’s aides had affixed fluorescent tape to the carpet, “colorful bread crumbs [that] showed the leader of the free world where to walk”.

“He knows to look for that,” one aide explained. Think, President Grampa Simpson. It’s a lousy image, whoever the other side is running.

In 2020, the Trump campaign mocked Biden for hiding in his basement. In turn, Bidenites twitted Trump for his inability to handle stairs. Time passed. By 2023, Trump was approaching 80, but Biden had shuffled past it. In public, he froze. The memes flowed but Biden’s woes were not comedic.

According to Parnes and Allen, Harris aides “strategized around the possibility that Biden might die in office”. Jamal Simmons, Harris’s communications director, drew up a “death-pool roster” of federal judges who might swear his boss in.

After the debate, Obama and Pelosi were distraught. The debacle left Obama shocked, if not exactly surprised.

“The 44th president never had much faith in [the] political ability” of his former vice-president, Parnes and Allen write. “Less than two weeks earlier, at [a] Los Angeles fundraiser, Obama led Biden offstage by the wrist after the president stood frozen for a few moments while staring into the crowd.”

Obama was disturbed. Parnes and Allen describe a post-debate call.

“What is your path?” Obama asked Biden.

“What’s my path? Biden thought as he listened to Obama. What’s your fucking plan?”

He intuited Obama’s endgame. But Obama also lacked faith in Harris.

“Obama already had determined that he didn’t think Harris should take the president’s spot on the ballot,” Parnes and Allen write. “‘That was his position from the outset,’ according to one person who spoke to him at the time.”

Pelosi, like Harris from northern California, unlike her a hardened politico with ruthless instincts, thought the same way.

“She actually was worried when people were panicking the night of the debate, saying ‘Oh my God, it’s going to be her,’” Parnes and Allen quote “someone who spoke to Pelosi”.

Obama and Pelosi applied pressure. Biden caved. Harris generated buzz, but not enough. She bested Trump in debate, but memory of that triumph faded swiftly. Harris would not and could not put distance between herself and Biden. The president, his family and his handlers wanted it that way.

Biden and Harris’s shortcomings had been clear for years. In June 2019, on the debate stage, Harris trashed Biden over his record on race. Less than six months later, having burned through millions of dollars, she dropped out of the Democratic primary. Her place on Biden’s ticket resulted from the threat posed by Trump, the protest-filled aftermath of the police murder of George Floyd, and the leftward drift and outsized role of identity politics within Democratic ranks.

His opponents brought to a historic low, Trump openly weighs running for a third term, in defiance of the constitution. Whether the Democrats can respond is in grave doubt indeed.

• Fight is published in the US by HarperCollins

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2025/apr/06/fight-book-review-biden-harris-us-election-2024

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YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

No committee chairmanships, ongoing threats, inadequate facilities: The legal case against the AfD has collapsed but the cartel parties continue their dirty tricks undeterred
Nobody can say why the evil fascist Nazi Hitler party is so evil or fascist or Nazi or Hitler, but they and their 10 million voters will continue to be treated like shit anyway...

Last week, a supersecret assessment of Alternative für Deutschland by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) leaked to the press. This document was supposed to prove, in excruciating detail, why the AfD is so evil and so fascist and so Nazi and so Hitler, and in this way make a preliminary case for banning the party. In fact its contents turned out to be such an arrant joke that it sapped all remaining momentum within the German political class to prohibit the AfD. I suspect even the “Right-wing extremist” classification of the AfD is now in jeopardy and may well be thrown out by the courts, that is how bad this much-heralded supersecret assessment turned out to be.

It took a few days for the full impact of the report’s idiocy to really sink in. That’s how it is with really stupid things – the incredulity they inspire must first dissipate. Finally, though, on Tuesday of this week, Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt announced that the dubious evidence marshalled by the BfV was “not sufficient” to support ban proceedings. Dobrindt also said that the whole debate had become “counterproductive” and that it was time to begin finding ways to “end social polarisation”, whatever that means. Hours later, it emerged that Chancellor Friedrich Merz had ordered the entire CDU leadership never to say another word about banning the AfD. If everyone will just shut up, Merz believes his party can “avoid further debate” and avoid “giving voters the impression that the CDU is aiming to eliminate a rival party” – which is of course exactly what the CDU was hoping to do until the BfV fucked everything up with its retarded 1,108-page collection of dyspeptic Facebook-grade political takes.

There are still a few scattered calls for ban proceedings coming from the Left, but their heart isn’t in it and they don’t matter anyway. Without Union votes, no ban application will ever get to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Raed Saleh, an extremely obnoxious politician who heads the SPD faction in the Berlin House of Representatives, whined to the press this morning about how “appalling and disgraceful” it is that outlawing the opposition is no longer on the table and that his party is now being asked to “engage in political debate” with the AfD instead. Federal Justice Minister Stefanie Hubig, also of the SPD, likewise fervently hopes that the AfD might still be banned and she thinks the Interior Ministry should spend more time “evaluating” that BfV dumpster-fire assessment. Since Hubig is Justice Minister and not Interior Minister it doesn’t really matter what she thinks the Interior Ministry should be doing. I don’t understand why so many are citing Hubig’s remarks like they mean anything.

The implosion of this ban-the-AfD arc seems like kind of a big deal to me. Since 2021, the party has been ‘under suspicion’ of Right-wing extremism, but despite four years of snooping the BfV has been able to come up with nothing that is not some combination of legally irrelevant, harmless, banal, uninteresting, stupid and a complete waste of government resources. At some point, you have to put the question: if the AfD is so evil and so Nazi and so fascist and so Hitler, why can’t anybody, anywhere, adduce any evidence of its evil Nazi Hitler fascism?

The Federal Republic is not a serious country, so nobody has any interest in questions like this. Instead the exclusions, defamations and petty parliamentary attacks on the AfD continue apace, deprived of any real justification:

• The Greens in Saarland, dismayed at the dimming prospects of an AfD ban, have proposed that we should be working instead to strip key AfD politicians of their democratic rights, including their right to vote, their right to stand for election and their ability to hold public office. According to Volker Morbe, state Chairman of the Saarland Greens, this is necessary because of the dogshit BfV assessment that I very much doubt he has even read, and also because “the AfD is not a protest party, but an organised threat to our free democratic order”. Politics is a massively frustrating social and cultural process whereby a lot of people just keep saying the same refuted things over and over, sometimes for whole decades, and never ever stop or explain themselves or address any counterarguments ever.
• As has become customary, the cartel parties voted to deny the AfD a vice-presidential post in the new Bundestag. The vice presidents oversee parliamentary debate and issue calls to order. As long as the AfD has no representatives in this position, the vice presidents of the cartel parties can misuse their office to sanction the AfD selectively without fear of reprisal. They do this primarily by issuing AfD representatives an inordinate number of calls-to-order for the slightest trivialities. Pundits then argue on the basis of these disproportionately issued calls-to-order that the AfD has no respect for parliamentary debate and is therefore undemocratic. This tiresome game has been going on for years.
• The cartel has also joined forces to deny the AfD all committee chairmanships. These are traditionally awarded to each party in proportion to its strength in the Bundestag. As the second-strongest party, the AfD has a claim to six chairmanships. By keeping the opposition out of committee leadership, the cartel hopes to minimise the ability of the AfD to shape legislation and also to exercise oversight. As the largest opposition party, the AfD would ordinarily receive the chairmanship of the powerful Budget Committee. The idea is that the parliamentary opposition should control this committee in particular to exercise oversight over Government spending. Happily, the SPD, the CDU and the CSU helped exclude the AfD from this post, in one stroke both defending democracy and also clearing the way to spend taxpayer money with just a little bit less supervision. It is always fun to see how incentives align like that.

That is all a prelude to the latest childish pettiness – a kindergarten fight over who gets to play with the colourful wooden blocks.

Each party receives a large room in the Reichstag for internal discussion and debate. There are only a few such rooms, and they are awarded to parties pragmatically, based on their size. Since the government moved from Bonn to Berlin, the SPD has had room 3-S-001, a 462 square-metre hall. In the last election, however, the SPD was absolutely decimated; its remaining 120 representatives hardly justify retaining a room of this size, which ought to go to the AfD as the new second-largest party. The SPD, despite being the third-largest party, has literally refused to leave, insisting that the AfD should get a much smaller room, which offers half the space of room 3-S-001, and this for 25% more representatives.

By all accounts, the arrangement is unworkable, but the SPD refuses to give up its half-empty hall. Its primary argument – and I swear this is real and not just something I have made up – is that it has internally and unofficially named room 3-S-001 the ‘Otto Wels Hall’, and because Otto Wels is an SPD hero who spoke brave words against National Socialism in 1933 it would be inappropriate to give the room to the evil fascist Nazi Hitler party. This is like how I get to name my favourite park bench after Armin Mohler in my mind and then refuse to let anybody to the Left of pre-war Ernst Jünger ever sit there.

The SPD has been able to keep the AfD out of room 3-S-001 because, you guessed it, it has the total collusion of the cartel. The so-called Senior Council is responsible for logistical decisions like this and all the other parties on the Senior Council voted to stick the AfD in the over-small room, despite problems as basic as fire safety.

Intriguingly, the SPD manoeuvring has drawn fairly widespread condemnation. Handelslbatt, no friend of the AfD, complains that the SPD is engaging in an “unspeakable, transparent power game” with its schoolyard dispute, rightly pointing out that the AfD will be significantly hindered in its work by the terrible conditions. The progressive Tagesspiegel, even less a friend to the AfD than Handelsblatt, laments that the move will “fit seamlessly into the AfD’s narrative about the evil cartel parties”. Even Jan Sternberg, writing at the SPD-adjacent RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland, thinks it is a bad idea. Admittedly, he must first clear his throat with a great wad of projection, informing us that “the AfD is not a normal party”, among other things because “it does not view its rivals as competitors, but as enemies”, which is totally not a perfect description of the way other parties view the AfD. Otherwise Sternberg is angry because “the AfD has gratefully seized the opportunity” granted it by the stupidity of the SPD “to play the victim once again”. Our political discourse is like a middle-aged woman with a cluster-B personality disorder: the problem with victimising the AfD is it gives the AfD the chance to be a victim, which is very wrong of the AfD and totally their fault.

The case against the AfD has collapsed, but it is still the evil fascist Nazi Hitler party, and I conclude with three observations about this predictable but deeply stupid state of affairs:

1) The major reason parties do not change parliamentary procedure or ignore tradition to disadvantage the opposition is that they fear the day they are no longer in power and the erstwhile opposition does the same to them. With every passing day, the cartel parties increase the stress on the firewall and also the cost to them of its inevitable collapse, and they do this with absolute heedless abandon. I guess this is because they are really, really stupid. I can’t think of any other reason.

2) The AfD is the strongest party in East Germany, and all of these slights dealt to the AfD in the Bundestag feel a lot like a general and pervasive disrespect towards East German political preferences from the West-dominated establishment. Parties favoured by East German voters don’t get proper parliamentary facilities, they don’t get committee chairmanships and they have to be berated for their alleged democratic defects all the time, because East German allegiances to liberal democracy will always be suspect. It is a terrible look, and I cringe internally every time I hear West German pundits and politicians using AfD-exclusive terms like “the democratic parties” and “the democratic middle”. They should not talk like this.

3) These incredibly tone-deaf tactics merely increase the popularity of the AfD in East Germany. This dynamic has become so obvious that you’d be justified in saying that the AfD and the cartel parties have developed a perversely symbiotic relationship. The AfD depends on the exclusion, the insults and the foul plays to grow, while the evil fascist Nazi Hitler party is the only glue holding the cartel parties together. A lot of potential energy has accumulated in this profoundly stupid system and I have no idea what will happen when it is released, but I know things cannot endure as they are forever.

This article originally appeared on Eugyppius’s Substack newsletter. You can subscribe here.

https://www.eugyppius.com/p/no-committee-chairmanships-ongoing

SEE ALSO: https://www.rt.com/news/618024-germany-afd-ban-threat-democracy/

===========================

Democracy in Decline
19 MAY 2023
By Emeritus Professor Damien Kingsbury

By many measurements, democracy is in a troubling decline, even in many Western states. As the debate about economics becomes increasingly hijacked by nationalist sentiments, it is little surprise that “flawed” democracies and “Hybrid” regimes are becoming more commonplace.

In its approximate century of substantive existence, democracy has been an idea whose time seemed to have come. It has been a mechanism for mediating competing interests, helping form them as political parties playing by “the rules of the game,” while producing a largely equitable system for political organisation.

Yet, democracy is now in decline. There are fewer democracies, fewer people live in democracies, and most established democracies have veered towards more authoritarian responses. The world passed its democratic highwater mark in 2012. This decline may be permanent.

Just 24 countries are “full democracies,” with just eight percent of the world’s population. Including “flawed democracies,” that number increases to 72. Such “flawed democracies” includes the United States, Poland, South Africa, and Botswana. People in 95 countries live under “hybrid” or authoritarian regimes.

Democratic countries have also become less democratic, reflecting increasing levels of autocracy, political populism, the personalisation of political power, restrictions on free speech, and other forms of democratic “backsliding.” This trend began in 2006, with around three-quarters of all democratic countries undergoing degrees of democratic deterioration by 2021.

Such democracies have increasingly adopted authoritarian measures, often with popular support, and include Brazil, India, the US, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Authoritarianism is deepening in non-democratic states and autocratisation has increased overall. The undermining of otherwise reliable election results that started in the US in 2020 has since spread to Brazil, Mexico, Myanmar (where it rationalised a military coup), and Peru, among others.

Following the Cold War, a number of former Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and client states began to democratise, sparking a type of liberal democratic triumphalism. Such hubris, though, has been caught out by the unsentimental march of events. Those events have impacted in three areas, on developing countries, rising developmentalist economies, and on established democracies.

Many developing countries that had begun to democratise in the post-Cold War period succumbed to underlying tensions, including ethnic competition, poor economic performance, and elite rivalries. This has led to the widespread failure of democratic consolidation.

Many middle-income countries have also decided that autocracy is at least as good a fit for producing economic growth as democracy, and not nearly as messy. That China has shown that economic development can occur without democracy has made that model more appealing.

The world’s democratic stalwarts have also tended to gravitate towards nationalist populist figures specialising in fear-mongering. As in the past, economic insecurity, manifested as a sense of betrayal, has been a key driver for this nationalist populist wave.

Such economic insecurity has been most sharply felt by less-educated Westerners whose once secure manufacturing jobs have been sent off-shore and where job security and even full-time work is, for many, a thing of the past. Added to this is a growing gap between rich and poor, and consequent resentment.

The post-war social contract that underpinned democratic consolidation, in which improving living standards were widely shared, has been lost to neo-liberalism’s fundamental economic reordering, accelerated by technological change. Perceptions of competition for scarce good jobs from “others” has consequently been more easily manipulated by unscrupulous politicians.

This manipulation has been reflected in the rise of “nationalism,” not of a civic pride in well-functioning institutions but an insular, exclusivist, and dumbed-down reaction to a changing world. Manipulation of this politics of resentment has resulted in the tearing up of the democratic “rules of the game,” noticeably in the US.

The rise of Europe’s Far Right also reflects the politics of insecurity. France has faced recent elections between the Centre Right – as saviour of democratic rules, supported by what used to be the Left – against the Far Right.

In Italy, Spain, Germany, Holland, the UK, and Russia, populist reaction against decline, insecurity, and nationalist assertion dominates and polarises political debate. The “rules” are, for many, regarded as an expression of older, vested interests. In some countries, such as Turkiye, Thailand, and the Philippines, such “rules” never had a firm grip.

Yet, the “rules of the game” are essential to a voluntary political order. Without agreement on these “rules,” there is conflict within and between groups of peoples. Without consistent “rules,” democracy fails.

Arguing against the “rules of the game” is usually undertaken through the impoverishment of political vocabulary in order to limit complex and critical reasoning. Complex questions are, thus, answered with simplistic or dishonest answers.

Reflecting this political diminution, rather than Left and Right, political divisions are now more evident between technocratic economic management regimes, regardless of party, and nationalist populism. And, as developmentalist autocracy has demonstrated, democracy is not necessary for economic well-being.

The question must now be asked whether a global technocratic future need also be a democratic one. Following that, if democracy does have an intrinsic value, the further question arises as to how, or whether, democracy’s future can be secured.

Damien Kingsbury is Emeritus Professor in the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of The Rise and Decline of Modern Democracy.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/democracy-in-decline/

==============================

10 Reasons Why Democracy Doesn’t Work

by A. J. Simonson

It is an accepted fact that liberal democracy is the worst possible political system—except for all others (thank you, Sir Winston). This list doesn’t aim to advocate tyranny, but to review the flaws and failures of the democratic process.

We are not perfect—and neither are our governments, since they are made by humans too. It is most advisable to be skeptical, even of democracy itself. After all, even Thomas Jefferson was wary of the “tyranny of the masses”.

1 Aprioristic Equality

One of the foundations of democracy is the assumption that all votes are equal. Well, that’s the theory—but in fact it is rarely so (more on that later). It assumes that all opinions are worth the same, which is quite a big leap of faith, since we are putting the same value on the opinions of the educated and the ignorant, and the law-abiding citizens and crooks.

Even if you think that all people are created equal, it is obvious that their environments are very different—and as a result, so is their character. By assuming that all opinions are equal you are also assuming that most people are able to reach a rational, informed decision after seriously exploring all pros and cons.

2 Populism

A common criticism of democracy is that in the end it devolves into a popularity contest. Polls don’t decide who is right—that’s simply decided by whoever is most willing to say what people like to hear. As a result, many candidates to political office resort to populism, pursuing policies that focus on the immediate satisfaction of whims instead of long-term improvements.

Populist leaders focus on emotion before reason and “common sense” over more academic wisdom, which often produces bad ideas that will be defended with the stubbornness of a mule, regardless of whether they are good or bad.

3 Tribal Mentality

Let’s be honest here: mankind has not evolved much since the Stone Age. Yes, we have tamed the forces of nature and discovered a lot of things—and this Internet business is amazing. But human nature remains the same, more or less. We still think in tribal terms, “my people vs. your people”. Call it class struggle, xenophobia, nationalism, or whatever you like—the thing is that most of us identify with one group or another, and almost every meaningful group has alliances or enmities with other groups. This is part of human nature, and can work peacefully . . . or not.

In a democracy, tribal mentality is very dangerous, because it will make you vote “for your team” instead of voting according to issues. That means that whoever leads “your team” can rest assured that they have your vote, and instead of focusing on your interests, they can proceed to deal with their own. Unfair legislation can be passed if there are vocal groups in the majority (by oppressing the minority) or in the minorities (by entitling them to privileges that the majority can’t enjoy).

4 Corruption

This is not a specific flaw of democracy, and in fact it can be argued that democracy tends to be less prone to corruption than other systems, since it leaves open the possibility of ejecting someone from office. But that possibility also favors a very specific kind of corruption: machine politics, a political organization in which the bosses dole out rewards in exchange for the vote.

It can be as simple as paying money to someone in exchange for their vote, or giving someone a job in the office of the politician who commands the machine. A softer form of machine politics (or “clientelism”) involves the earmarking of federal funds for certain districts or states, so that Representatives and Senators vote for the programs those funds are allocated to.

5 Entitlements

Another side-effect of democracy is that if the State starts providing a service or a pay to someone, they begin to feel entitled to it. So if someone tries to stop providing it—well, they just made a large number of deadly foes. When Margaret Thatcher cut coal subsidies, for example, coal miners felt that their jobs had been threatened and became bitter enemies of Thatcher and her ilk. Most people will never vote for the party of someone who “took their jobs”, no matter how long ago this might have happened.

6 Mob Rule

An unrestricted democracy means that the majority decides over the minority. This leaves the minority relatively powerless—and the smaller it is, the less power it wields. Which means that the smallest minority of all—the individual—is effectively depending on his agreement with the majority.

To account for this problem, mature democracies have developed a set of checks and balances in an attempt to make sure that it doesn’t happen; chief among these is the separation of the powers of the State. But this actually makes a system less democratic, since it interferes with the principle of “people’s power.”

7 Complex Accountability

When a dictatorship falls, it is fairly easy to hold someone accountable for any crimes committed by the State. It is certainly easier than in a democracy, since in that case, officials have been elected by the people. If those officials have committed a crime in opposition to their official platform and without the knowledge of the public, it is simply their own fault and the people who voted for them are innocent. But if a candidate advocates curtailing human rights for a minority, and upon finding himself elected to office, carries out his plan . . . are not the voters also responsible in some degree?

8 State Secrets

All states have dirty skeletons in the cupboard. In a dictatorship they are just discreetly hidden, sometimes in plain sight. In a democracy, which tends to rely on moral superiority, this is difficult to carry out.

People have a right to know—at least in theory. Spying and covert operations are part of the daily workings of the state, admittedly sometimes for the greater good (such as when the police infiltrate a criminal organization to put their members on trial). But their efficiency runs against their transparency. A perfectly democratic system would be transparent, and as such, no covert operations could be effectively carried out.

9 Democracy Is Unsustainable

As seen in points three, four, and five, a perfect democracy is unsustainable—but a mostly democratic system can (and does) work. In many democratic countries, your vote only measures up against other votes in your district. So if your district runs a majority system and you vote for a losing runner, then your vote was useless. You can use a proportional system, but that doesn’t solve the problem: the issue still remains that large numbers of people can effectively “waste their vote.”

10 It Can’t Really Work

That pure democracy cannot work is not a personal opinion—it is a mathematical result of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. According to this theorem, so long as there are more than two candidates, there is no possible voting system that can ensure the satisfaction of three crucial criteria for fairness:

– If every voter prefers alternative X over alternative Y, then the group prefers X over Y.

– If every voter’s preference between X and Y remains unchanged, then the group’s preference between X and Y will also remain unchanged.

– There is no “dictator”; no single voter possesses the power to always determine the group’s preference.

If these criteria are left unsatisfied, it effectively means that democracy—at least in its purest form—cannot work.

https://listverse.com/2013/06/16/10-reasons-why-democracy-doesnt-work/

DEMOCRACY HAS TO WORK — AS FLAWED AND SEE-SAWING AS IT IS... WE NEED TO WEED OUT THE JOE BIDEN, THE BILL CLINTON, THE BUSHES AND THE OBAMAS OUT OF IT... OTHERWISE WE END UP WITH EL TRUMPO... SEE ESPECIALLY:

READ FROM TOP.

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

SEE ALSO: