The controversial AUKUS deal has potentially dangerous implications for a global non-proliferation regime already facing an array of challenges. 

BY Dr Trevor Findlay — a principal fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia. After an early career in the Australian Foreign Service, serving in Tokyo, Mexico City and Geneva, he held academic positions at the ANU, Carleton University in Ottawa, and at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.He has served on the United Nations Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and Board of Trustees of UNIDIR and chaired both bodies in 2017. His current research focuses on global nuclear governance, especially nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation, as well as Asia-Pacific regional nuclear governance. He is a leading scholar on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Assuming that Brazil, which is building its own nuclear-powered submarines, does not get there first, the AUKUS deal announced in September foreshadows that Australia will become the first non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear-powered submarine.

Yet despite its impressive non-proliferation credentials and the deal’s promise of gold-standard safeguards, transparency, verification and accountancy measures, Australia risks creating heedless complications for nuclear safeguards and paving the way for the wider proliferation of nuclear-powered submarines.

For decades Australia has been a dedicated supporter of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and more recently of the global nuclear security arrangements designed to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials or weapons by terrorists. It is one of the strongest champions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system which verifies compliance with the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Australia not only has a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) as required by the NPT, but also imposes bilateral safeguards on Australian-origin uranium exports. It was the first country to sign an Additional Protocol to strengthen the safeguards system. It is an active member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other export control arrangements.

In the nuclear security realm, Australia’s track record is also impressive. It is party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment, along with all other nuclear security conventions. It has consistently been rated number one by the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative in its annual Nuclear Security Index and has enthusiastically contributed to continuing efforts to strengthen nuclear security resulting from the four nuclear security summits held between 2010 and 2016.

One might imagine, then, that if any country were to become the first non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, ours would be the safest pair of hands. Indeed, some have argued that Australia could use its submarine acquisition plan to strengthen global nuclear governance. Better Canberra than Brasilia, or at worst, Tehran. Even so, the implications of the AUKUS deal for the nonproliferation regime are complex and potentially dangerous.

Australia’s announcement, especially that it is partnering with two nuclear weapon states on the project, portends a further roiling of the political atmosphere around a regime already buffeted by numerous gales. The worst include the ongoing non-compliance cases of Iran and North Korea; the absence of India, Israel and Pakistan from the NPT; the continuing non-fulfilment of undertakings by the nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to achieve nuclear disarmament; the modernisation and expansion programs of almost all of the states with nuclear weapons; the decades-long lack of progress at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, especially in negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; and the non-entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The AUKUS submarine proposal will add to this litany of woes at the Tenth NPT Review Conference to be held in January next year.

It is not that anyone suspects Australia of seeking nuclear weapons through the backdoor of nuclear submarine propulsion, but rather that the idea reeks of the hypocrisy that has always plagued a regime built on the premise of a more or less eternal divide between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Unlike the IAEA statute, which envisaged no military use of nuclear material, the NPT carved out an exception for “non-explosive military use”, widely understood to be naval propulsion. The United States, which to date consistently refused to provide such technology to non-nuclear weapon states due to proliferation concerns, including to allies like Canada and South Korea, has now made an exception for Australia. Australia itself carved out an exception to its policy of not supplying uranium to non-NPT parties by doing a deal in 2014 with India, a state with nuclear weapons and which from the outset has sought to undermine the treaty. The constant chipping away at the fundamentals of the non-proliferation regime, especially by erstwhile champions, can only increase cynicism and undermine confidence in its longevity.

The precedent set by Australia will pave the way for other states to demand similar capability, either as a legitimate defence asset or as cover for a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Unlike Australia, some of the states that have expressed interest in nuclear-powered submarines, including Brazil and South Korea, also wish to enrich their own fuel. Exhibit A in this list is Iran, which has long argued, implausibly, that it requires enriched uranium for peaceful purposes, notably its Tehran research reactor and Bushehr nuclear power plant (currently supplied by Russia) but has now added nuclear-powered submarines to its list.

Australia would set another precedent by becoming the first state to take advantage of the “loophole” in comprehensive safeguards agreements that permits nuclear material for a non-explosive military purpose to be removed from safeguards for the duration of that use. If Australia chooses the “military to military option”, the reactors and an estimated four tonnes of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for eight submarines would be supplied by the US or British navies and returned to their control when the vessels are decommissioned. The “lifetime cores” of the reactors would operate for around 30 years and require no refuelling – a much prized characteristic of HEU-powered vessels. There would be no requirement for either removal or reapplication of safeguards since the material would originate from and remain in military use the entire time. But allowing a non-nuclear weapon state to import weapons-grade HEU outside of safeguards in this manner – in this case enough for an estimated 160 nuclear weapons – would make a mockery of the entire non-proliferation regime.

Fortunately, Australia’s CSA, like all others, requires that it notify the IAEA of its intention to acquire nuclear material for a non-explosive military purpose and help devise suitable verification arrangements with the agency. The sensitivity of the technology and the inaccessibility of the reactor to inspectors preclude the traditional approach comprising declarations of material, nuclear material accountancy, inspections, seals and remote monitoring. New approaches and methods will have to be devised to satisfy the IAEA that no diversion of nuclear material to weapons purposes takes place, while protecting confidential, proliferation-sensitive information. In working with the IAEA on this challenging task, Australia would, for good or ill, be setting a precedent for other states to exploit. Moral hazard lurks: Australia may succeed in making the world “safe” for the wider proliferation of nuclear-powered submarines to non-nuclear weapon states, some of which will be less scrupulous in complying with their obligations and some of which may be in our region.

Australia has already notified IAEA director-general Rafael Grossi of its intentions. Grossi has responded publicly, to date, only by noting that verification will be “very tricky”. For Australia itself the situation may become even trickier. Under the strengthened safeguards system, the IAEA accords a state the so-called broader conclusion when it is able to certify, based on the information available to it, that all nuclear material within the state has been accounted for. Just how this conclusion could be reached after nuclear-powered submarines have begun operating, especially at sea, is unknown. Australia has been particularly insistent that the IAEA should not automatically reissue the broader conclusion annually for each state without reassessing its current circumstances, as occurred for Libya when civil war prevented the agency from ensuring the continuity of safeguards in its territory.

A final precedent relates to nuclear security. The Australian project would see the acquisition of HEU by a non-nuclear weapon state at a time when the US and others, including Australia, are attempting to minimise global holdings of HEU, including by converting reactors to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) and repatriating HEU to the US or Russia for disposition. While the nuclear material in submarine reactors is relatively secure, albeit non-stationary, the use of HEU for naval propulsion by a country that has hitherto been HEU-free goes against the grain of the impressive efforts in recent years to ensure that nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorists or other non-state actors.

Some observers have suggested that Australia use LEU for its submarines, perhaps in collaboration with France, which uses such fuel. This may assuage French fury at the cancellation of its contract to build Australia’s conventional submarines, whose design, paradoxically, was at Canberra’s insistence to be based on French nuclear-powered submarines. IAEA verification would, however, become more challenging, as LEU-fuelled submarines using existing technology require periodic refuelling. The US is researching the possibility of LEU lifetime cores but estimates that it would take 10-15 years before such technology would be available.

It remains to be seen whether the AUKUS submarine proposal will survive the 18-month study announced in September, as details emerge and the political, diplomatic, military, economic, nonproliferation, security and opportunity costs become clearer. In the meantime, the AUKUS partners need to tell us how they propose delivering the gold-standard safeguards, transparency, verification and accountancy measures they have promised.

Read more:

https://johnmenadue.com/in-too-deep-the-risks-behind-australias-nuclear-submarine-deal/

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The agreement that already saw Canberra ditching its US$90 billion diesel-electric submarine contract with France in favor of new partners – the US and the UK – might now hit the Australian taxpayers’ pockets as well, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) warned in a report published on Tuesday.

Australia is yet to determine the exact submarine designs it wants, and whether it will partner with the US or the UK to build them. Prime Minister Scott Morrison said in September that this would be done “through the rather significant and comprehensive program assessment” over the next 12 to 18 months.

The ASPI admitted that “any cost estimation is an extremely assumption-rich activity” at this stage since most parameters of the deal are not yet agreed upon. However, the think tank still calculated the deal’s total costs under a set of various scenarios.

Should Canberra choose a set of smaller subs and opt to build them “in the most efficient manner possible,” the total costs in constant prices would amount to between AU$70 billion (US$49.86 billion) and AU$78 billion (US$55.55 billion). If inflation is taken into account, this price will rise to between AU$116 billion (US$82.62 billion) and AU$129 billion (US$91.88 billion).

If the Australian government goes with a more expensive ‘continuous build’ approach and prefers larger underwater crafts, the costs might increase to between AU$77 billion (US$55.55 billion) and AU$78 billion (US$61.96 billion) or AU$153 billion (US$108.97 billion) to AU$171 billion (US$121.79 billion) in out-turn prices.

The ASPI believes that the project will be “a massive undertaking and probably the largest and most complex endeavor Australia has embarked upon” while some local media reported that it is about to cut a major slice off Australia’s GDP.

The think tank’s analysts also believe that picking a partner for the project might be even more important than just determining the submarine design. The US is building underwater crafts 10 times faster than the UK. The British submarine program might begin by the end of the decade, while America might not start building the vessels until after 2030, the Australian media reported.

“Who has the capacity to ramp up to help us? If we want one every three years, the UK would have to double their production. The issue is which partner has the capacity to help us get there,”one of the report’s co-authors, Dr. Marcus Hellyer, told the Guardian Australia. He added that a collaborative approach that would let Australia’s industry be part of the project as well could save Canberra much time.

“That could make a huge difference to the schedule. It could aim for the early 2030s instead of the late 2030s or even early 2040s,” Hellyer said. The ASPI warns, though, that Australia’s existing six Collins-class submarines might retire well before the new underwater crafts become fully operational.

“It’s likely to be at least two decades and tens of billions of dollars in sunk costs before Australia has a useful nuclear-powered military capability,” the report said, adding that “we may have already reached the point at which it’s impossible to avoid a serious and potentially enduring decrease in submarine capability.”

Read more:

https://www.rt.com/news/543129-aukus-submarine-deal-price-report/

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