by Olivier CHAMBRIN

Recent statements “whose every word is weighed, measured and assumed" of the French head of state, then of his ministers, evoking a military deployment of ground troops in Ukraine, initiated numerous comments. Without being either a psychiatrist or a political leader, and refraining from any position contrary to the interests of France, it nevertheless seems useful to offer some reflections on the subject, before the clarifications and orientations which will be made before the party leaders and the French Parliament.

A splendid little war1

While supporters of the French regime praised the "strategic ambiguity" that would result from this proposal, some (notably domestic opponents) described the presidential remarks as "an error serving Putin's interests"; the international counterparts of the Head of State making public less clear-cut comments but refuting the hypothesis, and the Kremlin taking note by recalling the consequences of formalized cobelligerence.

On analysis, the making of these remarks seems to be able to be explained by different reasons, possibly combined: We cannot completely rule out psychoanalytic explanations (compensatory narcissism, proven tendency to provocation and the search for "buzz", feeling of personal rivalry against the Russian president), nor a tactical design during the European elections (through a strategy of fear comparable to that followed in relation to COVID in 2020), in a strategic desire to promote Europeanism (by promoting the EU as the only safeguard against the pseudo Russian threat). All these mobiles are compatible, in a probable search for one leadership European with the anointing of Washington.

It seems possible that, far from being an error, this threat was actually carefully calculated and integrated into the overall Western strategy defined across the Atlantic. Indeed, the conflict in Ukraine has essentially served US interests:

• by lastingly dissociating the Eurasian bloc (recreation of an iron curtain, reversing the glacis imposed on popular democracies by the USSR after 1945),
• by undermining the European economy and neutralizing Germany's economic rivalry,
• by imposing US strategic and political hegemony via expanded NATO,
• by relaunching the military-industrial complex Yankee.

The stated objective was to obtain this decoupling to the disadvantage of Moscow, to discredit the international policy hostile tohegemon (which seems less successful), to economically undermine the Russian Federation through financial sanctions and an industrial war of attrition (which also seems questionable as it stands).

The apparent disengagement of the USA does not call into question its leadership, but makes it possible to further exhaust the EU states, which have become suppliers of funds and materials and which seem to be competing to become Washington's preferential vassal.

In this context, maintaining the conflict appears necessary. Currently, Russia has demonstrated the ability to switch to a war economy and wage high-intensity industrial warfare without calling into question its internal development objectives or its international policy. The collective West has shown unsuspected weaknesses in this regard and it needs time to restart the war machine (for the USA) and rebuild effective military instruments (for the EU States). Different options were explored to achieve these results: Infusing the kyiv army with resources, doctrine, command and intelligence; labor, despite losses, unfortunately remains the greatest wealth that Ukraine can offer; it is still sufficient to continue the fighting, even at the cost of territorial withdrawals and the mobilization of active forces including women.

This is the option that the new CEM Oleksander Sirsky seems to be following2, catastrophically favorable to hold without hindsight in Artyemovsk/Bakhmut, unhappy in Lysitchansk, but crowned with success around Kharkov in 2022. His nickname “butcher” rather well evokes his tendency to accept losses and hold positions. However, a defensive strategy consumes fewer resources, is easier to execute by troops of declining quality, is relatively easy to implement by being backed by allies in the West and relying on urban moles (North , East and Center). On the other hand, she is not very “salesy”; it is not very troublesome internally since the kyiv regime has the necessary coercive tools (the elections are even postponed indefinitely) but more towards the allies of whom the populations are growing tired. Direct intervention by the latter would then make sense.

With this in mind, we will note that the French president's comments echo those, over the past month and a half, of British, German, Polish, Danish, Swedish, Finnish officials, the European Commission, the Pentagon and NATO, all of whom spoke over varying periods of time about the need to prepare for a war with Russia. The current denials do not mean much, any more than the various "red lines" which have been successively violated, on the supply of non-lethal equipment, then defense weapons, then long-range artillery, then combat tanks, then combat aircraft. The wording of the treaty signed by kyiv and Paris (and Berlin) appears a significant step towards cobelligerence and the commitment (for ten years) to assist kyiv in its war against Moscow. Shortly after the French declarations, London also mentioned the possible sending of two British units (volume unknown) to Ukraine, and Canada to engage “non-combatant” troops. In this diagram, Emmanuel Macron's remarks can as well be “probings” of opinion, as well as emerging from his preparatory conditioning, or both.

The open secret

In fact, the presence of Westerners in Ukraine is proven; she was known if not recognized. It explains in particular the successful strikes on the surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet. Servants of sophisticated equipment such as anti-aircraft missile complexes, ISR operators, myriads of ground technicians necessary for maintaining the condition and converting technical means to NATO standard, and even operators specialized in infiltration, sabotage and assassination, are identified and sometimes located3. Their status varies, from volunteers (mercenaries for Moscow), to technical assistants, retired or on availability, contractual and for some clandestine operational4.

  

Caricature displayed at bus stops in front of the French embassy in Moscow: “Boy, quickly! The leopards are already burned!” (MACRON OFFERS MORE WEAPONS TO ZELENSKY)

  

This widely publicized “secret”, however, has its interest. He avoids open and direct confrontation. This is confirmed by the exchanges between generals of the Bundeswehr made public, about the German commitment to destroy the Crimean bridge and organize the sending of Taurus missiles. We can wonder if this “leak” is the result of excellent Russian espionage, or if Germany organized it itself, to prevent an escalation and clear customs for example.5. Indeed, if troops are already projected as part of the peripheral strategy, to the North (closure of the NATO lake that has become the Baltic Sea, current NATO maneuvers in Scandinavia and Poland6), on the southern flank (positioning of French mechanized elements in Romania7, aircraft flights in the Black Sea) and on the South-Eastern flank (collaboration with Armenia, which denounces its OTSC agreements with Moscow, politico-economic prospects in Kazakhstan), this remains in the domain of posturing and does not fundamental Russian interests at stake8. On the other hand, a deployment in Ukraine (the “boot on the ground” policy) would very dangerously change this situation.

Until now, NATO's strategy has been to provide increased resources as part of a controlled escalation, without the objectives of the SVO having been modified in return. After a static phase which seemed to favor a so-called "Korean-style" solution by freezing the respective positions, the Kiev offensive was supposed to make it possible to return to the 1994 borders. The failure of this offensive and the rise in power of the Russian forces are leading to a compensatory strategy, by amplifying terrorist actions on the territory of the Federation itself. The supply of missiles increased the nuisance radius, which explains the German reluctance to supply Taurus in addition to the French SCALP/British Storm Shadow. The creation of a new F-16 air fleet will make it possible to have cruise missile vectors completing this bubble of effectiveness, well upstream of the front. This strategy completes the action of destabilization and radicalization of the diasporas and the internal opposition in Russia (with an attempt to capitalize on the death of Navalny by crystallizing the Liberalnyi remaining in Russia) on the sidelines of the presidential elections, to reactivate religious, ethnic and social fissures.

At the same time, recent actions give the impression of a desire to “empty the sky” for the F-16s, by liquidating the reduced fleet of Russian K-50U AWACS (8 in service for 50 aligned by NATO); this would also have the effect of reducing the effectiveness of the VKS, which with the firing capacity of the FAB guided bombs made it possible to crush the Kievan fortification line at Avdievka and the Robotino salient. The actions in the Black Sea obviously aim to neutralize the Russian fleet, which is almost achieved, and to facilitate the destruction of the Kerch bridge, a major symbolic objective. But if we add these observations to the mention of a sending of British ships to Odessa, the prospect of a large-scale plan emerges, aimed at thwarting the advance of Russian forces on the coast and the maritime lung of Kiev. , while weakening Transnistria and consolidating the stopping line on the west bank of the Dnieper (operation failed by the Wehrmacht in 1944). For this, two postulates are currently not met. Firstly, the opening of the straits by Ankara9 and secondly the acceptance of a direct confrontation at sea. Because it is difficult to do more clandestinely. NATO forces already provide training, maintenance, even specialized intervention and direct advice.10. The secondary missions mentioned publicly (training, border surveillance, anti-aircraft defense of the bases cited by the French Prime Minister) are already entrusted to territorial or police personnel from kyiv.

Paris, how many divisions?

Are France, or even the member states of the EU and NATO, able to deploy more than a deterrent curtain testing Russian will?

As it stands, the delivery capacity for arms from stocks, surplus and purchased abroad, seems exhausted; the reconstruction of a military-industrial complex outside the USA, capable of supplying military production, will be both time-consuming and very costly for already damaged economies and states in economic rivalry11. Re-equipping both kyiv's forces and the various national armies will also be very complex. Supposed Western technological superiority does not seem able to compensate for quantitative weakness, especially since qualitative domination has become questionable in the face of Russian developments.

Deployment capabilities outside the USA benefit from efficient Scandinavian armies, capable of defending their territory and interdicting the coasts and the Baltic Sea. The Turkish position retains an ambiguity which makes its deployment on NATO's southern flank uncertain. In the Balkans, Greece distrusts Ankara, Bulgaria has a hostile opinion and a reduced army, Albania is obsolete by standards, Romania too. The ex-Yugoslav states look at each other like stone dogs and mobilize reduced armies. These countries especially offer the provision of important bases. Poland wants to be the new military engine of Europe, but its re-equipment has not been achieved and the financial outlook could compromise it. The country offers an excellent base against Belarus and Russia and has significant troops. The Baltic States have a certain capacity to cause harm but cannot numerically hold a strategic position even to suffocate Kaliningrad. The United Kingdom is having difficulty recovering from its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and its quality Army lacks resources and recruitment capacity; even the iconic Royal Navy is experiencing significant difficulties. Despite its economic power being undermined since 2022, Germany is aligning a Bundeswehr downgraded and combining logistical and recruitment weaknesses. Spain and especially Italy have convincing land forces but do not seem very keen to deploy them. Denmark and the Netherlands can supply cutting-edge resources but do not have critical mass, which is also the case for Belgium and the Czech Republic. Slovakia and Hungary have clear anti-war positions.

Does France therefore have the means to achieve its ambitions?

According to the classification typology, it is considered the second army in Europe (after the Russian army), sometimes the fourth (excluding nuclear). However, we can deplore the fact that the French army defined for 2030 corresponds to the needs of 2015; its projection capacity, although it allows rapid deployment, suffers from limited resources. If the 2024-2030 military programming law attempts to respond to the new imperatives highlighted in Ukraine, the effect of inertia makes a real surge in capabilities unlikely. Designed alongside the nuclear strike force as a sample army (“complete army model”), adapted to the integrated battalion format of NATO, the French army has excelled in asymmetric warfare (without winning, more by limitation political than technical). However, without mass or means of duration, it has quality light infantry units but very small numbers. Launched towards Cyber, Intelligence, discovering the drone on a large scale, it suffers from a deficit in conventional means, tanks, artillery, support means. The choices for new generation vehicles do not seem well adapted to the high intensity or to the Ukrainian terrain and the sophisticated means (battle tanks, ALAT helicopters) show a rather low availability rate. The industrial capacity essential to support the forces is currently lacking. The aviation field has pilots and very efficient aircraft, superior to the Soviet aircraft from kyiv and the F-16, and perhaps even to those of the Russian VKS. But the air force, if it makes it possible to envisage action on the opposing forces and its bases, does not offer control of the terrain and knows the vulnerability of its own bases, if the fiction of non-alignment no longer protects those -this to the West. Detailed data is available as an open source for those who wish, but we can summarize French military capacity as follows:

• 200 renovated Leclerc tanks (this is an objective; the number available is not made public),
• An objective of new vehicles from the Scorpion program (900 VBMR Griffon and 150 EBRC Jaguar, 450 light multi-role armored vehicles VBMR-L) currently being delivered,
• A target of 110 155mm Caesar cannons (certainly precise and stealthy but with wear unsuitable for high-intensity warfare according to Kiev RETEX),
•  80 EC665 Tiger combat helicopters, 130 EC725 Caracal maneuvering helicopters (relatively poor operational availability).
• 217 Rafale and Mirage 2000-D, Mirage 2000 C and -5 combat aircraft, 4 airborne detection and command systems (AWACS), 14 tanker aircraft (MRTT), 50 transport aircraft (CASA CN-235, C-130 Hercules and Airbus A400M Atlas).
• 4 Le Triomphant-class SSBNs, 3 Rubis-class SNAs, 2 Suffren-class SNAs, a Naval Strike Group, 2 Horizon-class air defense frigates and 8 Aquitaine-class multi-mission frigates (NATO equivalent destroyers), 5 La Fayette-class stealthy light frigates (NATO equivalent frigates), 6 Floréal-class surveillance frigates, reinforced by patrol, mine-fighting, logistical and command support and amphibious vessels. A fine navy but torn apart throughout the world and with few military naval bases in mainland France (Brest, Cherbourg and Toulon).

This force is complete but ensures missions related to the considerable French maritime domain and international projections. All of the resources already cut by these missions could obviously not be transferred to Ukraine. By avoiding too uncertain hypotheses, it seems that maritime surface assets would be exposed to a fate comparable to that of the Russian fleet, in the Black Sea but perhaps even in the Mediterranean Sea. The Air and Space Force would likely be capable of partly ensuring air superiority and delivering significant blows as part of ground support or long-range strikes, but would be dependent on bases and faced with redundant air defense bubbles on a scale it has never known. Army troops would likely show the usual courage and professionalism but would completely lack the mass and support capabilities to face a “modern Verdun”12. In summary we can affirm without taking too much risk that the French army deployed to be more than a form of "blue helmets" would be capable of striking hard, but not for long (especially since there is no reserve for operation). Obviously, the deployment modalities, partnerships and logistical support (there is currently less than a week of fire capacity) are unknown factors which would strongly influence the performance of the force engaged.

In a theater which concentrates 33 equivalent Ukrainian divisions and 50 equivalent Russian divisions, this deployment of the French army seems hardly credible, but dangerous.

THE Unconditional surrender

The military strategy is defined by a political will to achieve the defeat of Russia, which has been affirmed and reiterated by the French president, the NATO secretary general and EU officials. It is reminiscent of the position of the Allies (including the USSR) against the Axis powers in 1945. This poses a problem since it seems to exclude any negotiated path13 and above all because this war aim clearly calls into question the fundamental interests of the Russian Federation. Just like French deterrence, Russian doctrine indeed allows the engagement of nuclear force in the latter case. The threshold for Russian engagement (the famous strategic ambiguity) was declared by the Pentagon as “lower” than initially envisaged by NATO14. When the Russian president mentions the fact, it is considered by the French press as a threat, whereas it is more of a warning about response methods. The calculation that the French president seems to be making (and we think that it is part of an overall reflection, probably at the level of Washington) is that the official presence of NATO troops, a fortiori French, will necessarily deter a Russian attack, through the risk of triggering Article 5 of the Charter and/or a French nuclear response.

Mutual assured destruction?

This reasoning seems to have flaws. First, deterrence must be credible. Can we really consider that the destruction of an expeditionary force abroad corresponds to the criteria for defending France's vital interests, justifying a nuclear fire which will in turn generate a larger response? The use of the ultimate ratio nuclear power was linked to that of protecting the national territory. The conventional forces were intended to oppose each other for the time necessary to activate the nuclear force and to obtain the renunciation of an enemy faced with a strategic dilemma of mutual destruction (MAD, mutual assured destruction, doctrine forged in the 70s, which led to peripheral strategies, but also to agreements, all of which were denounced by the USA and then Russia in the 2000s).

The M51 missiles of the four French SSBNs are in fact capable, if not of annihilating, at least of causing major losses to a Russia which concentrates the majority of its inhabitants in a relatively small number of metropolises. But, apart from the ethical aspect (on the part of an EU and a France which refuse to use forceful means to counter a migratory invasion and which continue to put forward their conception of Human Rights and Humanism) of anticity strikes15 theoretically rejected, the response being capable of erasing France from the face of the Earth, is this ultimate recourse justifiable outside of a national sanctuary? This dilemma only concerns France in Europe, since the other only endowed power, the United Kingdom, cannot use its own SSBNs without the approval of Washington. If we can imagine that NATO plans are limited to conventional intervention, strategic ambiguity serves precisely to create doubt in the mind of the adversary. However, in the event of a major threat of this order, it seems that the envisaged Russian response would risk being a preliminary strike.

Would the other NATO member states stand together in the face of this proven risk? Apart from the rabid Russophobes of the Baltic States, Finland and Poland (who have no strategic means) this seems uncertain, whatever the charter of the North Atlantic Organization provides (it would not be the first time that 'a treaty would become a "rag of paper"16. Berlin's position in this regard seems quite revealing. As for that of the suzerain, History is rich enough in duplicity and strategic cynicism to think that after having sacrificed a pawn and obtained a considerable and irreversible reduction in Russian power, it would not be considered appropriate to incur a strike in second by hypersonic missiles or SSBNs retained after the French attack. The Biden administration's statements on sending - or rather refusing to do so - Boys in Ukraine seems to corroborate a well-advised refusal of the nuclear duel17. One can even imagine that the other NATO members would be relieved and would congratulate Washington for its restraint and wisdom in this matter. Let us not conjecture any further and remember that France has dismantled its tactical capacity (Pluto then Hades) which means that the “graduated response” has no longer existed for thirty years, leading Paris to only be able to play an all-out game.

Leaving aside the French case, the analysis is hardly more reassuring. Some Russian observers predict the delivery of tactical nuclear devices to kyiv18 as part of the rise to extremes that accompanies earthly failures. It seems that the subject is a concern of President Putin. The latter must, contrary to what the Western media broadcast, reckon with an opposition which judges him to be “too soft”, too conciliatory and ready to negotiate.19[19]. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, supreme leader of the armed forces, has intermediate means, Russia having retained theater or “tactical” weapons. But in reality there are few rational employment options in Ukraine itself:

• Russia has shown a certain restraint (although contested in the West) in its strikes on cities considered to be Russian towns, reducing only those to rubble. forts from kyiv (Mariupol, Soledar, Artyemovsk/Bakhmut, Avdievka…). An antiquity strategy would create a major risk for the attacker himself.
• kyiv's forces are led to a strategy of loosening up due to the threat of aviation and drones and therefore have few concentrations likely to be treated with nuclear weapons.
• Military production centers have already been destroyed.
• Industrial and energy sites are too isolated in cities.

It therefore appears that the best targets would be the military and logistical bases upstream of the Bug, that is to say the resources concentrated in the NATO countries bordering Ukraine. This extraordinarily dangerous prospect has been avoided until now thanks to the screen of direct non-intervention, to the point that even the flights of drones and NATO aircraft which made it possible to sink Russian ships have not really done anything. subject to retaliatory measures. Likewise, the sea routes from Odessa to export wheat and import war materials were not targeted by the SNA of the Black Sea Fleet.

The second option for using “tactical” nuclear weapons would be to provide a final warning demonstrating that the threat is not a bluff. In this context, the target ultimately does not matter, the desired effect is no longer tactical but strategic.

Breaking this taboo was a decision, probably “thoughtful and weighed”, but which opens Pandora’s box in a truly very worrying way.

source: stratpol

 

https://en.reseauinternational.net/macron-sen-va-t-en-guerre-mironton-mirontaine/

 

 

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