THE AMERICAN EMPIRE HAS BEEN A PLAGUE ON THIS PLANET… THIS EMPIRE REPLACED A GAMUT OF OTHER EMPIRES — THE ENGLISH, THE FRENCH, THE SPANISH, THE PORTUGUESE, THE GERMANS AND OTHER PLUNDERERS OF WEAKER NATIONS. 

SOON AFTER THE BRITISH LED THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, THE AMERICAN EMPIRE BECAME THE BIGGEST POLLUTER ON THE PLANET — WITH MAINLY A DECEITFUL IDEOLOGY, PLASTICS, CHEMICALS, VIRUS GAIN OF FUNCTION AND CO2… 

ON THE FOOTSTEPS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL DESPOTISM, THE AMERICAN EMPIRE WAS THE INSPIRATION FOR FASCISM, USING FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND EXCEPTIONALISM AS SMOKESCREENS FOR ITS VILE RUTHLESSNESS. 

WAIVING MONEY AS BAIT, IT DESTROYED THE SPIRITS OF FAIRNESS AND COVERTLY CONTINUED SLAVERY… INDEPENDENCE IS A DIRTY WORD FOR THE EMPIRE: “YOU’RE WITH US OR AGAINST US”…

WAR FOREVER AND DEBT HAVE BEEN THE MAIN TOOLS OF DESTRUCTION AGAINST THOSE WHO REFUSED TO SUBMIT, WHILE THE EMPIRE CLAIMED VARIOUS (IM)MORAL SUPERIORITIES TAILORED TO JUSTIFY FIGHTS AND ROBBERIES. 

FOR THE LAST FEW YEARS, THE DECEIT OF THE EMPIRE HAS BEEN CHALLENGED BY EMERGING TRUTH-TELLING NARRATIVES, BUT THE EMPIRE FIGHTS BACK WITH MORE LIES AND MORE DANGEROUS BLACKMAIL THAT ONLY THE STRONG AND CLEVER CAN DEFLECT.

WE NEED TO EXPOSE THE EMPIRE UNTIL IT COMES TO REASON… IF IT EVER WILL, OR SELF DESTRUCT..

...

The three main centres of the American Empire operations are Russia, which America has principally hated since 1917 for creating an anti-capitalistic system — communism —, China which also used communism as a way to liberate itself from the Empire and its secondary colonialists, and Israel which was founded as a way to divided the Middle-East, using a mix of communism (kibbutz) and fascism (ruthless expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland).

When the USSR declared the end of itself, America tried to subdue Russia, by various means, overt and covert. in 2000, Putin put an end to this dangerous influence… Meanwhile, the America Empire “helped” China become the working hub for the world, hoping to turn it into a slavey shop, but China had its own plan to become its own master… (not to become the master of the world as the excuse we use to demonise China).

In the last 24 years, Russia has regained its peace seeking spirit (unfortunately having to still fight the Empire invasion nonetheless), China has become the biggest smartest economy in the world, and Israel continues its atrocities against Palestinians.

Through all this, the new axis of countering the Empire is an alliance between Russia, China, Iran and BRICS.... We wish them good luck...

 

Gus Leonisky

Political cartoonist since 1951

…..

 

Gandhi Jayanti: Why non-violent Mahatma Gandhi preferred violence to cowardice    Let no one say when I am gone that I taught the people to be cowards, he said in 1924.

 

"My non-violence does not admit of running away from danger and leaving dear ones unprotected. Between violence and cowardly flight, I can only prefer violence to cowardice," he said in 1924. The he added that "non-violence is the summit of bravery."

Nine years later in 1935, he wrote this: "Non-violence cannot be taught to a person who fears to dice and has no power of resistance."

And this is what Gandhi said in 1939, as the struggle was peaking: "For I cannot in any case tolerate cowardice. Let no one say when I am gone that I taught the people to be cowards... I would far rather that you died bravely dealing a blow and receiving a blow than died in abject terror...fleeing from battle is cowardice and unworthy of a warrior... cowardice is worse than violence because cowards can never be non-violent."

This Gandhi, so different from our textbook perception of a pacifist saint, was brought forth by Norman G. Finkelstein, a professor-activist from America.

In his slim book - 'What Gandhi Says' - written after he saw the stamp of this Gandhian sort of brave nonviolence in the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US.

https://www.indiatoday.in/featured/story/gandhi-jayanti-non-violent-mahatma-gandhi-preferred-violence-over-cowardice-212996-2013-10-01#

 

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How They Study War... 

 ... in Western academe. Recall this both heartbreaking but also a heartwarming picture of dedicated Ghanian teacher Richard Appiah Akoto trying to introduce kids in his village to computers. 

 

This story had a happy end--Richard was invited by Microsoft to Singapore meeting and donations of lap and desktops poured in. This lesson has a lesson in it--here, we have a person of a true dedication trying to make the best of it with no means at all. 

 

Here is the opposite -- bunch of imbeciles from London parade themselves as... imbeciles. 

 

This objective had seemed impossible. Now, though, a string of Ukrainian garrison cities are suddenly in peril as Russian combat units move forward, supported by planes dropping lethal glide bombs. Putin’s generals are using classic Soviet military tactics from the second world war. They are trying to encircle Ukrainian troops on multiple fronts. The capture of Ocheretyne means Moscow has tantalising options. It can push west through Hrodivka to the city of Pokrovsk, a key Ukrainian military base. Or its forces can head north. If Russia manages to capture the city of Chasiv Yar, it can simultaneously advance from the south, chopping off a further large chunk of Ukrainian territory.

 

The Guardian and its "military experts" evidently, unlike Richard who had no means, have everything at their disposal but UK and its lilliputian military literally has NO people who understand modern warfare and do not know a simple issue of force economy mode by Russian forces in SMO, as opposed to Deep Operations in WW II which saw not only demolition of Wehrmacht and Axis armies, and army groups, but also high casualties for the Red Army. Offensive operations are ALWAYS costly in blood and materiel. Two wars cannot be more different strategically, not to mention operationally, especially because NATO (US) ISR works 24/7 for Nazis in Kiev. The military illiteracy of the combined West is stupefying--lazy uncultured hacks who study world outside the same way Richard tried to introduce kids to computers by drawing them on the chalkboard. But if Richard is a hero and an example of humility and humanity, these creeps with all those advanced degrees in nothing should pay more attention to their resources at hand and try to study real war, not BS they teach at Sandhurst...

 

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by Alex Vershin

If the West is serious about the possibility of great-power conflict, it must carefully examine its ability to wage a protracted war and pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than maneuver.

Wars of attrition require their own "art of war" and are fought using a "force-centered" approach, unlike wars of maneuver which are "terrain-centered." They rely on massive industrial capacity to replace losses, on geographic depth to absorb a series of defeats and on technological conditions preventing rapid land movements. In wars of attrition, military operations are determined by a state's ability to replace losses and create new formations, not by tactical and operational maneuvers. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than conquering ground is most likely to prevail.

The West is not prepared for this type of war. For most Western experts, the attrition strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West has always preferred short clashes between professional armies, where the winner takes all. Recent war games, such as CSIS war on Taiwan, covered a month of combat. The possibility of the war continuing was never discussed. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are seen as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs, and usually the product of leadership incompetence. Unfortunately, wars between neighboring powers are likely to be wars of attrition, thanks to the large amount of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield, regardless of which army started with better trained forces. As the conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that realize this and wage such war through a strategy of attrition aimed at depleting the enemy's resources while preserving their own are more likely to prevail. The quickest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on maneuvering, spending valuable resources on short-term territorial goals. Recognizing that wars of attrition have their own art is essential to winning them without suffering disastrous losses.

The economic dimension

Wars of attrition are won by economies that allow massive mobilization of armies thanks to their industrial sectors. Armies grow rapidly during such conflict, requiring massive quantities of armored vehicles, drones, electronics, and other combat equipment. Since high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, having a high-low mix of forces and weapons is imperative to achieve victory.

High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when arming a rapidly mobilized army with a high attrition rate. For example, during World War II, the Panzers German tanks were superb tanks, but using roughly the same production resources, the Soviets produced eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. Training them takes a lot of time, time that is not available in a war where attrition rates are high.

It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of inexpensive weapons and ammunition, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian products, allowing mass production without having to expand production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons more quickly, allowing new formations to be created quickly or existing formations to be rebuilt.

It is difficult for high-end Western economies to reach the masses. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they are shedding excess capacity and struggling to expand quickly, especially as lower-tier industries have been moved abroad for economic reasons. In war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this problem is the lack of qualified labor with experience in a particular sector. These skills are learned over decades, and once an industry is closed, it takes decades to rebuild. The 2018 U.S. Government Interagency Report on US industrial capacity highlighted these problems. Ultimately, the West must seriously address the question of excess peacetime capacity in its military-industrial complex or risk losing the next war.

Force Generation

Industrial production exists to be channeled towards replacing losses and creating new formations. This requires appropriate doctrine and command and control structures. There are two main models: NATO (most Western militaries) and the old Soviet model, with most states falling somewhere in between.

NATO armies are highly professional and rely on a strong NCO corps with extensive peacetime military training and experience. They rely on this professionalism for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics and techniques) in order to emphasize individual initiative, delegating a large margin of maneuver to junior officers and non-commissioned officers. NATO formations enjoy extraordinary agility and flexibility that allow them to exploit the opportunities offered by a dynamic battlefield.

In a war of attrition, this method has a disadvantage. The officers and NCOs required to execute this doctrine require extensive training and, above all, experience. It takes years to train a non-commissioned officer in the United States Army. A squad leader generally has at least three years of service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven. In a war of attrition characterized by heavy casualties, there simply isn't time to replace sub-commissioned officers. lost officers or train them for new units. The idea that civilians can go through three months of training, receive sergeant chevrons, and then be expected to behave the same way as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can generate leaders capable of executing NATO doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive demands of attrition warfare do not provide.

The Soviet Union built its military in preparation for a full-scale conflict with NATO. It had to be able to expand quickly by drawing on massive reserves. All men in the Soviet Union received two years of basic training upon leaving high school. The constant turnover of enlisted personnel prevented the creation of a Western-style NCO corps, but generated a massive reserve of semi-trained reservists available in times of war. The absence of reliable NCOs created an officer-centered command model, less flexible than NATO's, but more adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by attritional warfare.

However, as a war progresses beyond a year, frontline units gain experience and an improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving the Soviet model greater flexibility. In 1943, theRed Army had established a strong non-commissioned officer corps, which then disappeared after the Second World War, with the demobilization of combat formations. One of the main differences between the models is that NATO doctrine cannot function without high-performing NCOs. Soviet doctrine was reinforced by experienced NCOs, but did not need them.

The most effective model is a mixture of the two, in which a state maintains a medium-sized professional army, as well as a mass of conscripts available for mobilization. This leads directly to a high/low mix. The pre-war professional forces form the upper part of this army, becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to sector in battle to stabilize the situation and carry out decisive attacks. Low-end formations hold the line and slowly gain experience, increasing their quality until they gain the ability to conduct offensive operations. Victory is achieved by creating the highest quality low-end formations possible.

Training and combat experience helps transform new units into combat-ready soldiers rather than bands of civilians. A new formation must train for at least least six months, and only if it is made up of reservists who have already received individual training. Conscripts need more time. These units should also include professional soldiers and non-commissioned officers from the pre-war army, in order to strengthen their professionalism. Once initial training is completed, they should only be engaged in battle in secondary sectors. No training should be authorized to fall below 70% of its numbers. Removing rosters early allows experience to proliferate among new replacements as veterans pass on their skills. Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, forcing the process to start again. Another implication is that resources should prioritize replacements over new formations, thereby preserving the combat advantage in both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised formations (low ). It is advisable to disband several pre-war (high-end) formations to distribute professional soldiers among the newly created low-end formations, in order to improve the initial quality.

The military dimension

Military operations in a conflict of attrition are very different from those in a war of maneuver. Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid maneuver, attrition warfare focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one's own. In this context, a successful strategy accepts that the war lasts at least two years and is divided into two distinct phases. The first phase goes from the outbreak of hostilities to the moment when sufficient combat power has been mobilized to enable decisive action. Changes in field position will be limited, with emphasis placed on favorable exchange of casualties and building up combat power in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fire rather than maneuver, supplemented by extensive fortifications and camouflage. The peacetime army begins the war and conducts holding actions, allowing time to mobilize resources and train the new army.

The second phase can begin when one of the parties has fulfilled the following conditions.

• The newly mobilized forces have completed their training and acquired sufficient experience to become combat-effective formations, capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in a coherent manner.
• The enemy's strategic reserve is exhausted, which prevents him from reinforcing the threatened sector.
• Superiority in fires and reconnaissance is achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively concentrate their fire on a key sector while preventing the enemy from doing the same.
• The enemy's industrial sector is degraded to the point where it can no longer replace the losses suffered on the battlefield. In the case of a coalition of countries, the industrial resources of the latter must also be exhausted or at least taken into account.

Only after meeting these criteria should offensive operations begin. They must be launched on a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points with superficial attacks. The objective is to remain inside a stratified bubble of friendly protection systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. Only then should the offensive expand towards objectives deeper in the enemy's rear. Concentration of forces on a main effort should be avoided, as it gives an indication of the location of the offensive and allows the enemy to concentrate its reserves against that key point. L'Brusilov offensive of 1916, which led to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, is a good example of a successful attrition offensive at the tactical and operational levels. By attacking on a broad front, the Russian army prevented the Austro-Hungarians from concentrating their reserves, leading to collapse along the entire front. At the strategic level, however, the Brusilov offensive is an example of failure. Russian forces failed to impose their terms on the entire enemy coalition, focusing only on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting German capabilities. The Russians spent crucial resources they could not replace, without defeating the most powerful member of the coalition. To emphasize this essential point again, an offensive can only succeed if key criteria are met. Attempting to launch an offensive early will result in losses without any strategic gains, thus working directly in the enemy's favor.

Modern warfare

The modern battlefield is an integrated system of systems that includes various types of electronic warfare (EW), three fundamental types of air defenses, four different types of artillery, countless types of aircraft, attack drones and reconnaissance, construction engineers and sappers, traditional infantry and armor formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has become more dangerous with increased ranges and advanced targeting, which extends the depth of the battlefield.

In practice, this means that it is easier to massage fires than forces. Maneuver in depth, which requires the massing of combat power, is no longer possible because any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before success in depth can be achieved. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight protective bubble to ward off enemy strike systems. This bubble is generated by the superposition of friendly counterfires, air defense and electronic warfare means. Moving many interdependent systems is extremely complicated and unlikely to be successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line of troops are most likely to succeed at an acceptable cost; deep penetration attempts will be exposed to group shots as soon as they leave the protection of the defensive bubble.

Integrating these overlapping assets requires centralized planning and exceptionally well-trained staff officers who can integrate multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to train such officers, and even combat experience does not allow such skills to be acquired in a short time. Mandatory checklists and procedures can address these shortcomings, but only on a less complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive operations require rapid reaction times, of which semi-trained officers are incapable.

An example of this complexity is the attack of a platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require electronic warfare systems to jam enemy drones, another electronic warfare system to jam enemy communications and prevent enemy fire from being adjusted, and a third electronic warfare system to jam space navigation systems and prevent the use of precision guided munitions. Additionally, fires require counter-battery radars to defeat enemy artillery. Planning is made even more complicated because enemy electronic warfare systems will locate and destroy any friendly radar or electronic warfare transmitter that transmits too long. Engineers will need to clear paths through minefields, while friendly drones will provide time-sensitive ISR and fire support if necessary. (This task requires extensive training of support units to avoid dropping munitions on friendly attack troops). Finally, artillery must provide support both to the objective and to the enemy's rear, targeting reserves and suppressing artillery. All of these systems must function as an integrated team, even if only to support 30 men in multiple vehicles attacking another group of 30 men or less. A lack of coordination between these assets will result in failed attacks and horrendous losses without ever seeing the enemy. The increase in the size of formations carrying out operations is accompanied by an increase in the number and complexity of the means to be integrated.

Implications for combat operations

Deep firing – more than 100-150 km (the average range of tactical rockets) behind the front line – targets the enemy's ability to generate combat power. These include production facilities, munitions depots, repair depots, and energy and transportation infrastructure. Targets that require significant production capabilities and are difficult to replace/repair are of particular importance, as their destruction will inflict long-term damage. As with all aspects of the war of attrition, it will take a long time for such strikes to have an effect, with delays of up to several years. Low global production volumes of long-range precision-guided munitions, effective deception and concealment actions, large stocks of anti-aircraft missiles and the repair capabilities of strong and determined states are all elements that contribute to prolonging the Conflicts. To be effective, air defense layering must include high-end systems at all altitudes, coupled with less expensive systems to counter the enemy's massive, low-end attack platforms. Combined with large-scale manufacturing and effective electronic warfare, this is the only way to defeat the enemy's deep fire.

A successful war of attrition focuses on preserving one's own combat power. This generally results in a relatively static front, broken up by limited local attacks aimed at improving positions, and the use of artillery for most fighting. Fortification and concealment of all forces, including logistics, is essential to minimize casualties. The time required to construct the fortifications prevents any significant movement of land. An attacking force that cannot quickly entrench itself will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery fire.

Defensive operations buy time to develop low-level combat formations, allowing newly mobilized troops to gain combat experience without suffering heavy losses during large-scale attacks. Building experienced, lower-level combat formations generates the capacity to conduct future offensive operations.

The early stages of the war of attrition range from the outbreak of hostilities to the time when mobilized resources are available in large numbers and are ready for combat operations. In the event of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by one side may be possible until the defender can form a solid front. Then the fight consolidates. This period lasts at least one and a half to two years. During this period, major offensive operations should be avoided. Even if large attacks are successful, they will result in considerable losses, often for insignificant territorial gains. An army should never accept a battle under unfavorable conditions. In a war of attrition, any terrain without a vital industrial center is irrelevant. It is always best to retreat and preserve your forces, regardless of the political consequences. Fighting in disadvantageous terrain burns through units, losing experienced soldiers who are the key to victory. The German obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime example of fighting on unfavorable terrain for political reasons. Germany burned vital units it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a city named after Stalin. It also makes sense to push the enemy to fight in unfavorable terrain through information operations, exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives. The objective is to force the enemy to expend vital material and strategic reserves on operations of no strategic interest. One of the main pitfalls to avoid is letting yourself be drawn into the same trap that was set for the enemy. This is what the Germans did during the First World War. Verdun, where they planned to use the element of surprise to seize key and politically sensitive terrain, thus provoking costly French counterattacks. Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their own trap. They failed to capture key, defensible terrain early on, and the battle devolved into a series of costly infantry assaults from both sides, with devastating artillery fire the attacking infantry.

When the second phase begins, the offensive should be launched on a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points through superficial attacks. The objective is to remain inside the stratified bubble of friendly protection systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in which a crisis in one sector forces defenders to move reserves from a second sector, which generates a crisis in that sector in turn. When forces begin to retreat and leave the prepared fortifications, troop morale plummets and the question arises: "If we can't hold the mega-fortress, how will we hold these new trenches?" The retreat then turns into a rout. Only then should the offensive expand towards objectives located further in the enemy's rear. LAllied offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked on a broad front, while the Germans did not have sufficient resources to defend the entire line. Once the German army began to retreat, it proved impossible to stop it.

The defense-focused strategy of attrition is counterintuitive to most Western military officers. Western military thinking considers the offensive as the only way to achieve the decisive strategic goal of forcing the enemy to the negotiating table under unfavorable conditions. The strategic patience required to establish the conditions for an offensive runs counter to their combat experience gained in counter-insurgency operations abroad.

Conclusion

The conduct of wars of attrition is very different from that of wars of maneuver. They last longer and eventually test a country's industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, the development of an industrial base and mobilization infrastructure in peacetime, and even more careful management of resources in war.

Victory is possible if one carefully analyzes one's own political objectives and those of the enemy. The key is to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of competing business models and identify the economic strategies most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be used to build a massive army using the high/low mix of forces and weapons. The military conduct of war is determined by overall political strategic objectives, military realities, and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy assets, not conquering terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.

Unfortunately, many Westerners have a very cavalier attitude, believing that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the reasons stated above. Even middle world powers have both the geography, population, and industrial resources to wage a war of attrition. The idea that a great power would back down in the event of initial military defeat is, at best, wishful thinking. Any conflict between great powers would be considered by opposing elites as existential and pursued with all the resources available to the state. The resulting war will become a war of attrition and will favor the state whose economy, doctrine and military structure are better suited to this form of conflict.

If the West is serious about potential conflict between great powers, it must carefully examine its industrial capacity, its mobilization doctrine, and its means of waging a long-term war, rather than waging wargames covering a single month of conflict and hope that the war will then stop. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.

source: RUSSIA

https://en.reseauinternational.net/lart-de-la-guerre-dattrition-les-lecons-de-la-guerre-russe-contre-lukraine/

 

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Ending the Logic of War

 

Why Western societies need to find new responses to violence and crises.

 

By Fabian Scheidler / Substack

Over more than two decades, the Western world has moved further and further into a permanent state of crisis and emergency, which, according to the rhetoric of some of our leading politicians, has now escalated into an outright state of war. It began with the “war on terror” after September 11 and the subsequent attacks in Europe, followed by the responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and finally the Gaza war, which especially the US and Germany are supporting with massive arms supplies. A state of war was also declared by many Western heads of state in response to the pandemic, with Emmanuel Macron famously proclaiming: “We are at war. And that requires our general mobilization.”

In the name of fighting the respective enemies, a massive rearmament of the military, police and surveillance technologies was set in motion, basic civil rights were restricted. Urgent concerns such as social justice and climate protection have been and continue to be marginalized with reference to ever new states of emergency and the overpowering threat posed by the current enemy. In Germany, we are hearing increasingly militaristic tones from top politicians that are reminiscent of the late days of the German Empire, with the Minister of Defense, Boris Pistorius, calling on the country to become “ready for war”.

While the capitalist world-system is in a permanent structural crisis and the legitimacy of Western political elites is dwindling, governments tend to resort to states of war and emergency, as this allows them to silence domestic conflicts and to justify massive crackdowns on dissidents. In the logic of war, the view is narrowed to the external enemy, societies are called upon to close ranks. Anyone who disagrees runs the risk of being declared an ally of the enemy.

It is obvious that these developments are extremely dangerous for a democracy. In view of the global challenges that are likely to increase in the coming decades due to geopolitical shifts, growing environmental crises and scarcity of resources, it is high time question the logic of war and to highlight different responses to current and future crises.

First of all, when we look back, it should be noted that neither the US nor any EU country has been attacked militarily since the Second World War (apart from the conflict over the British colony of the Falkland Islands in 1982). The attack on September 11, 2001 was a serious crime, but – as the term terrorist attack implies – by definition not a military attack. Since then, despite all internal conflicts, peace has prevailed in these countries. The situation, however, is different when we look the other way around: The US alone has been involved in around 200 military interventions around the globe since 1950. In addition, it has engaged in more than 70 covert regime change operations – often against democratically elected governments – plunging the affected nations into decades of chaos or authoritarian rule. The UK, France, Germany and other Western countries were also involved in numerous military operations abroad, most of which were sold to the public as noble missions in defense of human rights. But the real balance sheet looks different.

The war in Afghanistan alone, the centerpiece of the “war on terror”, has cost 176,000 lives, 98 percent of them Afghans. The September 11 attacks, to which this war was the response, claimed 2996 lives – one sixtieth of the victims of the subsequent war. While 80 percent of Afghans lived in poverty before the war, 97 percent did so after the withdrawal of the USA and its allies. Terrorism has exploded worldwide as a result of these “wars on terror”. Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya: wherever Western missions have been active, they have left behind failed states and a trail of devastation.

As a result of these interventions, terror finally arrived in Europe. Western societies did not respond to the attacks in Madrid, London, Paris and elsewhere with self-reflection and a change in their policy towards Arab states, but with more military operations abroad, while boosting mass surveillance, militarization of the police, and restrictions on civil liberties domestically. This is despite the fact that even in the years of the most bloody attacks in Europe, more than 100 times as many people died from multi-resistant hospital germs as from terror. If the money had been invested in the healthcare system, ruined by decades of austerity, instead of the military, tens of thousands of lives could have been saved instead of sparking new wars.

We encounter here two essential characteristics of Western responses to crises and violence: firstly, the extreme disproportionality between event and reaction. The threat posed by the enemy is magnified out of all proportion, the responses are completely out of scale in relation to the original act and can even cause orders of magnitude more damage and casualties. Secondly, the inability to grasp the cycle of cause and effect. Acts of violence such as terrorist attacks are interpreted as manifestations of a primordial evil without a history; the world disintegrates into a Manichean duality of good and evil that no longer allows for any complexity or shades. There is no analysis of the causes and prehistory, especially not when it comes to one’s own mistakes or even complicity. On the contrary: anyone who addresses the genesis of the violence and the role of their own governments in it is accused of relativizing and trivializing the enemy.

After the Hamas attacks on Israel, which claimed the lives of 1140 people, one might have expected that lessons would have been learned from the disastrous outcome of the war on terror. But instead, Western governments supported the Israeli government in repeating the mistakes of that time. Once again we are witnessing an almost obscene disproportionality in the military response, which has now claimed the lives of 34,000 people, 14,000 of them children. This is 30 times as many deaths as on October 7. The causes of the violence are not only being ignored, but are even being exacerbated by the permanent traumatization and humiliation of the enemy. An analysis of the roots of the escalation, such as Israel’s 16-year blockade of the Gaza Strip in violation of international law, is denounced as a legitimization of Hamas’ deeds and a betrayal of Israel. Hence, the Israeli government and the Western states supporting it have embarked on a maelstrom of blind destruction without any realistic political goal.

The inability or reluctance to understand the connection between cause and effect, the excessiveness of reactions, the pompous and narcissistic self-adulation as representatives of the good, the denunciation and suppression of criticism, the lack of empathy towards the victims and the inability to comprehend even a minimum of complexity are signs of an alarming mental regression among the political elites of the Western world. Indeed, this regression is disturbingly reminiscent of the “sleepwalkers” on the eve of the First World War.

And that brings us to the war in Ukraine, which, like the Gaza war, carries the risk of global escalation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 was undoubtedly a serious violation of international law and a crime against the Ukrainian people. And yet these findings do not exempt us from analyzing the causes and the question of whether and how this war could have been avoided, what role the West played in it – and how it can be ended. It should be a matter of course in political analysis that investigating causes has nothing to do with legitimizing crimes, that there can be more than one culprit in a conflict and that the misdeeds of the one in no way justify those of the other.

But even these minimal requirements for rational thinking seem to go beyond the grasp of Western foreign policymakers and media pundits. Instead of seeing the war in Ukraine as an expression of geopolitical and regional conflicts of interest that have a history and could possibly even be resolved diplomatically, it is portrayed as a Manichean struggle between the ever virtuous, God-sent West against the diabolical dragon from the East, which is driven by an insatiable greed for power, blood and land. A typical indication of this relapse into mythical thinking and propagandistic demonization is the inflation of comparisons between Putin and Hitler, which both the press and top politicians on both sides of the Atlantic routinely indulge in. This tendency culminates in the fully-fledged regressive fantasy that the satanic beast in Moscow wants to devour us all – in other words, the whole of Europe and eventually the rest of the world. In Germany, defense minister Pistorius has already prophesied that the time for a Russian attack on NATO will come in “five to eight years”. Apparently he either disposes of a crystal ball or he sees, like John of Patmos, the approach of the apocalypse in nightly visions. Yet there is not the slightest indication that the Russian leadership would ever be so suicidal as to attack a NATO country and thus send itself to nuclear nirvana.

No, we are not dealing here with an incarnation of primeval evil, not with Voldemort or Sauron, nor with a new Hitler, but with a thoroughly rational, albeit often unscrupulous, actor who in this respect is hardly any different from the major Western powers – just think of the Iraq war. The Russian leadership is pursuing very clearly defined and regionally limited goals with this war. This includes, in particular, the neutrality of Ukraine. According to a recently leaked document on the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, this was also at the heart of a possible ceasefire agreement in spring 2022 – with Ukraine’s express consent. At the time, Russia had held out the prospect of withdrawing to the lines of February 23, 2022 in return.

Today, this option is practically off the table and Ukraine is in a much worse negotiating position. The suppression of sober analysis by mythical thinking has prevented the West from engaging in de-escalation and peacemaking. Instead of participating in the numerous negotiating missions of the Turkish government, of Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet and later of the South African, Brazilian and Chinese governments, Western politicians, led by the US, have rejected or even sabotaged all diplomacy and opted for the pipe dream of a complete reconquest of the occupied territories, which even according to the Pentagon and the long-time commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has long been completely unrealistic. Once again, the West is lurching towards a permanent escalation with pompous rhetoric, but without a political goal, while a new Verdun is looming in Ukraine. The only answer our political leadership has given to the geopolitical changes associated with the rise of China and the decline of the US hegemony is: more weapons. Almost all other pressing tasks, from social justice to a serious protection of the biosphere, are sacrificed on the altar of rearmament, which supposedly has no alternative. Cults of sacrifice are always part of the logic of war.

But the logic of war is not destiny. The answer to the acts of violence of the recent past lies in our hands. Neither the Russian invasion of Ukraine nor the Hamas attack are forcing us into a spiral of militarization, armament and war. On the contrary, this spiral only makes our lives and the survival of our species on the battered planet Earth even more precarious. We can only achieve security by tackling the causes of violence and creating a new peace order that takes equal account of the security interests of all parties involved: Israelis and Palestinians, Ukrainians and Russians, Americans and Chinese. To achieve this, we must learn to see the world through the eyes of others. The West is not God’s chosen force for good in the world; on the contrary, it has left a 500-year trail of violence on Earth. Its dominance will inevitably come to an end in the 21st century. May we find the wisdom to accept this transition and perhaps even see it as an opportunity for a more peaceful world.

https://scheerpost.com/2024/05/06/ending-the-logic-of-war/

 

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MAKE A DEAL PRONTO BEFORE THE SHIT HITS THE FAN:

 

 

NO NATO IN "UKRAINE" (WHAT'S LEFT OF IT)

THE DONBASS REPUBLICS ARE NOW BACK IN THE RUSSIAN FOLD — AS THEY USED TO BE PRIOR 1922. THE RUSSIANS WON'T ABANDON THESE AGAIN.

THESE WILL ALSO INCLUDE ODESSA, KHERSON AND KHARKIV.....

CRIMEA IS RUSSIAN — AS IT USED TO BE PRIOR 1954

TRANSNISTRIA WILL BE PART OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

A MEMORANDUM OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE USA.

 

EASY.

 

THE WEST KNOWS IT.

  

FREE JULIAN ASSANGE NOW....