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killing europe to save the kiev nazis.... gusnote: the kiev nazis are losing.....President of Poland Andrzej Duda said that gas flows from Russia to Western Europe should never be restored, even if Russia and Ukraine reach a peace agreement. Source: Duda in an interview with BBC; European Pravda reports Details: Duda said that the Nord Stream gas pipelines, which have not been in use since 2022, "should be dismantled". He said this would mean that countries such as Germany "would not be tempted" to resume Russian supplies to support their struggling economies. Quote: "I can only hope that European leaders will learn lessons from Russia's aggression against Ukraine and that they will push through a decision to never restore the pumping of gas through this pipeline." Details: Gas prices in Europe have risen sharply since the closure, and in recent months politicians from the far-right German AfD party have proposed reopening the Nord Stream pipeline. This is why Duda believes that the Nord Stream pipeline "should be dismantled". Quote: "This pipeline causes a very big threat to Ukraine, to Poland, to Slovakia but also to other Central European countries. It is a threat from the point of view of energy, from the point of view of the military but also it is a huge economic threat because it means a domination of Russia over Europe in the economic sense." ・The Russian gas pipeline Nord Stream 2, in which Russia has invested billions of euros* (1), has not been put into operation since its completion – first because of legal problems**(2), and then because of the outbreak of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. ・In September 2022, one of the branches of NS2 and both branches of Nord Stream 1 were damaged by explosions, and the investigation is still ongoing***(3). ・In 2024, Nord Stream 2 AG lost a lawsuit in the EU Court of Justice over a directive that extends the rules of the internal natural gas market to gas pipelines from third countries.
-------------------- * (1) WHO INVESTED IN NORDSTREAM 2? For Nord Stream 2, the loan from Uniper, Wintershall Dea, OMV, Engie, and Royal Dutch Shell covers 50 percent of the projected costs of €9.5 billion. The rest is being financed by Gazprom. RUSSIA LOST ONLY €4.9 BILLION.
** (2) On 18 March, the US Department of State published the first official statement from the US Secretary of State regarding Nord Stream 2. Antony Blinken confirmed the previous US position that NS2 was a Russian geopolitical project aimed at dividing Europe and undermining its energy security, and assessed that it was a bad deal for Germany, Ukraine and the US allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe. He also stated that the Biden administration would implement the sanctions regulations currently in force and supported by the bipartisan Congressional majority. He also reminded the entities involved in the project about the risks of sanctions associated with them and the need to immediately halt work. According to a publication by Bloomberg (also on 18 March), the US administration is considering imposing further sanctions which could potentially affect Nord Stream 2 AG (which is project company responsible for the construction and subsequent operation of the pipeline), the insurer of the pipe-laying ships and other companies providing support vessels and materials. Blinken’s statement suggests that the US administration is ready to apply tougher measures regarding NS2 and may indicate that the pressure from Congress has been effective. It also met with an immediate reaction. In response to the statement, Senator Ted Cruz allowed the US Senate to confirm two of the blocked nominees, which happened the same day. At the same time, he announced that he would maintain the blockade of subsequent nominations to the Department of State until sanctions against NS2 were fully implemented. It is difficult to predict at present when and to what extent the administration will decide to impose them. Applying the stricter provisions envisaged in PEESCA in full – unless this happens too late – could make it genuinely difficult to complete construction. Another report identifying entities involved in the pipe-laying activities as subject to PEESCA restrictions is due to be presented by the Department of State to the US Congress by 17 May this year.
The ways to regulate the problem under consideration and the possible consequences According to reports from the German media (mainly Handelsblatt), the measures currently under consideration include: a moratorium on the construction or launch of the gas pipeline, the introduction of a ‘snapback’ mechanism to block gas supplies by NS2 (in the event that Gazprom cuts off transit via Ukraine) and investment support for the reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector (primarily switching it to hydrogen production). It was also suggested that the agreement concerning continuing the transport of Russian gas through Ukraine might be renegotiated. A moratorium on the pipeline construction or launchThe appeal to temporarily suspend construction of NS2 appeared in the German debate following the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. The possible period of the work stoppage would depend on Russia meeting certain conditions. However, a wide circle of NS2 supporters invariably perceives any further delays in the implementation of the project as disadvantageous. The arguments against the moratorium option include the risk of claims for damages. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Germany will unilaterally suspend construction work due to exceptional circumstances. It should be noted that a short delay in operation within the German Exclusive Economic Zone could actually take place if the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency maintained the original version of the work schedule; this would be in line with the demands of environmental organisations. A formal suspension of pipe-laying would probably not mean a ban on necessary technical work. Court proceedings regarding the permit granted by the Stralsund Mining Authority could also be used as a procedural measure to suspend construction work. A moratorium based on a multilateral agreement in which the EU, the US or possibly Russia would be engaged would be a more convenient approach for Berlin. In such a case, Germany would avoid the bilateralisation of the dispute with the Russian investor and all stockholders of the project. Moreover, responsibility for its consequences would be shared by all the parties involved. However, Germany would only accept a possible moratorium, if it concluded that it was possible to meet the conditions necessary to end it. This would also require the involvement of EU institutions, especially the European Commission. However, Russia is unlikely to participate in any such moratorium. Germany certainly prefers the option of delaying the launch of the pipeline than suspending construction. Again, it may be more interested in making such a decision multilateral, as long as the conditions for the suspension are kept under control. At the same time, it does have real influence by employing the administrative procedures concerning the installation under construction in a manner that – within the formal framework – would clearly be understood by the Russian side as an element of negotiations (e.g. strict inspections, commissioning). In practice, the US views the proposed moratorium as a preparatory phase for other instruments that are being considered. In turn, both talks on the possible terms of the compromise and limiting any moratorium to when the pipeline launches would let Germany and Russia gain time to complete the project during the ‘ceasefire’. Possible progress in talks on the conditions of use of the installation or on other demands would increase the chances that Germany and Russia will carry out certification without the risk of restrictions from the United States. At the same time, the finalisation of construction work would weaken US pressure, and certification would effectively deprive the US of the possibility of exerting it. Transit and compensation guarantees for UkraineAny political agreement involving the consent to complete the construction and launch of NS2 in exchange for guarantees that Russian gas will continue to be shipped via Ukraine may turn out to be completely ineffective. Firstly, the strategic goal of Russian infrastructure projects oriented towards the European market (Nord Stream 1, Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream) is to reduce transit dependence on third countries, in particular Ukraine. This can be inferred from the statements of government officials and Gazprom, as well as from the strategic documents adopted in 2000–2020 concerning the energy and transport sectors. Any declarations by President Vladimir Putin or the company regarding the desire to maintain transit via Ukraine also after the launch of NS2 should be treated as part of the Russians’ negotiating strategy. An illustration of this is the significant reduction in shipping Russian gas through Ukraine after the launch of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline in 2011–2012. Besides, even if the transit was not completely suspended upon the launch of NS2, the limited volumes of gas transport via the Ukrainian Gas Transmission System would reduce its cost efficiency. Some statements by Gazprom suggest that once Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream operate at full capacity it will be possible to send only 10–15 billion m3 of gas via Ukraine annually. Secondly, the legal form of granting the guarantees is problematic. Any political deal between Washington and Berlin to this effect could end up being completely ineffective, especially if Gazprom regulated the legal aspects of supplies via the new route with Western European customers (with new or amended contracts). An enforceable commitment to ship a certain amount of gas through Ukraine would therefore require Russia to sign an appropriate long-term transit agreement with its Ukrainian partners determining the minimum transit volume (the current contract is valid until 2024). Forcing the Russians to enter into this kind of deal seems completely unrealistic at this stage. Even if they declared their readiness to consult this issue, the consultations would be conducted only for the sake of appearance, until the construction of Nord Stream 2 was over. As for possible compensation for Ukraine in the form of investments in its capacity and infrastructure for renewable energy production (including the production and transmission of hydrogen), it is unlikely that the scale will be comparable to the losses incurred as a result of a serious cut or suspension of Russian gas transit once NS2 is launched (US$1.5 billion to US$3 billion annually in transport charges). Additionally, it seems that in order to launch hydrogen exports with the use of the existing infrastructure, it would be necessary to keep it operational and to ship (at least in the medium term) amounts of raw material sufficient to guarantee its cost-effectiveness. According to technical tests, the Gas Transmission System of Ukraine could now ship gas with a 10–20% hydrogen admixture, but the possibility of transmitting only hydrogen has not yet been confirmed. The mechanisms restricting or withholding gas flow via NS2The ‘snapback’ mechanism to block gas flow through Nord Stream 2 is one of the recurring options in the media for a possible German-American compromise on this project. It would be implemented after the pipeline is completed and would make it possible to suspend gas flow in the event of problems with supplies or transit through Ukraine, or if Moscow takes any other aggressive actions against Kyiv. Ukraine has not imported gas from Russia since November 2015, so – unless this changes – it would only make sense to use the mechanism if it was linked to the transit of Russian gas. It is not clear what the legal grounds for imposing a blockade would be. Any moves that would interfere with the EU’s trade and/or energy policy should be negotiated not only by Germany but also by the European Commission and be in line with the applicable law. It cannot be ruled out that, in order to enable a formal gas transport cut off, in certain cases it would be necessary to amend EU regulations, such as the security of gas supply regulation. However, the European Commission is in no way engaged in working out a possible compromise on NS2, and it is not known whether and on what terms this could change. So far, Germany has avoided cooperation with EU institutions on issues related to NS2, and the commission has recently unambiguously distanced itself from actions aimed at stopping the project, arguing that this is within Germany’s competencies. The compliance of the blocking mechanism with selected international law regulations (in particular with the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty or the WTO legal system) is unclear. There are also questions as to how this solution would affect the market. The simultaneous suspension of gas transport (and thus the supply of Russian gas) both via Ukraine and (as a consequence) via NS2 would result in the shutdown of approx. 70% of the entire capacity of Russian gas export pipelines to Europe. This would entail a surge in prices and, in the event of a longer suspension of transport via both routes, the risk of a gas crisis. Despite the progress in diversification of sources, such a cut-off would seriously affect European economies and societies. This would also require a carefully prepared contingency plan for gas supplies. Even if a plan is developed, this move would entail significant additional costs for providing alternative gas supplies and would provoke social discontent. It would be particularly difficult and costly to supply gas at the time of peak demand in winter. It became clear in 2021 that, in the event of a wave of frosts around the world and an outflow of LNG to Asia, Russia remains a key supplier capable of satisfying the growing demand. It also seems that the blocking mechanism would be ineffective. It is unlikely that Russia will decide to resume gas transit via Ukraine, if Germany or the EU blocks gas transport via Nord Stream 2 in retaliation for problems with Ukrainian transit. The experience of several Russian-Ukrainian gas crises shows that Moscow may even use European problems with gas supplies as an opportunity to pursue its own interests (in this case, to enable unrestricted use of NS2 at full capacity). Therefore, it seems unlikely that during a time of high demand, Germany/the EU would be able to maintain the blockade on the gas pipeline for more than a few days, maybe weeks, and this would significantly undermine the effectiveness of this instrument.
Summary and conclusions Once the pipe-laying is over, the bargaining power of the main actors interested in launching the new gas pipeline (Russia and Germany) will become stronger. The existing sanctions regime will remain a serious obstacle to the pipeline’s certification, which is a necessary step preceding its launch. Nevertheless, finalising the construction phase will allow the parties to focus their efforts on making the pipeline operational. The determination which Germany and Russia have demonstrated to continue this controversial project so far suggests that they will focus their efforts on finding a legal solution to the problems related to the future operation of the gas pipeline. No political deals that make consent to complete and launch Nord Stream 2 conditional on possible political or economic concessions from Russia or Germany will neutralise the threats that implementation will entail for Poland, Central Europe and the EU as a whole. Firstly, most of them should be treated primarily as elements of the negotiation strategy, the main goal of which is to complete the construction of the pipeline. Secondly, it would be difficult to give such informal arrangements any concrete form (such as an agreement to guarantee transit via Ukraine or the rules of suspending gas flow through NS2). This will be problematic, especially since Germany wants them to be political, legally non-binding arrangements, which would in fact prevent them from being enforceable. Furthermore, the compromise options currently under consideration contradict the strategic goals of the main stakeholders (especially Russia) and raise doubts as to compliance with the provisions of European law and selected regulations of international law (the Energy Charter Treaty). Thirdly, such arrangements would not reduce the harmfulness of NS2. This involves undermining the declared goals of the EU energy policy, such as improving the security of energy supplies (for example, by diversifying the sources of supply). It also involves strengthening Gazprom’s dominant position as a gas supplier to Central European countries and weakening the economic foundations of alternative projects aimed at improving the region’s energy security (such as the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline running from Norwegian fields via Denmark to Poland, LNG supplies and the expansion of the North-South gas corridor). The text was updated on 19 March 2021.
*** (3) THE NORD STREAM PIPELINES AND THE PERILS OF CONTAINMENTThe sabotage in the Baltic Sea was the result of a long-standing US policy of driving a wedge between Russia and Western Europe
Thursday marks one year since I reported President Joe Biden’s decision in the fall of 2022 to send a signal of resolve to Vladimir Putin by destroying Nord Stream 1 and 2, the Russian natural gas pipelines. Nord Stream 1 had turned Germany into the most powerful economic force in Western Europe. I won’t dwell on the failure of the mainstream media to follow up on that story—some reporters, as I learned decades ago, have inside sources and others do not. But I will relate a lesson I learned about presidential signaling of the sort that is going on now against the Houthis in Yemen; against the Iranians, who are believed to be behind much of the anti-Americanism in the Middle East; and, of course, against Moscow in the Ukraine war. It’s a Cold War story I was told by someone who was steeped in the history of the early days of American intervention in Vietnam. After the Second World War, the United States backed the wrong side in China, and the communist forces led by Mao Zedong declared victory in 1949. This was seen as yet another setback for America’s effort to contain worldwide communism. Containment was the overriding US policy then, and there was worry about Mao’s support for Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese leader who defeated the French in 1954, in the battle at Diem Bien Phu, despite much off-the-books American help for France. A little-noted international peace conference that year in Geneva concluded, in a triumph for rational diplomacy, that Vietnam would be divided, with Ho dominating the North and a non-communist regime to be set up in the South. https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/the-nord-stream-pipelines-and-the
SEE ALSO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cy-TZQWOz9M
YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.
Gus Leonisky POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.
HYPOCRISY ISN’T ONE OF THE SINS OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. HENCE ITS POPULARITY IN THE ABRAHAMIC TRADITIONS… EXCLUSIVE: Russian Partisans Prepare to Rise up in Ukraine Cities w/Col Jacques Baud
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trump under....
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XPscN1Ah6M
Mark Sleboda: Putin’s BOMBSHELL Stuns Ukraine, Trump is POWERLESShttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SI6C6H8-n_c
WATCH: Putin BLASTS Zelensky & NATO – ‘They Want War, Not Peace!’ | Times Now WorldRussian President Vladimir Putin, in an interview with journalist Pavel Zarubin, claimed that Ukraine had initially agreed to a peace deal in April 2022 but later backed out under Western pressure, particularly after consultations with then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Putin stated that by April 4, 2022, Russian troops had already withdrawn from Kiev, countering Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s justification for banning negotiations with Russia. He asserted that Zelensky’s current position as president is illegitimate under Ukraine’s constitution, making any potential negotiations with him invalid. Putin emphasized that only the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, could legally authorize negotiations and revoke the decree banning talks. He also suggested that Ukraine’s sovereignty was severely diminished, arguing that the war would end within two months if Western financial and military support ceased.
YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.
Gus Leonisky
POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.
PLEASE NOTE THAT THE AMERICAN EMPIRE HAS VOWED TO DESTROY RUSSIA SINCE 1917....
dear donald....
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZzgoGKNDCw
Ukraine ABANDONS Velyka Novosilka Triumphal Russian Flag RaisingRussian forces have captured Velyka Novosilka, the last Ukrainian bastion in South Donetsk Oblast. This battle was a nightmare for Ukraine, because the weakened 110th Mechanized Brigade was left behind as rearguard to protect the withdrawal of "more important" elements. However, instead of pulling them back in order, the men of the 110th were simply abandoned to their own fate.
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NOW SOME "NEWS" (OPINIONATED) OUTLET ARE TOUTING THAT "TRUMP IS NOW LISTENING TO THE PROFESSIONALS" ON UKRAINE... WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? LYING SIR BILL BROWDER IS ONE OF THESE PROFESSIONALS... ALL THE HAWKS AND WARMONGERS ARE ADVISING TRUMP... WE HOPE THE SILLY SAUSAGE DOES NOT DO SOMETHING STUPID... AND DECLARE WAR ON RUSSIA...
PLEASE DONALD... MAKE A DEAL AND PEACE WILL COME — AND YOU KNOW THE ONLY DEAL TO MAKE BUT YOU ARE AFRAID OF APPEARING WEAK, WHEN THIS WOULD BE THE BEST AND STRONGEST OUTCOME FOR YOU AND THE PLANET:
MAKE A DEAL PRONTO BEFORE THE SHIT HITS THE FAN:
NO NATO IN "UKRAINE" (WHAT'S LEFT OF IT)
THE DONBASS REPUBLICS ARE NOW BACK IN THE RUSSIAN FOLD — AS THEY USED TO BE PRIOR 1922. THE RUSSIANS WON'T ABANDON THESE AGAIN.
THESE WILL ALSO INCLUDE ODESSA, KHERSON AND KHARKIV.....
CRIMEA IS RUSSIAN — AS IT USED TO BE PRIOR 1954
TRANSNISTRIA WILL BE PART OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
A MEMORANDUM OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE USA.
EASY.
THE WEST KNOWS IT.
READ FROM TOP.
YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.
Gus Leonisky
POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.
HYPOCRISY ISN’T ONE OF THE SINS OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS.
HENCE ITS POPULARITY IN THE ABRAHAMIC TRADITIONS…