In Ukraine, Ultra-Nationalists Are the ‘Good Guys’

By Natylie Baldwin
Special to Consortium News

 

Neo-Nazism’s rise in Ukraine is due to the silent approval of Ukraine’s political and military elites who prefer to turn a blind eye because they rely on the far-right for their military potential, Ukrainian academic Marta Havryshko tells Natylie Baldwin.

Dr. Marta Havryshko holds a Ph.D. in History from the Ivan Franko National University in Lviv, Ukraine. Her research interests are primarily focused on sexual violence during World War II and the Holocaust, women’s history, feminism, and nationalism. 

She is currently a visiting assistant professor at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. Her Twitter handle is @HavryshkoMarta. 

I spoke with her recently via email. 

Baldwin: Please tell us a bit about your academic background and how you came to focus on the holocaust and Ukrainian ultra-nationalism?

Havryshko: Ukrainian ultra-nationalism is something that has surrounded me since childhood. I grew up in a village in Galicia, a region that holds a special place in the history of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, as it was here that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929, and its military wing — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which emerged in 1942 — were especially active.

Some of my relatives were involved in these organizations and were later repressed by the Soviet regime for their participation. Family memory was saturated with stories of forced collectivization. 

No family gathering passed without my grandfather recounting how the Soviets took away his family’s oxen, and how, when those oxen were later driven past their house to pasture, they made sorrowful sounds. Actually, the land, where my parents erected a house in [the] 2000s long ago belonged to our family and was seized by Soviets in 1939, when they occupied Western Ukraine due to [the] Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 

Despite the ethnic diversity in my family, the stories centered on the Ukrainian one were dominant. I believe this was partly due to it being a survival strategy in a small Galician community, which had various instruments of social control —including over the hegemonic memory regime. My school was one such guardian of the “correct” national memory. 

The history of Ukrainian nationalism was taught as both heroic and tragic, with a clear division between the “good guys” (Ukrainian nationalists) and the “bad guys” (Soviets). War crimes and crimes against humanity committed by OUN and UPA were obscured, marginalized, and silenced in the educational program. The glorification of these organizations became a fundamental part of “patriotic upbringing” at my school. That is why, to this day, I know all the nationalist songs by heart.

When I became a history student at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, I didn’t significantly deepen my knowledge about OUN and UPA, as an apologetic approach to them prevailed in the academic environment. So, after defending my dissertation on the attitudes of various Galician political circles toward Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1939, I decided to delve deeper into the history of Ukrainian nationalism during WWII. My findings shocked me. 

I realized that many of those who are celebrated in Ukraine as freedom fighters were, in fact, involved in the Nazi Holocaust and anti-Jewish violence. The myth that Jews willingly served in the UPA shattered when I started conducting interviews with my informants—dozens of women who had been part of the OUN underground. 

One lady told me there was a Jewish doctor in her UPA unit, but he was always under guard. “Why?” I asked. “So he wouldn’t escape,” she replied, surprised by my ‘naivety’. This story — like many others I heard — revealed the forced mobilization of Jewish professionals into the ranks of the UPA. Some of them were executed in the spring of 1944, as they were suspected of potentially siding with the Soviets.

 

Baldwin: You’ve written a lot about how the history of WWII and how the holocaust has been weaponized by both Russia and Ukraine in the current conflict. Can you explain what you see as the misuse of the holocaust and WWII by the Russian government and nationalists?

Havryshko: The memory of World War II plays a crucial role in the political and military discourse of the Russian-Ukrainian war. And not only because it is the largest war in Europe since 1945. And not only because there are still living witnesses of the Nazi occupation in Ukraine, who often compare the behavior of the Nazis to that of Russian soldiers in the occupied Ukrainian territories. 

The memory of World War II is weaponized by different political actors for political and military purposes. For example, when Putin began his angry speech on the night of February 24, 2022, he emphasized that one of the goals of the so-called “special military operation” was the “denazification” of Ukraine. 

Top Russian propagandists frequently refer to the Ukrainian government as a “Nazi regime” and call Ukrainian soldiers “Nazis.” State actors construct a hegemonic narrative that evokes the memory of the brave Soviet people, particularly Russians, who fought against the Nazis and their allies. This idea is clearly represented in the so-called Immortal Regiment marches held in major Russian cities every May 9 during Victory Day celebrations. 

During these processions, people carry portraits of their ancestors who fought in the “Great Patriotic War.” Since 2022, participants in some of these events have also begun carrying portraits of Russian soldiers who died in the war against Ukraine—portraying them as the successors of their grandfathers who fought the Nazis. 

Russian soldiers participating in the war against Ukraine also wear symbols and patches that allude to WWII memory—for example, the ribbon of Saint George. In Ukraine, the opposite trend is observed. Some Ukrainian soldiers wear patches bearing the symbol of the Waffen-SS Division “Galicia,” formed in 1943 under German command. 

There is also a unit in the Ukrainian army named “Nachtigall,” after the battalion formed by the German Abwehr in 1941 from ethnic Ukrainians. Another unit named Luftwaffe uses Nazi eagle as its symbol. 

The “Vedmedi” unit uses SS bolts and the SS motto “My Honor is Loyalty” as official insignia. Some soldiers also wear patches featuring symbols of various SS divisions, including infamous Dirlewanger Brigade, and the Nazi eagle. Some soldiers of the Russian Volunteer Corps wear ROA patches (Russian Liberation Army, aligned with Nazi Germany).

A number of soldiers have even founded clothing brands that glorify the Wehrmacht and de facto justify Nazi crimes, including the Holocaust. 

This trend is deeply absurd, given that the Nazi occupation regime in Ukraine led to the deaths of millions of people, including 1.5 million Jews.  However, in the logic of those soldiers who glorify the army of the Third Reich, the Nazis fought against the main enemy of the Ukrainian nation — the Russians and the Soviet Union. 

In doing so, they artificially isolate this particular aspect of Nazism, while ignoring its crimes. This is an extremely dangerous trend that, unfortunately, is gaining popularity, due to the silent approval of Ukraine’s political and military elites, which prefer to turn a blind eye on this because they rely on the far-right in terms of their military potential.

Baldwin: Can you also explain how the Ukrainian government and its western allies have white-washed the contemporary Ukrainian ultra-nationalists and their historical role in the WWII massacres against Jews, Poles and others?

Havryshko: For a long time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the glorification of OUN and UPA remained mostly a regional cult, specific to Western Ukraine. After the Maidan revolution, this cult began to be artificially promoted at the national level. 

Firstly, this was facilitated by the creation of the so-called Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, which made the glorification of Ukrainian nationalists one of its key areas of work. Secondly, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a memorial law in 2015 that recognized members of the OUN and UPA as “fighters for the independence of Ukraine” and introduced penalties for individuals who “publicly express disrespect” toward them.

A number of Western scholars criticized this law, fearing that it would close the door to open discussion about the complex history of the OUN and UPA.

Despite this, both state and non-state memory actors in Ukraine launched a vigorous campaign to heroize Ukrainian nationalists. This was reflected in the emergence of numerous new places of memory — such as monuments, museums, memorial plaques, street names, exhibitions, documentary films, programs, etc. At the same time, a process of so-called “decommunization” began, aimed at erasing everything connected to Ukraine’s Soviet past from the public space.

This memory crusade targeted not only monuments to Lenin, Dzerzhinsky, Kosior, and other Soviet figures involved in mass repressions and other Soviet crimes, but also soldiers of the Red Army who liberated Ukraine from German occupation. This war on everything Soviet entered a new phase after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

One of its consequences has been an even deeper “Banderization” of Ukraine (from Stepan Bandera—the leader of the OUN). Streets named after Stepan Bandera and UPA commander Roman Shukhevych began to appear in regions like Chernihiv, Odesa, Kherson, Donetsk, and Poltava — places where these historical figures were never popular, and were often seen as Nazi collaborators responsible for political terror against Ukrainians who had built the “Soviet national project” in Ukraine.

The problem with this memorialization lies in the fact that Bandera, Shukhevych, and other members of the OUN and UPA were proponents of ethnic nationalism, racism, and antisemitism and an authoritarian state. They collaborated with the Nazis and took part in their crimes, including the Holocaust. 

Furthermore, they are responsible for the deaths of at least 100,000 Polish civilians in Ukraine during World War II as part of their nationalist project to build an ethnically homogeneous state. 

They also widely used terror against Ukrainian civilians who criticized their actions. They often applied the principle of collective punishment, killing entire families—including small children—of alleged “enemies of the Ukrainian nation.”

However, these inconvenient facts are being concealed, and those who criticize this ethnonationalist memory regime are labeled “Russian agents”—a charge which, in the context of war with Russia, not only delegitimizes them but effectively puts a target on their backs. 

They are subjected to cancel culture, bullied by their colleagues, and their voices are silenced and marginalized. This is being done because a heroic historical myth is needed by the state to consolidate society around political leadership during wartime. In other words, the state is instrumentalizing historical myths and nationalist memory in its war efforts.

What is particularly notable is that Western scholars, who were until recently quite critical of the glorification of the OUN and UPA, are now largely silent. Moreover, some are framing this ethnonationalist memorial policy as part of the nation-building process and decolonization. 

In doing so, they are legitimizing dangerous trends—glorification of ethnonationalism, racism, antisemitism, and the justification of ethnic and political violence in the name of the nation. This poses a threat to a Ukrainian democratic future and clearly contradicts talking points that Ukraine is fighting for “freedom and democracy” in its resistance to Russian aggression.

Baldwin: There have been many reports in recent years about the growing influence of ultranationalists on Ukrainian society and culture. For example, there are reports of Ukrainian schoolbooks that teach outlandish propaganda, such as suggesting that Ukraine was the linguistic origin of western European languages and revering Nazi era war criminals. As far as you are aware, to what extent is there such propaganda in Ukrainian schools? What does this portend for the future of Ukrainian society?

Havryshko: The whitewashing of the Ukrainian nationalist underground—which inevitably leads to Nazi apologism and Holocaust distortion—is one of the most troubling developments in public schools across Ukraine. For example, not long ago, all schools in Lviv, following an order from the city council, widely commemorated the anniversary of the death of Roman Shukhevych, who was killed by the Soviets on March 5, 1950. Children of various ages watched propaganda films and attended lectures. The youngest students were encouraged to draw the red-and-black flag of the UPA or portraits of Shukhevych. These forms of memorialization were clearly apologetic. I highly doubt that the children were offered any opportunity to discuss the role of the 201st Schutzmannschaft Battalion, which Shukhevych commanded during punitive actions against civilians in Belarus in 1942, or his responsibility for other war crimes.

Any attempts to include critical questions about the history of the OUN and UPA in Ukrainian school textbooks are met with strong resistance from nationalist circles. A few years ago, for instance, a scandal broke out in Lviv when a history textbook referred to the “Nachtigall” Battalion as a collaborationist formation—which it indeed was, since it was created by the Germans and served German interests.

The anti-Jewish violence committed by Ukrainian nationalists is one of the most hidden and suppressed chapters in the school curriculum. Recently, I came across a 10th-grade history textbook published in 2023. It contained no information at all about the pogroms that took place in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1941. In many places, these pogroms occurred during a power vacuum—after the Soviet army had retreated and before the Germans had fully arrived. 

Taking advantage of this vacuum, members of the OUN in towns and villages across Galicia, Bukovyna, and Volyn organized killings, beatings, rapes, and robberies of their Jewish neighbors—accusing them collectively of crimes of the Soviet regime and declaring them enemies of the Ukrainian people.

In cities like Lviv, Ternopil, and Zolochiv, these pogroms were instigated by the Germans, but local Ukrainians were willing perpetrators. This uncomfortable truth is hidden from students because it does not fit into the dominant heroic or victimhood narrative. However, responsibility can only be cultivated through the acknowledgment of one’s own guilt.

Baldwin: You have spoken frequently on social media recently about the dangerous influence of and threats you’ve personally received by Ukrainian ultranationalists and Neo-Nazis. Tell us about that. What do you think will happen with this element as the war winds down eventually and ends? Are you safe from the threats?

Havryshko: I began receiving a violent pushback from radical nationalists more than ten years ago, when I first started writing about sexual violence committed by members of the OUN and UPA—both against their female counterparts and against civilian women as a form of punishment, terror and revenge. 

At that time, the leadership of the academic institution in Lviv where I worked contacted the Security Service of Ukraine to report my “dangerous activities.” The entire situation was absurd and grotesque, because I was being harassed not just by fringe far-right groups, but also by professors holding high academic positions. That was also the first time I experienced antisemitic verbal attacks that invoked a common trope about the alleged disloyalty of Jews to the Ukrainian national project.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these attacks became more frequent. The attackers grew more aggressive, believing that by doing so they were “defending Ukraine.” In September 2023, amid the scandal surrounding Yaroslav Hunka, a former member of the Waffen-SS Galicia Division who was given standing ovations in Canadian parliament, one of Ukraine’s largest museums—the Museum of the History of Kyiv—opened a photo exhibition organized by Azov’s 3rd Assault Brigade. 

The exhibit included several photos of soldiers from the Waffen-SS Galicia Division. None of the Ukrainian historians, journalists, human rights activists, cultural figures or politicians who visited the exhibition publicly commented on the inappropriateness of this kind of analogy, where active-duty members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were essentially equating themselves with Nazi collaborators, involved in war crimes in Poland and Slovakia. 

I wrote a short critical social media post about this. In response, far-right —including members of the Azov movement—launched a campaign of harassment against me. This included media publications, YouTube programs, and incitement of violence against me on the social media pages of prominent leaders of far-right groups and military units.

Students from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv even wrote a letter to the Minister of Education and Science demanding that “measures be taken” against me. I was relieved that I wasn’t in Ukraine at the time, because I honestly cannot imagine what might have happened to me. 

At the same time, I began to pay closer attention to Nazi apologism in Ukraine’s wartime society—particularly within the military. And the more I study this phenomenon, the more shocked I am by its scale—and the more death and rape threats I receive from various far-right groups.

What is especially alarming is that I now receive threats not only from Ukrainian neo-Nazis, but also from foreign ones who are fighting on Ukraine’s side and are part of far-right military units such as the 3rd Assault Brigade, Karpatska Sich, Kraken, the Russian Volunteer Corps, and others. 

One of those threatening me is an American neo-Nazi, antisemite, and convicted felon currently fighting in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government is instrumentalizing far-right extremists from around the world due to a shortage of manpower. Their activities are often overseen by Military Intelligence, headed by [Kyrylo Oleksiiovych] Budanov. With that kind of backing, they feel—and in fact are—truly empowered. So I cannot realistically expect protection from the Ukrainian state.

To be honest, I am afraid to travel to Ukraine due to these ongoing threats, which are laced with antisemitic slurs and misogyny. What makes the fear even more real is that last year in my hometown of Lviv, Professor Iryna Farion was shot dead. She had openly criticized right-wing soldiers for using the Russian language. 

Various far-right social media channels demonized her and openly incited violence against her. According to the police, some of these channels were followed by the suspected killer, who has been detained and is under investigation.

What saddens me the most is that some of my fellow scholars in Ukraine have also threatened me, incited far-right violence against me, and downplayed or completely disregarded my concerns for my safety and the safety of my child. I have repeatedly and publicly asked them to reconsider their aggressive rhetoric, but to no avail.

Baldwin: You have talked about how the Maidan events of 2014 marked a turning point in the influence of the ultranationalists in Ukraine. In an interview with Ondrej Belecik last December, you said “I’m convinced that the Maidan Revolution enabled ultranationalists to hijack memory politics in Ukraine. They started to impose an ultranationalist narrative. And from the beginning many people were actually not in favor of this.” Can you elaborate on this? How and why do you think this hijacking was allowed to happen?

Although people with a wide range of political views took part in the Maidan protests, nationalist groups—particularly those representing the Western Ukrainian strain of nationalism historically associated with the OUN and UPA—played a significant role. 

The Maidan gained enormous popularity in Western Ukraine, where then-President Viktor Yanukovych was widely perceived as overtly pro-Russian and as someone obstructing Ukraine’s movement toward the West. In contrast, in the East and South of the country, the majority of the population supported Yanukovych and held a critical view of the Maidan, which partly explains the bloody civil unrest in Donbass that started in spring 2014, that was instrumentalized by Russia. 

Given that many Maidan participants were from Western Ukraine, they used specific historical analogies to legitimize their activities. In particular, they glorified Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, and used the symbols of the OUN and UPA. 

In doing so, they created a symbolic connection between themselves and members of the nationalist underground through the idea of a shared struggle against a “common enemy”—Moscow. It was the radical Ukrainian nationalists from Right Sector and Patriot of Ukraine (the forerunner of Azov) who ultimately determined the fate of the Maidan by taking up arms and resorting to violence.

The victory of the Maidan thus marked the triumph of an ethnonationalist project, rather than an inclusive national one—as many Ukrainians and some Western scholars, including Americans, tried to portray it. With each passing year, this romanticized version of the Maidan is increasingly challenged by a harsher reality—one marked by attacks on the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. 

In this reality, the memory of millions of Ukrainians who fought against the Nazis as part of the Red Army and Soviet partisan units is being erased, and in their place stand a few dozen members of the OUN and UPA, who were not only a regional phenomenon but also collaborators with the Nazis and participants in their crimes. 

In this post-Maidan reality, the memory wars have even reached major cultural figures such as Mikhail Bulgakov, Isaac Babel, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Pyotr Tchaikovsky — who have been targeted for their alleged pro-Russian positions.

Baldwin: In a May 2022 interview with Regina Muhlhauser, you discussed the role of sexual violence in the Russian-Ukrainian war. You talked about sexual violence against Ukrainian refugees who’d fled the war and were in the border countries. Can you tell us about that?

In early March 2022, shortly after the start of Russian full-scale invasion, I fled Ukraine with my 9-year-old son. We spent several hours on the Polish side of the border, waiting for our friend who was supposed to drive us both to Warsaw. During that time, I observed how some Polish men offered shelter exclusively to young women. It was unsettling.

Later, my friend—who was working with Ukrainian refugees at the border and in shelters—confirmed my suspicions. She said there was a noticeable group of men who clearly preferred to help young women, likely expecting sexual favors in return. Soon after, more and more stories began to emerge about the sexual harassment and exploitation of these vulnerable women. This issue was reflected in the reports of different human rights organizations.

Feminist friends of mine in Switzerland and Germany also confirmed that the number of Ukrainian refugees involved in prostitution in their countries is growing—particularly in street prostitution, where the most vulnerable women tend to end up. This once again proves that prostitution often becomes a “choice without a choice” for traumatized and vulnerable women. In some cases, we may be talking about sex trafficking and sexual slavery.

Baldwin: What kinds of sexual violence are we seeing in this war? Does it seem to be characterized mostly by discrete incidents on both sides or is there any evidence that it is ordered at the top levels as a policy on either side?

Sexual violence has emerged as a recurrent and disturbing phenomenon in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. While its presence has been documented since 2014, it has gained greater visibility and public attention following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the true scope and prevalence of this violence remain largely unknown due to several structural and political constraints. 

One of the most significant limitations is the lack of access to approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory currently under Russian occupation, which prevents both systematic documentation and independent research.

Although isolated cases were reported during the early phases of the conflict, the escalation of sexual violence in recent years has drawn the attention of human rights organizations, law enforcement bodies, the media, and political actors. This is partly due to the expansion of occupied territories, which has created more opportunities for abuses, and partly due to the increasing use of sexual violence as a tool within the broader framework of information warfare. 

Both Ukraine and Russia have used the issue to accuse each other of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, which in turn complicates the work of researchers and limits open access to reliable, depoliticized data.

As a feminist researcher, I rely primarily on the testimonies of survivors. A growing number of individuals have come forward to share their experiences with organizations such as the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and various media outlets. 

Their accounts describe a range of sexualized abuses perpetrated by Russian military personnel, including rape, threats of rape, forced nudity, genital beatings and mutilation, castration, and forced witnessing of sexual violence. Victims include individuals of all sexes, genders, and ages, including minors.

Based on patterns identified in survivors’ testimonies and broader historical parallels with other armed conflicts, it is plausible to hypothesize that a significant proportion of victims are men. This assumption is grounded in the fact that men constitute the majority of detainees—both military and civilian—held in places of confinement in Russia and in the territories of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. 

Studies of Russian carceral institutions point to a longstanding culture of sexualized hazing practices, where sexual violence is routinely employed to assert dominance, maintain prison hierarchies, and inflict torture. War, in this context, amplifies and legitimizes such practices.

Sexual violence in captivity thus becomes a mechanism of domination, humiliation, coercion, information extraction, and punishment. These functions are clearly discernible in the narratives of former Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilian detainees. The consistency and repetition of such abuses strongly suggest that sexual violence is not incidental or opportunistic, but rather instrumental for the Russian military. 

Importantly, recognizing sexual violence as a weapon of war does not require the existence of formal written orders. Rather, it necessitates attention to recurring patterns, institutional mechanisms, the nature and purpose of the violence, and the response (or absence thereof) from the chain of command. 

To date, no known prosecutions have been initiated by the Russian state against its own soldiers for sexual violence committed against Ukrainians—despite multiple documented cases. One high-profile instance involved a video circulated via Russian Telegram channels, depicting the castration and subsequent execution of a Ukrainian serviceman. 

The main suspect was identified by open-source investigators from Bellingcat, but there has been no indication of an official investigation by Russian authorities. The absence of accountability serves as both an implicit endorsement and a mechanism of encouragement, thus reinforcing the use of sexual violence for political and military objectives.

Another salient indicator of the political nature of wartime sexual violence is the selection of victims. Testimonies indicate that women targeted by Russian forces are often connected to men serving in Ukrainian governmental, military, or security institutions—such as wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters. The female body, in this context, becomes a site of symbolic warfare. 

The capture and violation of these women is intended not only to inflict individual trauma but also to send a collective message to their male relatives, undermining morale, asserting dominance, and emasculating the perceived enemy. In such cases, sexual violence serves a strategic function and should be analyzed not merely as individual criminal behavior, but as a form of politically motivated violence embedded within a broader war apparatus.

[With respect to the use of sexual violence by Ukrainian forces], according to the 2017 Report of the Eastern-Ukrainian Centre for Civic Initiatives, sexual violence was used in Donbas by different actors, including the Ukrainian Armed Forces and its satellites – volunteer battalions. This sexual violence took place primarily in detention facilities and checkpoints. One of the most infamous in this regard was the Tornado Battalion. 

A couple of members of it were charged with sexual violence, but after 2022, they were released from prison and sent to the frontline. After 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported instances of sexual violence against Russian POWS. In particular, one of them was threatened with castration on camera. Also, recently Russia’s representative in the U.N. reported cases of rape allegedly committed by Ukrainian soldiers in the Kursk Region. 

Baldwin: Not long after the war started, I spoke to several experts on Russia/Ukraine and the phenomenon known as “the narcissism of small differences” was pointed out to me. It’s based on an observation originally made by Sigmund Freud and elaborated on by a few modern war reporters.

It basically says that a war between two peoples who are very similar can be the most vicious – that small differences that are perceived as representing even minor advantages are magnified and take on a significance that can be difficult for outsiders to understand. Do you think that is true in this conflict?

This is a very interesting theory, as Ukrainians and Russians share a common history, culture, and, to some extent, language — since a significant portion of Ukrainians speak Russian. Ukrainians and Russians also share a common history of crimes, such as the mass rapes of German women in 1945, the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, and war crimes in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

However, a distinctive feature of Ukrainian-Russian relations is the lack of symmetry. Russian political elites, both during the times of the Russian Empire and the USSR, viewed Ukrainians as “younger brothers”—naive, reckless, in need of guidance and instruction. This colonial superiority is one of the underlying reasons behind Russia’s current aggression against Ukraine.

The desire of Ukrainian political elites to “leave the family”—that is, to break away from Russia and drift toward the West—is perceived by the Kremlin as a form of rebellion and ingratitude, as if it were a betrayal by a loved one. As a result, Russians act like a patriarch in a hierarchical family, who believes he has the right to use violence against subordinate relatives in order to “save” them and “bring them back to the right path.”

Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian war resembles domestic abuse, where the abuser desperately tries to preserve his power and privileges over other family members. The vulnerability and partial dependence of these members on the patriarch—who seeks to discipline them through force—requires the intervention of external actors. 

These actors are meant to help the victim escape from an abusive and toxic relationship and begin a new life. The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that sometimes the rescuers try to take advantage of the vulnerable victim, which causes them to fall into a new trap of toxic and exploitative relationships.

The views expressed in this interview may or may not reflect those of Consortium News.

Natylie Baldwin is the author of The View from Moscow: Understanding Russia and U.S.-Russia Relations. Her writing has appeared in various publications including The Grayzone, Antiwar.com, Consortium News, Covert Action Magazine, RT, OpEd News, The Globe Post, The New York Journal of Books and Dissident Voice. She blogs at natyliesbaldwin.com.  Twitter: @natyliesb.

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/04/20/in-ukraine-ultra-nationalists-are-the-good-guys/

 

 

READ FROM TOP.

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

 

 SEE ALSO: https://consortiumnews.com/2025/04/20/on-neo-nazi-influence-in-ukraine/

 

The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 2
 by Larry C. Johnson

 

The decade of 2000 marked the start of Ukraine becoming a de facto member of NATO. It not only participated in all of the main exercises, but it hosted many. In fact, between 2000 and 2010, Ukraine is ranked in the top six of countries that hosted a NATO or USEUCOM exercise. Ukraine and Georgia, who was ranked number seven, were not NATO members. What the hell? Two non-NATO countries hosted more NATO exercises than 22 of the member nations. This is prima facie evidence that the West, despite warnings from Russia, was intent on making Ukraine and Georgia official members of NATO. 

Only two things distinguished Ukraine from NATO members — it did not have a financial obligation to contribute to NATO and it was not covered by Article 5. Other than that, Ukraine was operating as a de facto member of NATO by 2010.

Project Ukraine was not confined to military cooperation alone. US and UK intelligence organizations were actively involved in Ukraine and were coordinating operations and activities with both NATO and EUCOM. The CIA, for example, has intelligence officers assigned to NATO and USEUCOM headquarters. There job is to brief senior leaders on CIA operations and coordinate activities to ensure no wires get crossed. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that during the period between 2000 and 2010, the US government, with collaboration from the UK, was working intently to split Ukraine away from Russia’s sphere of influence and capture it for the West.

Note: My chats with Nima and Judge Napolitano are posted at the end of this article.

2000

Cooperative Partner 2000:

The principal NATO-led military exercise conducted with Ukraine in 2000 was Exercise Cooperative Partner 2000. This exercise took place from 19 June to 1 July 2000 in the Black Sea and the area around Odessa, Ukraine. The exercise involved forces from NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and the Standing Mine Counter-Measures Force Mediterranean (MCMFORMED), along with participants from ten NATO countries and six partner nations. Russia attended as an observer. The main objective was to train multinational forces to work together for peace support operations, enhancing interoperability and cooperation between NATO and partner countries.

Peace Shield 2000 (May–June 2000)

• Type: Command Post Exercise (CPX) + Field Training
• Participants:
  • Ukraine (primary host)
  • NATO/PfP: U.S., UK, Germany, Poland, Canada, and others.
  • Observed by: Russia (under PfP, despite tensions over NATO-Ukraine cooperation).
• Objectives:
  • Train for multinational peacekeeping operations (e.g., Kosovo-style scenarios).
  • Improve C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)interoperability.
  • Test Ukraine’s ability to integrate with NATO-standard procedures.
• Notable Elements:

 

Cooperative Determination 2000 (September 2000)

• Type: Maritime/Search-and-Rescue (SAR) Exercise
• Location: Odessa and Black Sea waters
• Participants:
  • Naval forces: Ukraine, U.S. (USS Yorktown), Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia.
  • USEUCOM provided P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft.
• Objectives:
  • Counter-piracy, SAR, and maritime interdiction operations.
  • First major Black Sea exercise with Ukraine post-Cold War.
• Political Context:Russia criticized the exercise as “NATO expansionism” but participated as an observer.
• Demonstrated Ukraine’s push for Black Sea security partnerships amid rising regional tensions.

 

Cossack Steppe 2000 (Summer 2000)

• Type: Bilateral Field Training Exercise (FTX)
• Location: Desna Training Center (Chernihiv Oblast) & other sites
• Participants: Ukrainian Army + U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) advisors.
• Focus:
  • Peacekeeping tactics (e.g., convoy security, checkpoint operations).
  • Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and combat engineer drills.
• Legacy:
  • Part of the U.S.-Ukraine Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), launched in 1994 to aid Ukraine’s military reform.
  • Paved the way for future exercises like Rapid Trident (post-2006).

 

In 2000, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) executed its first Military Contact Plan with Ukraine, following the transfer of responsibility for U.S. military engagement in Ukraine from the Joint Staff to EUCOM in late 1998. The 2000 plan was developed collaboratively with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and included a variety of military-to-military events, such as planning meetings, medical, legal, and chaplain exchanges, and other cooperative activities. These events were designed to align with specific objectives and priorities identified by both sides.

2001Cossack Express 2001 (April–May 2001)

• Location: Ukraine (multiple sites)
• Participants: Ukrainian forces, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), and NATO advisors.
• Focus: Logistics, medical training, and crisis response.
• Significance: Aimed at improving Ukraine’s ability to support international peacekeeping missions.

 

Sea Breeze 2001 (July 16–27, 2001)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odessa and Crimea, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM/NATO), and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Maritime security, search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and amphibious operations.
• Significance: Part of the annual “Sea Breeze” series (started in 1997), enhancing interoperability between Ukraine and NATO.

 

Cooperative Determination 2001 (September 2001)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), and NATO allies.
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations (PKO), command post exercises (CPX), and joint maneuvers.
• Significance: Part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, improving Ukraine’s readiness for multinational operations.

 

Clear Sky 2001 (October 2001)

• Location: Starokostiantyniv Air Base, Ukraine
• Participants: Ukrainian Air Force, U.S. Air Force (USAFE), and NATO partners.
• Focus: Air defense, search and rescue (SAR), and airspace coordination.
• Significance: Strengthened Ukraine’s air force interoperability with NATO standards.

 

2002Cossack Express 2002″ (March–April 2002)

• Location: Ukraine (multiple regions)
• Participants: Ukrainian National Guard, U.S. National Guard (State Partnership Program), and other NATO advisors.
• Focus: Disaster response, counter-terrorism, and crisis management.
• Significance: Strengthened civil-military cooperation and emergency response coordination.

 

 Cooperative Partner 2002″ (June 2002)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area (Lviv region, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), NATO members (including Poland, Germany, Canada), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations (PKO), command-post exercises (CPX), joint staff coordination.
• Significance: Part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, aimed at preparing Ukrainian forces for potential NATO-led peacekeeping missions.

 

Sea Breeze 2002 (July–August 2002)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odesa and Mykolaiv, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM/NATO), and other NATO allies (including Turkey, UK, Greece, etc.)
• Focus: Maritime security, amphibious operations, search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
• Significance: Part of the annual “Sea Breeze” series (ongoing since 1997), enhancing interoperability between Ukraine and NATO naval forces.

 

Other Engagements:

• Ukraine also participated in NATO/PfP exercises such as “Cooperative Key” (a command-post exercise) and “Cooperative Nugget”, focusing on interoperability in peace support operations.

 

2003

In 2003, Ukraine participated in several notable military exercises with NATO and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), reflecting its growing partnership with the Alliance and Western militaries. Some key exercises included:

Cooperative Archer 2003 (June 2003 – Lithuania)

• A NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise focused on peacekeeping operations.
• Involved Ukrainian troops training alongside NATO forces in command post and field exercises.
• Aimed at enhancing interoperability between NATO and partner nations.

 

Sea Breeze 2003 (July 2003 – Black Sea, Ukraine)

• A U.S.-Ukraine co-led maritime exercise under the Partnership for Peace program.
• Focused on naval interoperability, search and rescue (SAR), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
• Participating nations included the U.S. (USEUCOM), Ukraine, NATO allies, and other partners.

 

Cossack Express 2003 (September 2003 – Ukraine)

• A command post exercise (CPX) involving Ukrainian forces and NATO/PfP partners.
• Focused on crisis response and peace support operations.
• Part of Ukraine’s efforts to align its military doctrines with NATO standards.

 

Combined Endeavor 2003 (September-October 2003 – Germany)

• A large-scale communications and interoperability exercise led by USEUCOM.
• Ukrainian forces participated alongside NATO and partner nations to improve military data-sharing and command systems.

 

Clear Sky 2003 (October 2003 – Ukraine)

• A joint air defense exercise involving Ukrainian, U.S., and other NATO/PfP forces.
• Focused on airspace coordination and air-missile defense cooperation.

 

In March 2003, Ukraine finalized its 2003 Target Plan within the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan framework. This plan provided for intensified military cooperation, consultations, and preparation for large-scale military exercises, including international ones. These activities were part of a broader effort to align Ukraine’s military standards and procedures with those of NATO, as well as to test military equipment and armaments
in a multinational context.

2004

In 2004, Ukraine participated in several significant military exercises with NATO and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), reflecting its growing partnership with the Alliance and Western militaries following the 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. Key exercises included:

Cossack Express 2004 (Spring 2004)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Lviv Oblast (Western Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. Army Europe (USEUCOM), and NATO partners.
• Ukrainian Participants: 24th Mechanized Brigade (Yavoriv) – Trained with U.S. Army Europe’s 1st Infantry Division on peacekeeping logistics.
• National Guard Units – Drilled on crowd control (later relevant during the Orange Revolution protests).
• NATO Link: The Yavoriv Training Area later became the Combat Training Center for NATO partners(2015 onward).
• Focus: Peacekeeping drills, command post exercises (CPX), and logistical coordination.
• Significance: Aimed at preparing Ukrainian troops for potential contributions to NATO-led missions (e.g., Kosovo or Iraq).

 

Rapid Answer 2004 (June 2004)

• Location: Poland and Ukraine (joint border areas)
• Participants: Ukraine, Poland (a newly NATO-acceded member), and other Allied forces.
• Focus: Rapid deployment, crisis response, and interoperability with NATO forces.
• Significance: Demonstrated Ukraine’s role in regional security alongside NATO’s eastern flank.

 

Sea Breeze 2004 (July–August 2004)

• Location: Black Sea (Odessa and Crimea regions)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. Navy (USEUCOM), NATO allies (including Turkey, UK, France), and partner nations.
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-terrorism, search-and-rescue (SAR), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Part of the annual “Sea Breeze” series (ongoing since 1997), enhancing Black Sea regional security cooperation.

 

Cooperative Determination 2004 (August 2004)

• Location: Crimea, Ukraine (Feodosia training area)
• Participants: Ukrainian Armed Forces, NATO members (including the U.S., UK, Germany, Poland, and others)
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations, interoperability with NATO standards.
• Significance: Part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, emphasizing joint command structures and crisis response.

 

Political Fallout & Long-Term Impact

• Russian Reaction:
  • Moscow accused NATO of “encroachment” and pressured Ukraine to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) instead.
• Domestic Divide:
  • Pro-Western factions (e.g., Viktor Yushchenko’s bloc) praised the drills, while pro-Russian groups (Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions) opposed them.
• 2008 NATO Summit:
  • Ukraine’s 2004 exercises built momentum for its eventual Membership Action Plan (MAP)bid, though blocked by German/French hesitancy.

 

2005

Throughout 2005, NATO and Ukraine developed practical projects aimed at addressing Ukraine’s national security and defense needs. These included the launch of PfP trust funds to assist with the destruction of excess munitions and the retraining and resettlement of redundant military personnel . Additionally, there was the launch of a project to assist with the training of civilian personnel for Ukraine’s security and defense structures.

Cooperative Archer 2005 (June 2005)

• Location: Tbilisi, Georgia (but involved Ukrainian troops).
• Participants: Ukraine, Georgia, NATO members, and PfP nations.
• Focus: Crisis response, peacekeeping, and NATO interoperability (Ukraine contributed troops as part of PfP engagement).

 

Rapid Trident 2005 (July 9–22, 2005)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Lviv region, Ukraine.
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM-led), NATO members, and PfP countries.
• Focus: Peace support operations, joint command post training, and enhancing interoperability with NATO standards.
• Significance: Part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, helping Ukraine align with NATO procedures.

 

Sea Breeze 2005 (July 18–29, 2005)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odessa) and Mykolaiv regions, Ukraine.
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM/NATO), NATO allies (including Turkey, UK, France, etc.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Maritime security, amphibious operations, and interoperability between NATO and Ukrainian forces.
• Details: Involved naval, air, and ground forces, with a focus on counterterrorism and peacekeeping scenarios.

 

Cossack Steppe 2005 (September 2005)

• Location: Ukraine (multiple training areas).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other NATO/PfP partners.
• Focus: Command and staff training, peacekeeping operations, and logistical coordination.

 

The first Rapid Trident exercise in Ukraine took place in 2005 at the Yavoriv training ground as part of the Partnership for Peace program, marking the beginning of this recurring multinational exercise.

2006

These exercises were part of Ukraine’s broader push for NATO integration following the Orange Revolution (2004).

Cooperative Archer 2006 (June 2006)

• Location: Tbilisi, Georgia (but involved Ukrainian troops)
• Participants: NATO members, Ukraine, Georgia, and other PfP nations.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) simulating NATO-led crisis response operations.
• Details: Aimed at improving Ukraine’s compatibility with NATO standards in crisis management.

 

Sea Breeze 2006 (July 17–28, 2006)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odessa and Crimea, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine (host), U.S. (USEUCOM/NATO), NATO allies (including Turkey, UK, France, Germany, etc.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-terrorism, search and rescue (SAR), and interoperability between NATO and Ukrainian forces.
• Details: Involved naval maneuvers, amphibious operations, and air defense drills.

 

Rapid Trident 2006 (July 17–28, 2006)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Lviv Oblast, Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM-led), NATO members, and Partnership for Peace countries.
• Focus: Ground force interoperability, peacekeeping operations, and joint command procedures.
• Details: Part of the U.S.-led Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) initiative to enhance Ukrainian military readiness.

 

Cossack Steppe 2006 (September 2006)

• Location: Southern Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Peacekeeping and stability operations training.

 

2007

In 2007, NATO and Ukraine conducted a notable command post exercise in Sevastopol and maintained a structured program of military cooperation under the NATO-Ukraine Military Work Plan and Annual Target Plan. The chiefs of defence from NATO and Ukraine met in May 2007 to assess progress under the NATO-Ukraine Military Work Plan for that year. They tasked their military representatives to begin preparations for the next cycle of cooperation, indicating ongoing planning and execution of joint activities. The NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan (ATP) for 2007outlined practical steps for cooperation in political, military, and security spheres, including exercises and advisory activities to improve Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration . While the ATP itself is a planning document, it confirms that military exercises and collaborative activities were a significant part of the 2007 agenda.

Cooperative Archer 2007 (May 9–18, 2007)

• Location: Tbilisi, Georgia (but involved Ukrainian forces)
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members, and PfP partners.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) simulating NATO-led crisis response operations.
• Note: Though held in Georgia, Ukrainian troops participated as part of NATO interoperability training.

 

Cossack Steppe 2007 (June 2007)

• Location: Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine with NATO advisors (including U.S. personnel)
• Focus: Peacekeeping and stability operations training.

 

Sea Breeze 2007 (July 16–27, 2007)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odessa and Mykolaiv, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), NATO allies (including Turkey, Greece, Canada, and others)
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and interdiction operations.
• Significance: Part of the annual U.S.-Ukraine co-hosted exercise series under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

 

Rapid Trident 2007 (September 17–28, 2007)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Lviv Oblast, Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), NATO members, and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations, interoperability, and joint command post training.
• Significance: Part of the U.S.-led Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) initiative.

 

2008

The NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2008 formalized cooperation, including joint exercises, training, and seminars . Ukraine’s participation in multinational exercises was part of its broader Euro-Atlantic integration efforts, as reaffirmed at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit . While Sea Breeze and Immediate Response were the most prominent multinational exercises involving Ukraine in 2008, other smaller joint training events and seminars were also conducted under the NATO-Ukraine partnership framework. 

These exercises occurred amid Ukraine’s push for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. While NATO declined to grant MAP due to opposition from some members (e.g., Germany and France), it affirmed Ukraine’s future membership prospects, stating it “will become a member of NATO” eventually. Russia strongly opposed these developments, escalating tensions that later influenced its 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Rapid Trident 2008

• Date: June 2008
• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukrainian Armed Forces, U.S. Army Europe (USEUCOM), NATO member & partner nations.
• Focus: Interoperability, peacekeeping operations, and joint command procedures.
• Significance: Part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, enhancing Ukraine’s ability to work with NATO forces.

 

Sea Breeze 2008

• Date: July 2008
• Location: Black Sea (Odessa region) & Southern Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM/NATO), and other allied navies.
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-terrorism, and disaster response drills.
• Context: Annual U.S.-Ukraine naval exercise demonstrating NATO-Ukraine cooperation in the Black Sea.

 

Combined Endeavor 2008

• Date: September 2008
• Location: Grafenwöhr, Germany (communications-focused exercise)
• Participants: Ukraine joined NATO and partner nations.
• Focus: Improving military communications interoperability with NATO standards.

 

2009

The exercises in 2009 were central to strengthening Ukraine’s military cooperation with NATO and the U.S., laying the groundwork for deeper defense ties in subsequent years These exercises were part of Ukraine’s NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which sought closer military cooperation without full membership. Russia strongly criticized these drills, particularly Sea Breeze, as encroaching on its sphere of influence. The training laid groundwork for future cooperation, especially after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, when Ukraine intensified NATO-linked exercises.

These exercises also were part of the broader NATO-Ukraine cooperation, as outlined in the NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2009, which emphasized joint training, equipment modernization, and increasing interoperability . USEUCOM (United States European Command) regularly supported and participated in these exercises, underscoring the U.S. commitment to European security and partnership with Ukraine.

Sea Breeze 2009

• Date: July 2009
• Location: Black Sea (near Odessa and Crimea)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), NATO allies (including Turkey, Greece, Canada), and partner nations.
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-piracy, amphibious operations, and interoperability between NATO and Ukrainian forces.
• Details: Involved naval ships, aircraft, and special operations forces. Russia opposed the exercise, viewing it as NATO expansionism near its borders.

 

Rapid Trident 2009

• Date: September 2009
• Location: Yavoriv Training Center (near Lviv, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. Army Europe (USEUCOM), NATO members (including Poland, Germany), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations, counterinsurgency, and joint command post training.
• Details: Part of the U.S.-led Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) initiative to enhance Ukrainian military interoperability with NATO.

 

Saber Guardian 2009″ (Part of the “Combined Endeavor” series)

• Date: Conducted periodically (Ukraine participated in related interoperability drills)
• Focus: Communications interoperability between NATO and partner nations.
• Details: Aimed at improving secure data-sharing and command structures.

 

2010

2010 was part of Ukraine’s pro-NATO phase under President Viktor Yanukovych, who initially continued military cooperation, despite later rejecting NATO membership (2010–2014). The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved an action plan in June 2010 for annual cooperation with NATO, which included participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions, joint exercises, and training of Ukrainian troops within NATO structures. Ukraine participated in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, a counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean Sea. Ukraine deployed ships to support this operation six times between 2007 and 2010, including in 2010. The State Partnership Program (SPP)between Ukraine and the U.S. National Guard (California) continued, including joint training events.

Rapid Trident 2010

• Date: July 2010
• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Lviv Oblast, Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members (including the U.S.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Joint multinational peacekeeping operations, interoperability with NATO forces.
• Significance: Part of the annual U.S.-Ukraine cooperative military training program under the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U).

 

Sea Breeze 2010

• Date: July 2010
• Location: Black Sea (near Odessa)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM/NATO), and other allied nations.
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-piracy, search and rescue (SAR), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: A long-standing U.S.-Ukraine naval exercise, enhancing Black Sea security cooperation.

 

Saber Guardian/Rapid Reaction 2010

• Date: Conducted in multiple phases (summer/fall)
• Location: Ukraine and other Eastern European countries
• Participants: Ukrainian forces alongside U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and NATO partners.
• Focus: Rapid deployment, peace support operations, and joint command post exercises.

https://sonar21.com/the-road-to-war-in-ukraine-the-history-of-nato-and-us-military-exercises-with-ukraine-part-2/

 

READ FROM TOP.

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

 

The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 3

      by Larry C. Johnson

 

The ten-year period — 2011 -2021 — marked a dramatic surge in the size of the Ukrainian military. Although the number of active duty soldiers stabilized at 200,000 starting in 2018, the Ukrainian reserves grew by a factor of 10. These reserves were made possible by Ukraine’s annual military training with NATO and USEUCOM forces. The stage was set for going to war with Russia.

In 2010, the size of the Ukrainian army (Armed Forces of Ukraine) was approximately 245,000 personnel. This figure reflects the continued downsizing and restructuring that followed Ukraine’s independence, as the government reduced the military from its Soviet-era levels. By the end of 2013, the number had dropped further to around 165,500 total personnel, including about 120,900 active military members, highlighting the significant decline during this period. 

In 2010, the size of the Ukrainian army reserves was very limited. According to official plans, Ukraine aimed to have 6,300 reservists in 2010, but by the end of that year, only 1,681 reservists were actually in place-just 27% of the planned number. This reflects the fact that, at the time, Ukraine did not maintain a large, well-trained reserve force, and the system for professional reservists was still being developed.

By January 2022, just before the full-scale Russian invasion, a dramatic transformation had taken place. The Ukrainian Armed Forces had an estimated active personnel strength of approximately 200,000 to 250,000, but its pool of reservists had surged to 900,000.

The International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC) in Yavoriv, Ukraine, which was established in 2007, gained importance during the decade starting in 2011. It was created to serve as a major training facility for Ukrainian and international military units, supporting multinational exercises and peacekeeping training. The IPSC remained a central hub for joint training activities, including large annual exercises such as Rapid Trident, until Russia attacked it with a missile on March 13, 2022.

The annual military exercise in the Black Sea, i.e., SEA BREEZE, shifted in 2017 from maritime security, anti-piracy, and naval interoperability objectives to amphibious warfare and anti-submarine warfare. NATO could no longer pretend that it was just a defensive organization. Amphibious and anti-submarine warfare are offensive operations.

Here is a video of the US Marines landing on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast in 2017:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aP19rwyfI1k

 

2011COMBINED ENDEAVOR (May 2011 – Communications-focused)

• Location: Grafenwöhr, Germany (Ukraine participated as a partner nation).
• Focus: NATO interoperability in communications and information systems.

 

RAPID TRIDENT (June 20–July 1, 2011)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: The exercise involved approximately 1,600 personnel from Ukraine, the United States, and other NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, including Latvia, Belarus, Moldova, Slovenia, Canada, Georgia, Poland, Serbia, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Estonia, as well as the California and Utah National Guards and U.S. Air Force Europe.
• Focus: Multinational interoperability, peacekeeping operations, and joint command procedures.
• Significance: Part of the U.S.-Ukraine “Sea Breeze” and “Rapid Trident” series, enhancing Ukraine’s ability to work with NATO forces.

 

SEA BREEZE 2011 (July 6–16, 2011)

• Location: Black Sea (Odessa region) and Myrhorod Air Base, Ukraine.
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM-led), NATO allies (including Turkey, Romania), and other partners.
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-piracy, and air defense operations.
• Significance: Aimed at improving naval and air force coordination in crisis scenarios.

 

2012Rapid Trident (July 2012)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members (including the U.S.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Joint multinational peacekeeping and stability operations, enhancing interoperability with NATO forces.
• Significance: Part of the annual U.S.-Ukraine bilateral exercise program under the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) initiative.

 

Sea Breeze 2012 (July 2012)

• Location: Black Sea (Odessa and Mykolaiv regions, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM & U.S. Navy), NATO allies, and partner nations.
• Focus: Maritime security, counter-piracy, and naval interoperability.
• Significance: A long-running U.S.-Ukraine co-hosted exercise promoting regional stability in the Black Sea.

 

Saber Guardian/Rapid Reaction 2012 (June-July 2012)

• Location: Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria (multinational, with Ukrainian participation)
• Participants: U.S. Army Europe, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and other NATO/PfP nations.
• Focus: Combined arms training, command post exercises, and rapid deployment operations.

 

Other Engagements:

• Ukraine also participated in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) drills and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) events, focusing on defense reforms and interoperability.

 

2013Exercise Rapid Trident (2013)

• Date: July 2013
• Location: International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC), Yavoriv, Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members (including the U.S.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Interoperability, peacekeeping operations, and joint command procedures.
• Details: This annual U.S.-led exercise aimed to enhance cooperation between Ukrainian forces and NATO allies, focusing on peace support and stability operations.

 

Exercise Sea Breeze (2013)

• Date: July 2013
• Location: Black Sea region (Odessa and Mykolaiv areas, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. Navy (6th Fleet), and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-piracy, and naval interoperability.
• Details: A U.S.-Ukraine co-hosted exercise involving naval, air, and ground forces to improve Black Sea security cooperation.

 

Exercise Saber Guardian / Rapid Reaction (2013)

• Date: June–July 2013
• Location: Multiple locations in Europe, including Ukraine’s participation.
• Focus: Multinational command post and field training exercises.
• Details: Part of a broader NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) effort, involving U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and allied forces.

 

Other Cooperative Drills

• Ukraine also engaged in smaller-scale NATO-Ukraine exercises, including medical, logistics, and command post training under the NATO-Ukraine Annual National Program (ANP).

 

2014

In 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine intensified its military cooperation with NATO and the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). Several key exercises were conducted to enhance interoperability and strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Here are the notable exercises from that year:

Exercise Sea Breeze (July–August 2014)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odessa)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM/NATO), and other allied nations.
• Focus: Maritime security operations, including anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Conducted amid heightened tensions in the Black Sea region following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

 

Exercise Rapid Trident (September 2014)

• Location: International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC), Yavoriv, Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members (including the U.S.), and partner nations.
• Focus: Joint multinational training to improve interoperability with NATO forces, including field maneuvers, peacekeeping operations, and counterinsurgency tactics.
• Significance: This was part of the long-running Rapid Trident series, but the 2014 iteration took on greater importance due to the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

 

Exercise Fearless Guardian (Planned for 2015, but preparations began in late 2014)

• Background: Although officially launched in April 2015, planning and initial coordination with U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) started in late 2014.
• Focus: Training Ukrainian National Guard units in counterinsurgency and defensive operations, with U.S. Army instructors.

 

Other NATO-Ukraine Cooperation in 2014

• NATO Trust Funds for Ukraine: Established to support military rehabilitation, logistics, and cyber defense.
• Increased U.S. Military Aid: The U.S. began providing non-lethal assistance (e.g., body armor, medical supplies, and communications equipment) and stepped up advisory missions.

 

2015

The exercises were part of NATO’s response to Russia’s support for the Ukrainian militia in the Donbas, aimed at improving Ukraine’s military capabilities and interoperability with Western forces. They also signaled Western support for Ukraine amid ongoing conflict in Donbas.

Fearless Guardian 2015 (April–November 2015)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine
• Participants: U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), Ukrainian Armed Forces, and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Training Ukrainian National Guard units in defensive tactics, medical aid, and countering hybrid threats.
• Significance: Part of the U.S. Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) program to bolster Ukraine’s military readiness.

 

Saber Guardian/Rapid Griffin (July 2015)

• Location: Multiple locations in Europe, including Ukraine.
• Participants: U.S. Army Europe, Ukrainian forces, and other Eastern European allies.
• Focus: Large-scale multinational maneuvers to enhance regional security and NATO-Ukraine cooperation.

 

Rapid Trident 2015 (September 2015)

• Location: Yavoriv Combat Training Center, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., NATO allies, and partner nations (over 1,800 troops from 18 countries).
• Focus: Enhancing interoperability between Ukrainian forces and NATO, including command post exercises, field training, and peacekeeping operations.
• Significance: Part of the U.S.-led Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) initiative to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities.

 

Sea Breeze 2015 (September 2015)

• Location: Black Sea (Odessa and Mykolaiv regions, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (Navy and Marines), NATO members (including Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and others).
• Focus: Maritime security, amphibious operations, and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Annual U.S.-Ukraine co-hosted exercise aimed at improving Black Sea security.

 

2016

The exercises in 2016 were part of NATO’s broader support for Ukraine following Russia’s aggression, emphasizing interoperability, defensive capabilities, and reforms aligned with NATO standards. The U.S. and EUCOM played a central role in funding and organizing these drills.

Exercise Rapid Trident (2016)

• Location: Yavoriv Combat Training Center, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., NATO allies, and partner nations (over 1,800 troops from 15 countries)
• Focus: Joint multinational interoperability, peacekeeping operations, and defensive drills.
• Led by: U.S. Army Europe (now U.S. Army Europe and Africa) in partnership with Ukraine.

 

Exercise Sea Breeze (2016)

• Location: Black Sea (hosted by Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (Navy and Marines), NATO members (including Romania, Turkey, and others).
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, and naval interoperability.
• Led by: U.S. 6th Fleet and Ukrainian Navy.

 

Exercise Saber Guardian/Rapid Griffin (part of U.S.-led drills)

• While Saber Guardian 2016 primarily involved Eastern European NATO allies (e.g., Romania, Bulgaria), Ukraine participated in related training under the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U), a U.S.-led effort to enhance Ukrainian Armed Forces’ capabilities.

 

Exercise Fearless Guardian (2015–2016, ongoing training)

• Though officially launched in 2015 under the U.S. Army Europe’s Operation Atlantic Resolve, this program continued into 2016, providing Ukrainian troops with training in counter-artillery, medical response, and tactical maneuvers.

 

Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) 2016

• Overview: A NATO-wide strategic political-military exercise to rehearse consultation and decision-making procedures. While not Ukraine-specific, Ukraine is a NATO partner and may have participated in related activities.

 

2017

The 2017 exercises were part of a broader strategy to enhance the readiness and interoperability of Ukrainian forces with NATO and partner nations in response Russia’s support for the Donbas.

Sea Breeze 2017

• Date: July 10–22, 2017
• Location: Black Sea (Odessa and Mykolaiv regions, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., NATO members (including Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria), and other partners.
• Focus: Maritime security operations, amphibious warfare, and anti-submarine warfare.

 

Saber Guardian 2017 (Part of Allied Shield exercises)

• Date: July 2017
• Location: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria (Ukrainian observers participated)
• Participants: Multiple NATO members and partners.
• Focus: Large-scale multinational land operations, though Ukraine’s role was limited compared to its involvement in other drills.

 

Rapid Trident 2017

• Date: September 2017
• Location: Yavoriv Combat Training Center, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., NATO allies, and partner nations (over 2,500 troops from 15 countries).
• Focus: Enhancing interoperability between Ukrainian forces and NATO through command post and field training exercises.

 

Joint Endeavor 2017 (Cyber Defense Exercise)

• Date: November 2017
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE).
• Focus: Strengthening cyber defense capabilities against hybrid threats.

 

2018

The 2018 exercises were part of Ukraine’s post-2014 push for NATO compatibility following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Donbas conflict. The U.S. and NATO emphasized “territorial defense” training, reflecting Ukraine’s need to counter hybrid threats.

Exercise Rapid Trident (2018)

• Location: Yavoriv Combat Training Center, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Over 2,200 troops from 14 nations, including Ukraine, the U.S., and other NATO allies.
• Focus: Joint multinational interoperability, peacekeeping operations, and defensive maneuvers.
• Significance: Part of the U.S.-led European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) to bolster Eastern European partners.

 

Exercise Sea Breeze (2018)

• Location: Black Sea (primarily near Odesa and Mykolaiv, Ukraine)
• Participants: Naval forces from Ukraine, the U.S., and other NATO members (e.g., Romania, Turkey).
• Focus: Maritime security, anti-submarine warfare, and amphibious operations.
• Context: Aimed at countering Russian dominance in the Black Sea post-2014 annexation of Crimea.

 

Exercise Joint Endeavor (2018)

• Part of: NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Program (EOP), which included Ukraine as one of six “enhanced partners.”
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) testing interoperability between NATO and Ukrainian forces in crisis response.

 

Exercise Saber Guardian (2018 – Limited Involvement)

• While primarily a U.S. Army Europe-led exercise in Bulgaria/Hungary/Romania, Ukrainian forces participated in related training events under NATO’s framework.

 

Clear Sky 2018

• Conducted in mid-October 2018, primarily at Starokostiantyniv Air Base in western Ukraine.
• Marked Ukraine’s largest aviation exercise to date, with participation from the United States and eight other nations (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine).
• Approximately 950 personnel took part, including robust participation from the California Air National Guard as part of the U.S. State Partnership Program.
• Focus areas included air interdiction, air-to-ground integration, air mobility operations, aeromedical evacuation, cyber defense, and personnel recovery.
• U.S. aircraft involved included F-15C Eagles, C-130J Super Hercules, KC-135s, and MQ-9 drones.

 

Other Multinational Exercises Involving Ukraine

• Iron Wolf 2018: A Lithuanian-led exercise held in November 2018 in Lithuania, involving around 3,500 troops from 13 NATO Allies and partner nation Ukraine. While not hosted in Ukraine, it included Ukrainian participation and focused on defensive operations and rapid mobility with NATO battlegroups.

 

2019

 

Exercise Sea Breeze (July 2019)

• Location: Black Sea (Odesa and Mykolaiv regions)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (co-hosted with USEUCOM), and NATO allies (including UK, Canada, Turkey, and others).
• Focus: Maritime security operations, amphibious warfare, and anti-submarine warfare.

 

Exercise Saber Guardian (July 2019)

• Location: Multiple Eastern European countries (Ukraine participated in related drills)
• Participants: U.S. Army Europe (now U.S. Army Europe and Africa), NATO allies, and partners, including Ukraine.
• Focus: Large-scale multinational maneuvers to enhance readiness and coordination.

 

Exercise Rapid Trident (September 2019)

• Location: Yavoriv Combat Training Center, Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (led by USEUCOM), and multiple NATO allies.
• Focus: Joint multinational training to enhance interoperability among NATO and partner nations, including command post exercises and field training.

 

Exercise Maple Arch 2019 (October-November 2019)

• Location: Poland (with Ukrainian participation)
• Participants: Ukraine, Poland, U.S., and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Air defense and joint operations training.

 

Exercise Joint Endeavor 2019 (November 2019)

• Location: Germany (but involved Ukrainian forces in NATO interoperability drills)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and NATO members.
• Focus: Command post exercise testing NATO’s rapid reinforcement capabilities, including Ukrainian staff officers in NATO-led scenarios.

 

Other Related Exercises

The U.S. Army Europe also participated in a series of nine exercises in the Black Sea and Balkan regions during May and June 2019, including Immediate Response and Saber Guardian, but these were not specifically noted as involving Ukraine directly in the provided results.

 

2020Exercise Sea Breeze 2020

• Date: July 2020 (initially scaled down due to COVID-19)
• Location: Black Sea region (Odessa, Mykolaiv, and nearby waters)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (Navy & Marines), NATO members (Romania, Turkey, Spain, etc.), and partners (Georgia).
• Focus: Maritime security, amphibious operations, and anti-submarine warfare.

 

Exercise Rapid Trident 2020

• Date: September 2020
• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Western Ukraine
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., NATO allies, and partner nations (including the UK, Canada, Poland, and others).
• Focus: Enhanced interoperability between Ukrainian forces and NATO, including command post exercises (CPX) and field training (FTX).

 

Exercise Maple Arch 2020 (Ukraine-Canada bilateral)

• Date: September 2020
• Location: Ukraine
• Focus: Tactical medical training and combat readiness.

 

Exercise Combined Resolve XIII (USEUCOM-led, with Ukrainian observers)

• Date: September-October 2020
• Location: Hohenfels Training Area, Germany
• Focus: Large-scale combat operations with NATO allies (Ukraine participated as an observer).

 

Exercise Joint Endeavor 2020

• Date: November 2020
• Location: Germany (virtual/command-post format due to pandemic)
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members, and partners.
• Focus: Crisis response, command & control (C2), and multinational coordination.

 

Bomber Task Force Missions

• On September 4, 2020, U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bombers entered Ukrainian airspace for the first time, conducting a long flight along the borders of Crimea.
• These missions were part of broader U.S.-NATO bomber integration training across Europe, demonstrating U.S. commitment to security in the region and interoperability with NATO and Ukrainian forces.

 

2021

In 2021, Ukraine participated in several significant military exercises with NATO and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), reinforcing interoperability and defense capabilities amid rising tensions with Russia.

Exercise Defender-Europe 2021 (May-June 2021)

• A large-scale U.S.-led multinational exercise across Europe, involving over 28,000 troops from 26 nations.
• Ukraine contributed mechanized units and participated in drills focused on joint maneuvers, logistics, and command operations.
• Part of the exercise took place in Yavoriv, Ukraine, at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC), a key training hub for NATO-Ukraine cooperation.

 

Exercise Sea Breeze 2021 (June-July 2021)

• A major naval and air exercise co-hosted by Ukraine and the U.S. in the Black Sea.
• Involved 32 ships, 40 aircraft, and 5,000 troops from over 30 countries (including NATO members).
• Russia strongly opposed the drills, accusing NATO of escalating tensions in the region.

 

Exercise Rapid Trident 2021 (September 2021)

• An annual U.S.-Ukraine co-led exercise under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.
• Held at Yavoriv Combat Training Center, involving 6,000 troops from 15 countries (including NATO members).
• Focused on interoperability, peacekeeping, and defensive operations.

 

Exercise Cossack Mace 2021 (October-November 2021)

• A command-post exercise (CPX) involving Ukrainian forces and NATO allies.
• Focused on joint staff planning, crisis response, and hybrid warfare scenarios.

 

Exercise Joint Endeavor 2021 (November 2021)

• A communications and cybersecurity exercise aimed at improving NATO-Ukraine coordination in electronic warfare and secure data exchange.

 

Additional Engagements

• NATO Days in Ukraine 2021: NATO teams visited Ukrainian Armed Forces Institutes, providing presentations and briefings to enhance cooperation and understanding

https://sonar21.com/the-road-to-war-in-ukraine-the-history-of-nato-and-us-military-exercises-with-ukraine-part-3/

 

READ FROM TOP.

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

 

WE'D LIKE TO THANK LARRY JOHNSON FOR HIS REMARKABLE RESEARCH....

I still clearly remember the scene when our teacher read the episode to us first-grade pupils in which Pinocchio, once again caught telling an untruth, was swiftly punished by having his wooden nose extended – an outrageous disgrace to all truthful, honest people. At the time, I was paralysed with shock: I was one of those children who knew the tricks of the white lie and used them from time to time. Involuntarily, I reached for my nose, which fortunately was not yet elongated, but only occasionally not quite immaculately cleaned.
  220 years after the publication of the Pinocchio book, the lie is firmly established as a political tool. What’s more, in view of existing wars and the threat of a third world war, dealing with the truth and its opposite is becoming a weapon in a second war, the war of opinions. In this war, secret services and large corporations enslaved to them, which sell nothing other than opinions, play a major role. And thus undermine the foundation of any real democracy.
  In his extensive and meticulously documented essay on the genesis and significance of the Ukraine war for the whole world, Patrik Baab, political scientist, journalist and author, also repeatedly mentioned this other Ukraine war in the issue of Current Concerns (No. 5/6 of 11 March 2025), the war for our opinions, the strategically approached manipulative steering of our thoughts in the desired direction. Baab’s article, which presents and summarises his research work, is also a compendium in this respect. Step by step, the carefully arranged web of lies that the Western elites, above all the arms lobby, are relying on to ensure that this war continues for quite some time, even under the conditions newly articulated by Trump, becomes tangible. If Trump betrays Europe’s new crusade of the “free world” against Putin’s “Asian autocratic regime”, then the heroic EU will have to take it on itself. That’s how it sounds today in the ranks of the EU war faction and still from Germany.

 

A new great war is looming in Europe, constant lies are preparing the ground for it

Today, long noses in the Pinocchio sense should characterise above all those public officials who cannot do enough to drive their populations into senseless and hopeless wars with fear-mongering. Under the conditions of today’s “controlled democracies” in the West, primarily through the media, politically motivated lying is no longer a disgrace, but a kind of trivial offense.
  During the invasion of Poland, which triggered the Second World War, Hitler had to put his own soldiers in Polish uniforms and fabricate a fictitious attack so that he could shout over the “Volksempfänger” in the morning: “Since 5.45 a.m. we have been returning” the fire”.
  Even back then, his offense was already being misrepresented as a defence. This very simple trick has survived to this day in all wars to expand power. Even states that prove to be aggressive (the USA is one of them) only have a ministry of defence, not a ministry of aggression. The Rwandan army, which for thirty years, together with changing mercenary troops and permanent commanders, has been driving the civilian population out of the lucrative raw material mines in eastern Congo with systematic terror, unanimously recognised for years by all observers on the ground as ethnic cleansing, in order to attack the Congolese rare earths undisturbed, calls itself the Rwanda Defence Forces; the Israeli forces raging in Gaza are called the IDF (Israel Defence Forces). Hitler’s “Volksempfänger”, the obligatory short-wave receiver in every household, was a timid forerunner compared to the means that today’s “communications” industry makes available to the powerful of this world. With today’s hardball tactics and sophisticated propaganda technology nothing is left to chance. The rhetorical question “Do you want total war?” is no longer decided with a staged, thousandfold shouted “Yes!” from the mobilised NSDAP party mob, as was the case with Goebbels’ famous speech on 18 February 1943 in the Berlin Sportpalast. Today, things are quieter and more sophisticated, and it takes more effort to recognise and expose the media manipulation aimed at us. The goal is the same. The whole of Europe should say yes to the next world war, especially Germany, but also Switzerland.

 

The key role of war propaganda

Every war must overcome the natural protection of species, which has protected apes and their offshoot, Homo sapiens, from killing members of their own species for hundreds of thousands of years. In humans, this requires an extremely frightening enemy image. The fear of the enemy must be greater than the desire to resolve a conflict with an opponent. In the first case, naked anger reigns, in the second, empathy and trust that the partner is fair and will remain so. The inner switch is not given to us by instinct, as is the case in the higher animal world through the law of species protection. Human impulses are hardly guided by instinct, but by the cerebrum which reacts not only rationally, but also emotionally. In order for the Western arms lobbies to continue to achieve their main goal of keeping war alive in a world that is moving towards serious peace, their governments and thus the politicians at the levers of power must frighten their populations. They have to conjure up an acute threat situation.
  The case of Colin Powell, American Secretary of State under G.W. Bush at the time of “Nine eleven”, is an illustrative model. In view of Bush’s announced “turning point” (he also invented his own “Zeitenwende”, not just Scholz), the great war “against terrorism” and all the “rogue states” supporting it, there was initially no tangible opponent. So, he had to be sought and found. Special commissions within the American secret services (with the help of the British and Israeli secret services) worked feverishly and found him in good time. They came across Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which had long been a thorn in the side of the USA because it was only settling its oil transactions in dollars. Iraq then also had to serve as the epitome of a rogue state. Colin Powell received enough material from the relevant secret services that his payroll writers heated up into an incendiary speech, which he then delivered to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003. The Security Council was not convinced, so Bush junior carried out his 2003 Iraq war with the bombing of Baghdad under the telling name “Shock and Awe” without the approval of the Security Council, as had already been the case in the Yugoslavian war in 1999. Powell later confessed to having spread lies and apologised for them.
  With this war and its consequences, the short-lived dream of the whole world of achieving effective disarmament and thus finally eliminating a major threat was unfortunately over. Since then, the global West, led by all the successor American administrations, has been relentless in its efforts to create a permanent situation of tension with the Russian Federation and Vladimir Putin under various pretexts. Under Obama and Biden, their stalling tactics in the face of Russia’s urgent request to receive security guarantees on Russia’s borders in view of NATO’s word-breaking expansion to the east were supported by targeted stalling and humiliation. The fact that a bloody civil war had been raging in Ukraine since 2014 was declared non-existent by the Western media and the political elite and therefore never entered our heads or our hearts. Following the model of the domino theory at the time of the Vietnam War, it is still and again being suggested today that things will only get worse after Putin’s Russia occupies Ukraine. Then the paranoid maniac in Moscow will subjugate one European country after another. “Though this be madness, yet there is method in it,” is all one can say.

 

The acceptance of a new great war is being pursued insidiously

The manipulation for the acceptance of war, the winning of the hybrid war, runs like clockwork under today’s conditions. The main lubricant for achieving the desired attitudes in the population is the media. The recipes for waging war against serious peace concepts are very simple. If you repeat a lie long enough, it will eventually become the “truth”. The mental “colour revolution” desired by these forces in the minds of as many voters as possible in Western democracies works according to this simple recipe.
  The main mental weapons used are the empty phrases provided by specialised consulting firms. They guarantee what is known as “language regulation”. Bribery and pressure ensure that large media in particular adhere to the required language rules. A prime example of this is the phrase “Putin’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine”, which has been used millions of times. This empty phrase is always casually mixed in with weather reports and sports results in the same form on Western mass communication channels. This guarantees its hammering in, on the radio every hour of every day, through maximum repetition. At the same time, mixing it with weather and sport guarantees the reinforcement of the impression that a modern war is as normal and irrevocable as football or the weather – a terribly simple and deadly effective means of getting people used to daily murder, currently mainly focused on the example of Ukraine.
  Here, too, Baab’s work provides, among many other insights, the repeatedly verified proof that the phrase “Putin’s unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine”, repeated millions of times, contains three blatant war lies in a nutshell. The Russian partial occupation of Ukraine is not a war of aggression, but a defensive war against the threatening eastward shift of NATO. Russia’s military action was not provoked by Putin, but by NATO. The war in Ukraine is not Putin’s war, it is an act of self-defence by a nation that is rightly proud of itself. It is resisting submission to the West and its presumed role as the world’s policeman and has now had enough of being subjected to decades of Western sabotage, sanctions, provocations, existential threats and humiliation (see box).

 

Brazen lying as the last word of Western democracies?

Patrik Baab is not the only one who has proven the falsehood of the war doctrine that all Western vassals of the USA worship. In his article, the serious experts he consulted also have their say. Reading the article makes one thing very clear: this war is also based on a construct of lies, which feeds the daily war of opinions in the run-up to it, at its outbreak and in the efforts to keep it alive unresolved. Baab’s chain of evidence is long and has been proven many times over with the “persuasive power of the factual”. He formulates the bitter truth as follows: “The attempt to challenge the largest nuclear power only reveals the West’s megalomania, its inability to realistically assess the balance of power. Once again, the sleep of reason has brought forth monsters. We can now dream on and dismiss the normative power of the factual as Russian propaganda, but this will only lead to more destruction. The loss of reality of Russophobic fanatics in the political and media elite of the West is the main reason for the high death toll.” (Current Concerns, No. 5/6 of 11 March) And this ride into the abyss is now to continue, with a change of horses?

* * *

“Guided Democracy”, which has been steered in the right direction for thirty years according to the recipes of American mass psychology, does not want the autonomous citizen, but rather the patronized one. Baab’s bitter conclusion results to a large extent from the deliberate leading behind the light of the entire Western society by its “elite”. This is the spiritual catastrophe that accompanies war. Emmanuel Todd, the French lateral thinker, has long predicted that it is the hollowing out of the former spiritual substance of the West, that will inevitably lead to the cultural downfall of the West. Nevertheless, it remains to be hoped and worked towards that the decline lamented by many is not inevitable. After all, the erosion was brought about, it did not “just happen”.
  And there remains a spark of hope for correction. History is made by people, it can be changed by people, otherwise there would have been no development. If historical processes had been compelling, the basic misconception, stubbornly maintained in many cultures, that man is man’s wolf would have led to the mutual destruction of the human species much earlier. This has not yet been the case. Urs Graf has pointed this out emphatically in his commentary on the current situation in Europe (“Chance of confusion – turning point?”; Current Concerns No. 5/6 of 11 March 2025). The decisive power of human beings is their empathy, their imagination. It can spiritually transcend the present, develop an image of the future, transcend the oppressive present into a better image of the future, as the philosophers say, and work towards it. The human in us human beings is of a spiritual nature. It can wither and become dull, but we cannot lose it completely as long as we are alive. Part of the hope and honour of humanity is that it has always recognised threatening lies, also the intention of those who brought them into the world, named this intention and derived knowledge and targeted action from it. 

https://www.zeit-fragen.ch/en/archives/2025/nr-9-15-april-2025/luegner-hatten-einmal-lange-nasen-und-heute-kommunikations-berater

 

 

READ FROM TOP.

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.