The empire returns: The new global order for the new world
Why the 21st century might not be as post-imperial as we thought

By Timofey Bordachev

Changes in the modern world suggest that the imperial order may not be so morally obsolete after all. Empires could return to world politics – not only as dark shadows of the past.

‘Empire’ may soon become a buzzword for discussing the direction in which the world’s political organization is heading. US President Donald Trump’s incessant talk of annexing Canada and Greenland to the US, the musings of Dutch politicians about splitting up Belgium – these are just the first sips of the great debate that will inevitably emerge as the order created in the second half of the 20th century unravels.

This order, it should be remembered, was based on granting independence to as many peoples as possible. The US, which promoted this concept, always assumed it was much easier to subjugate small and weak countries economically than to deal with large territorial powers.

The new ‘empire game’ is being launched by the West, while the rest of the world looks on – though not necessarily eager to join in. As always, Russia – whose supposed intent to restore an empire is a favorite thesis of US and European military propaganda – has acted with restraint, especially in relation to countries of the former Soviet Union. Russian observers, of course, have their own ideas when neighboring states look fragile or hostile powers try to exploit their territory to harm Russia.

In academic and popular literature, the concept of ‘empire’ is among the most compromised – largely thanks to American authors. In the popular imagination, it is associated either with the ancient world or with the era when aging European empires, including Russia, sought to impose their will on the rest of humanity. Ultimately, this culminated in World War I (1914-18), in which virtually every empire perished – physically or politically. Later, the US, which had rejected imperialism, and Russia, reborn as the USSR, rose to global prominence. They soon began calling each other empires, reinforcing the term’s negative connotation.

Even today, using the word ‘empire’ as a strategic foreign policy goal is considered the domain of political outliers. This is especially true because friendly nations in the Global South that are aligned with Russia view empires with deep suspicion. To them, empires represent European colonizers who brought nothing but plunder, followed by neocolonial domination through bribed elites and exploitative economic deals.

In this respect, Russia was never an empire in the European sense of the word. Its core principle was the integration of local elites into the Russian state and the development of new territories. A striking indicator is the demographic statistics of Central Asia since its incorporation into Russia, especially during its time in the USSR. There is reason to believe that the current demographic boom in the five republics of the region is still supported by the health and social policies of the 20th century. Whether that continues, as these countries gravitate towards a South Asian model with harsher climates, remains to be seen.

Even now, the concept of empire remains mostly negative. However, in recent decades, it has increasingly been applied to the US, and occasionally, to Europe. The ‘American empire’ has become a staple in public debate, referring to Washington’s ability to enlist many countries in its foreign policy ventures. As for Europe, it’s mostly rhetorical. While Western European powers maintain some influence over their former colonies, it can hardly be called imperial. Talk of the EU as an empire quickly turns into satire. A “blooming garden” may sound nice, but an empire – with its sense of unchallenged might and unchecked expansion – is something modern the bloc is ill-equipped to embody.

Yet there are now signs that empires may return to world politics – not just as echoes of the past. First, in a functional sense: As a way of organizing security and development in a chaotic world, both for the empire’s own people (Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ springs to mind) and for other nations under its wing. These discussions are becoming inevitable as old frameworks collapse and crises grow – whether we like it or not.

In the West, this discussion uses different language than history books do. But the idea is the same: Improve conditions at home by extending control abroad. Traditional economic partnerships no longer suffice. The competition from other great powers is too fierce. Trump often warns that if the US doesn’t take Canada or Greenland, China or Russia will. Russia, of course, has no such plans. But it’s becoming axiomatic that direct administrative control is seen as essential for future security.

There are good reasons for this, grounded in reality. International institutions are failing. The UN, hampered by Western sabotage, is becoming almost a symbolic organization. While Russia will continue to defend the UN’s role and international law – perhaps even successfully – the weakening of 20th-century institutions hasn’t led to credible replacements. BRICS is an impressive exception but does not aim to replace national governments in their core functions.

The EU, an old-style institution, is slowly drifting towards disintegration. Other international bodies have no real means to compel members to meet obligations. As a result, the major powers propping up these institutions are left disillusioned.

Even developments in science and tech fuel imperial discussions. While the author is no expert here, it’s clear that AI competition could lead to ‘digital empires’ –zones of dominance by tech giants from capable states. Another factor is the failure of some countries to maintain peace in their neighborhoods, reviving questions about whether imperial models are as obsolete as once thought.

But empires are hugely expensive. Even Western empires paid dearly to maintain their reach – remember Kipling’s grim lines about British soldiers’ fate after retirement in the likes of ‘Tommy’ and ‘The Last of the Light Brigade’? That’s why Britain and France happily shed their empires mid-century. Russia later realized it didn’t need vast territories, contributing to the USSR’s collapse. Still, in places like Tbilisi, some locals quietly express nostalgia for being part of a great power’s multicultural elite.

Another key obstacle is the contribution of new territories to the core state’s stability and prosperity. Russia isn’t trying to recreate an empire because it is now a different kind of state – combining imperial traits with principles unfamiliar to Europe, especially the equality of its citizens. True equality demands cultural cohesion, or at least a foundation for it. Russia and the USSR historically overextended this idea, often to their detriment. Today, Russia seeks new ways to ensure its neighbors’ security without harming its own interests.

This article was first published by Vzglyad newspaper and was translated and edited by the RT team.

https://www.rt.com/news/616753-empire-returns-new-global-order/

SEE ALSO: 

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650040802578658

The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century

Pages 26-46 | Published online: 21 Feb 2009 

Emre İşeri 

SEE ALSO: 

READ FROM TOP.

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.