On D. Trump’s “slip of the tongue” in characterizing relations with China

BY Vladimir Terehov

During a May 13 meeting with journalists at the White House, U.S. President Trump used the term “unification” when describing the state of relations with China. This was interpreted by commentators as a possible radical change in Washington’s policy on the Taiwan issue.

The context of the current state of U.S.-China relations

Let us quote in full the phrase of the American president, which caused so much commotion not only in the expert community, but also among responsible politicians: “They’ve agreed to open China, fully open China, and I think it’s going to be fantastic for China, I think it’s going to be fantastic for us, and I think it’s going to be great for unification and peace.” The White House press secretariat immediately followed with a “clarification” in the sense that the author of the unfortunate phrase, commenting on the 90-day mutual deferral of the implementation of “slaughter” tariffs, was referring to U.S.-China relations, not China-Taiwan relations.

As for Taiwan itself, it should be borne in mind that in recent months, they’ve been practically tripping over themselves in their eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the new U.S. administration 

However, this did not affect the fantasies of the commentators, who have good reasons for this. Indeed, what does “unification” have to do with it, if it was supposedly about the relations between the two currently leading world players. Which, of course, will never “unite”, if even the said relations move from the current de facto state of confrontation to a certain format of cooperation. But the same word “unification” fully reflects the key point in the PRC’s relations with Taiwan, and the Taiwan issue itself is one of the main obstacles to a possible “transition”. Meanwhile, and judging, in particular, by the main content of the above phrase, this is exactly what the current U.S. president personally would like.

But if something like that is “spinning” in his head, it directly contradicts the prevailing sentiments in the American political establishment regarding relations in general with the main geopolitical opponent, as well as, in particular, the Taiwan issue. There is plenty of evidence of this. Congress is at the forefront of the growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Washington, and on a bipartisan basis and in both chambers. The same positions are held by the “hardline faction” and a number of top officials of the Trump administration itself.

Among the most recent manifestations of such “activity” in Congress, let us point first of all to the bill currently being drafted to “codify,” i.e., make binding, the so-called “Six Assurances” of support for Taiwan. They were formulated in the early 1980s as part of the foreign policy activities of the executive branch of the U.S. government, which then established diplomatic relations with the PRC and terminated them with Taiwan.

Another equally significant initiative of this kind could be the project proposed by some congressmen for Taiwan to join the NATO Plus club, which currently includes Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. We note the presence in this initiative of elements of an “ambush” for D. Trump himself, who has taken a course to revise relations with NATO as a whole. A special committee in the lower house of the U.S. parliament, whose activities are fully devoted to “fighting Chinese Communists,”does not let us forget about it. This is despite the fact that the most important “Chinese Communists” are regular guests of the U.S. executive branch.

As for China’s detractors within the latter [the U.S. administration], those particularly vocal with what might euphemistically be called “less-than-friendly” remarks regarding Taiwan issues are primarily P. Hagerty and M. Rubio – in other words, the very officials overseeing the nation’s defense and foreign policy apparatus.

Meanwhile, the U.S. business community advocates for constructive and mutually beneficial relations with China – a force that could bolster President Trump’s position should he genuinely intend to continue the positive trend in Sino-American relations that emerged during the final phase of his first presidency. Recently, China has been hosting an increasing number of American business representatives, who consistently convey to their Chinese counterparts a strong desire to develop mutually advantageous cooperation.

This stance was articulated with particular clarity by Michael Hart, President of the American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham China), during his participation in the Global Trade and Investment Forum held in Beijing on May 22. Just a week earlier, reports emerged about U.S. tech giant NVIDIA’s plans to establish a research center in Shanghai. Notably, this decision came immediately after the latest U.S. administration’s measures aimed at excluding China from global supply chains in this cutting-edge industry sector.

It is quite likely that in favor of the above-mentioned (hypothetical, let us emphasize) plans of D. Trump may also play his agreement to cancel for the next three months the “murderous” tariffs in trade with China. For the consequences of a very risky measure (characteristic, however, for D. Trump, a businessman) to introduce them have already had a very negative impact not only on American business, but also on the average citizen.

Reaction in the PRC and Taiwan to D. Trump’s “slip of the tongue”

China, naturally, has also taken note of the debated “slip of the tongue” by the U.S. President, offering commentary from two perspectives. Firstly, observers highlight that it occurred immediately after the May 10-11 Geneva talks between China’s First Vice Premier He Lifeng and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bassent, the outcomes of which were outlined in a Joint Statement. While the primary focus of the meeting was the “tariff issue” – which ostensibly prompted Trump’s initial remark – discussions evidently touched on other sensitive bilateral matters. Among these, the Taiwan issue remains one of the most perilous flashpoints, as we’ve previously underscored.

Secondly, the comments of Chinese experts focus mainly on the “nervous reaction” of the Taiwanese leadership representatives to the discussed “slip of the tongue” of the country’s leader, who is their main foreign pillar.

As for Taiwan itself, it should be borne in mind that in recent months, they’ve been practically tripping over themselves in their eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the new U.S. administration. For instance, over the coming years, Taiwan plans to spend approximately $17 billion on U.S. arms purchases. This amounts to an obvious overture toward Donald Trump – much to the local authorities’ chagrin, given that he hasn’t exempted Taiwan from his infamous “tariff policy.” The aforementioned “slip of the tongue” by the U.S. president was met with no less apprehension.

Thus, Taiwan enthusiastically welcomes any positive gestures toward its local authorities – whether from official Washington or nominally “independent” organizations. One such group, Freedom House, awarded a token honor in late May to Taiwan’s “government and civil society” for their “tireless efforts to safeguard vibrant democracy.” Yet, it bears noting that these so-called “Houses” carry the indelible stain of “political Pharisees” – a taint that inevitably transfers to whoever earns their approval.

Finally, let us venture to suggest that the so-called “slip of the tongue” discussed here may not have been accidental at all. Despite Donald Trump’s well-documented penchant for colorful and verbose rhetoric – a trait characteristic, it must be said, of American political discourse in general – this particular remark appears far too deliberate to be dismissed as mere happenstance.

Irresponsible “verbal diarrhea” and outright delusional ramblings are the hallmark of schizoid propaganda. Its most zealous warriors – devoid of any demonstrable expertise – incessantly spew verbal condemnations targeting entire continents, “empires,” or work themselves into quasi-religious hysterics over the most complex matters of statecraft.

Another global massacre, this time with the use of nuclear weapons, is invariably “predicted”. For some reason, Russia and Germany are again placed in its center. Strange, we should note, is the predilection for such a format of (projected ?) massacre. Although, even following the “logic” of propaganda, there are options.

While the above assumption, if it reflects to some extent the realities between the two leading global players, is good news for the rest of the world as well.

 

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific issues

 

https://journal-neo.su/2025/06/03/on-d-trumps-slip-of-the-tongue-in-characterizing-relations-with-china/

 

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YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

 

 

The United States and the Indo-Pacific Region: A Strategy to Contain China through Alliance Building

Rebecca Chan, June 03, 2025
The Indo-Pacific region has once again fallen into an old trap—not one of geography, but of geopolitical theater, with Washington still scripting the play.

 

The Return of Bloc Logic

To the applause of its “allies,” the United States is reintroducing bloc logic to the region—not as an echo of the Cold War, but as a redesigned, more flexible, yet no less aggressive remake. Joint exercises with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, naval visits, flag-showing operations—this is not about defense; it’s about orchestrating fear. It’s the architecture of a new coloniality, where instead of a protectorate, there is “key partnership” status, and instead of direct occupation—“joint command.”

The so-called strategy of containing China is not about protecting the region—it is about annexing it into the American security system. Sanitized language like “integration” conceals the de facto absorption of entire states into the Pentagon’s orbit. Command centers, intelligence-sharing pacts, modular fleets—these are not so much tools of defense as instruments of power projection. It’s entirely possible that the White House no longer feels the need to pretend that China is merely a competitor. It is the designated adversary. And the entire Indo-Pacific stage is being arranged for the grand performance called “The United States versus China.”

Yet, there’s one question this play still hasn’t answered: how voluntary are the supporting actors?

Soft Underbelly of China: The Philippines as a Pressure Point

U.S.–Philippine Military Cooperation

Every dock that receives a U.S. warship becomes a point of no return—even if partnership is the word spoken ashore 

The Philippines is not just an ally. It is the frontier. The forward line of a new neocolonial campaign, where chessboards are replaced by minefields and every move Manila makes is framed as a “sovereign decision,” made under Washington’s all-seeing gaze.

The South China Sea has become a laboratory of managed escalation: water cannons against buoys, ramming instead of diplomacy—all against the backdrop of American nods of approval. Formally, it’s sovereign resistance. In reality, it’s a shadow play, where every Philippine maneuver echoes a baton waved from across the ocean. Manila performs confrontation like an actor in a bad play, but it’s the Pentagon that holds the curtains. The entire stage, meanwhile, is littered with the traces of transnational corruption and bribery that harm not only the Philippines, but neighboring states from Hong Kong to Thailand.

While Chinese ships maneuver near Second Thomas Shoal, the U.S. is upgrading bases, expanding legal guarantees of mutual defense, and building out intelligence channels. This is not assistance—it is systematic embedding. As in classic imperial logic, every “helper” turns out to be a new overseer. Geopolitics transforms the archipelago into a corridor of American influence—with bases instead of rooms, and satellites instead of windows.

U.S.–Japan–Philippines Trilateral Command Center

The establishment of a trilateral command center is no longer just muscle-flexing. It is the open institutionalization of control. This new center marks the end of ad hoc alliances and the beginning of systemic dependence. For China, it’s a foothold under the belly; for the U.S., it’s a control panel for a war that needs no formal declaration.

This is what modernized colonial architecture looks like in the 21st century: maps filled with sovereign nations, tied in reality by cords of allied obligations, military agreements, and defense protocols. The irony is that all this is sold as “security.” But security for whom? For a region dragged into someone else’s game? Or for the metropole projecting power without paying the cost?

The Philippines is no longer just a coastline. It is a living shield, pushed closer to Beijing with American money—but paid for in local blood.

Japan as Outpost and Operator

Japan’s New Military Doctrine

Japan is once again stepping onto the front line. But now, not as a power seeking its own voice, but as an outpost, dutifully reinforced under the guidance of its former occupier. Increases in the defense budget, purchases of strike missiles, investments in cybersecurity—all of this is, of course, presented as an “internal decision.” Yet behind every item of Japan’s “sovereign choice” looms the outline of the Pentagon.

Tokyo, once condemned for militarism, is today the apologist of a new militarization—but under the right flag. No longer a fearsome aggressor, but a “responsible partner” in the U.S. strategy. In Washington’s language, this means: a tool with historical amnesia and a well-defined functionality. Japan is now the operator of new operations—with the capacity to project force beyond the archipelago and direct access to the command interfaces of the global military machine.

When a former empire becomes a satellite of another, this is no longer about sovereignty. It’s about a redistribution of roles in the same old play.

Regional Mediation and the Risks of Dependency

Japan likes to call itself a bridge. But a bridge is always a structure for someone else to walk across. Tokyo plays an ambitious role as mediator between Anglo-Saxon alliances and Southeast Asia, offering infrastructure, diplomacy, and investment. It seems like initiative, development, strategic thinking. But reality is harsher: the more deeply Japan is drawn into the architecture of Pax Americana, the less it resembles an architect—and the more it resembles a tool.

Trilateral formats, infrastructure projects, diplomatic activity—all of this fits seamlessly into the American system of China containment. Infrastructure investments, which Tokyo uses to mask its role in new bloc logistics, are just one form of this struggle—where the West tears off the humanitarian storefront signs and rolls out the heavy machinery of competition for the region’s roads, ports, and fiber optics. And even if Japanese politicians are convinced of their autonomy, the logistics tell a different story. One step off course—and the fragile “bridge” finds itself suspended between loyalty and isolation.

With every passing year, Japan becomes less of an independent actor and more of an indispensable operator. But an operator is not the one who writes the rules. It’s the one who pushes the button—when told to.

Australia and New Zealand: War Logistics and Symbols of Participation

The Role of AUKUS and U.S. Infrastructure in Australia

Australia is no longer the southern flank—it is the southern hangar. A country once associated with Pacific independence is now becoming a transit hub for a future war. Not a defensive bastion, but the engineering bay of a new cold campaign. Ammunition depots, repair bases, refueling airstrips—these are not just consequences of the AUKUS alliance, but symptoms of a deep strategic surrender of sovereignty.

Washington is building out logistics in advance as if war is already a scheduled campaign. Not “if,” but “when.” Not a hypothesis, but a scenario. Australia is merely a geographically distant stage where props, scenery, and tools are placed ahead of time. And the lead role in this production is still played by the United States—as the director of a global conflict, casting Canberra as a set, not a character.

Submarine program? A technological gift? In reality—a strategic tether. The moment you receive a nuclear toy from the U.S., your foreign policy is no longer written in parliament, but at AUKUS headquarters.

The Significance of the USS Blue Ridge Visit to New Zealand

And here comes the symbolism. When the USS Blue Ridge slowly sails into New Zealand’s waters, it may seem like a polite visit. But in geopolitics, nothing is ever truly “polite.” This is not just the flagship of the 7th Fleet. It is a message made manifest—not to China, but to hesitant allies: “You’re already inside. Don’t fool yourselves with neutrality.”

New Zealand, a country that traditionally kept its distance from rigid military schemes, is now welcoming American ships into its waters. This isn’t integration—it’s a precedent. And from precedents, a web of dependency is woven.

There’s no need for pacts, statements, or speeches from the podium. One port call is enough. Every dock that receives a U.S. warship becomes a point of no return—even if partnership is the word spoken ashore.

This is the true logic of an undeclared alliance: drawing in quietly, absorbing through participation, eroding neutrality through symbols. All done under the banner of freedom—but aimed at submission.

Whose Security and Whose Game

“Enhancing collective security” — this is how the U.S. likes to frame every new turn in the militarization of the region. But whose security, exactly? Whose “collective”? The one dictated from Washington, where the maps are redrawn without the input of those actually on them?

For Asian countries, participation in the U.S. strategy is not an insurance policy—it’s a ticket into a game where the odds are pre-assigned. It’s a choice without alternatives, where every step toward alliance is a step away from autonomy. The deeper the region embeds itself in the American defense architecture, the less maneuverability it retains. Sovereignty doesn’t vanish—it evaporates in the routines of military day-to-day life: joint headquarters, unified protocols, intelligence sharing. All of this may seem like technical coordination, but in reality, it’s a daily ritual of subordination.

America is not simply reinforcing its position—it is redrawing the entire region in its own image, employing not only military alliances but also economic bludgeons, such as tariff pressure that strikes China from within. Flagless alliances, nameless bases, blocs without declarations—this is a new form of control, far more refined than the colonialism of previous centuries. It is an empire in stealth mode, smiling in the name of democracy, striking with the iron fist of “defensive necessity.”

And when the first real conflict erupts—whether with China or anyone else—the U.S. will remain at a distance. Not under fire, but behind the operations panel, watching its allies do the shooting, watching their economies crumble, watching their populations die. That is the real cost of American-style “collective security.”

Between seas, between promises and reality, between protection and submission—this in-between is where the main front of geopolitics now lies. This is where the decisive battles will unfold. Not in Washington, not in Beijing—but on the bodies and shores of those caught between two empires.

 

Rebecca Chan, Independent political analyst focusing on the intersection of Western foreign policy and Asian sovereignty

 

https://journal-neo.su/2025/06/03/the-united-states-and-the-indo-pacific-region-a-strategy-to-contain-china-through-alliance-building/

 

READ FROM TOP.

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.