Thursday 12th of June 2025

no parachute?....

The deliberate undermining of democratic norms and the conflation of personal power with national interest are consistent with patterns seen in states that have tipped into authoritarian rule.

The United States has entered a phase that resembles the early stages of a failed state. What once seemed impossible, in a country with vast resources and robust democratic traditions, now appears increasingly plausible.

 

Jesse MacKinnon

Is the US on the path to becoming a failed state?

 

The signs are evident. A government that has turned inward and become both self-protective and vindictive. An economy that is straining under a combination of political hubris and international estrangement. A population facing widening inequality and the fraying of social bonds. Historical examples of state collapse reveal that such trajectories, once set in motion, become difficult to reverse. For centrist Democrats who have long believed in the resilience of American institutions, it is essential to understand the historical precedents and the structural forces at play.

State failure is not typically marked by a single event. It is a process that begins with the corrosion of political legitimacy and ends in the disintegration of central authority. In the US, this erosion of legitimacy can be seen in the deliberate politicisation of the civil service and the Justice Department, the relentless attacks on the press and civil society, and the hollowing out of regulatory agencies through mass firings and loyalty tests. Historical parallels can be found in the final years of the Roman Republic, where the Senate’s inability to manage domestic discontent and external pressures created a vacuum for strongmen like Julius Caesar to exploit. In a more modern example, Weimar Germany’s democratic institutions were systematically undermined by the combined effects of economic crisis and political extremism, leading to the Nazi seizure of power.

Economically, the US is facing a self-inflicted crisis. The decision to impose sweeping tariffs on allies and adversaries alike has triggered a trade war that has cut the country off from vital imports and provoked retaliatory measures. The stock market crash of 2025 is a direct consequence of these policies. Historically, protectionism in the face of global integration has often led to economic collapse. Argentina in the 1940s under Juan Perón embraced similar trade isolation and industrial autarky, leading to decades of stagnation. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, though a different context, was a catalyst for the downward spiral of the global economy in the Great Depression.

The military and security apparatus in the US has also been turned inward. This is a hallmark of states on the brink of collapse. The administration’s decision to conduct loyalty tests for federal employees, to dismiss or sideline those deemed “insufficiently loyal”, and to demand public fealty to the president’s personal narrative mirrors the tactics employed by autocratic regimes throughout history. In the final years of the Soviet Union, a similar pattern emerged: The KGB was weaponised to target internal dissent as the economy faltered and the central government lost its grip on reality.

Domestically, the climate is one of deepening polarisation and mounting distrust. The forced departure of civil servants, the targeting of universities and independent journalists, and the use of the Justice Department as an instrument of political retribution have weakened the structures that once mediated conflict and enabled compromise. In 1970s Chile, President Salvador Allende’s government was destabilised by economic sabotage and political violence. While the American situation is not identical, the deliberate undermining of democratic norms and the conflation of personal power with national interest are consistent with patterns seen in states that have tipped into authoritarian rule.

Internationally, the administration’s decision to pursue annexationist policies — expressed in rhetorical claims to Canada and Greenland and actual negotiations over resource extraction in Ukraine — has isolated the US from its historical allies and weakened its global standing. Such expansionist fantasies do not typically succeed in a world defined by interdependence. They more often result in international sanctions, economic isolation and domestic overreach. This was the fate of Benito Mussolini’s Italy when it attempted to carve out an empire in North Africa, only to find itself diplomatically and economically encircled.

The cumulative effect of these policies is a government that no longer serves as an impartial arbiter of competing interests, but as a factional tool of the leader and his inner circle. The normal functions of governance — delivering basic services, maintaining order, managing foreign policy — are subsumed under the political imperative of loyalty and control. This is the point at which states enter the final stage of failure. In 1990s Yugoslavia, the central government’s failure to mediate ethnic and regional disputes led directly to the violent fragmentation of the state. In the American context, this dynamic is playing out along lines of political affiliation, class and race. The militarisation of border policy, the collective punishment of protest movements, and the repeated targeting of minority communities reveal a state that is no longer willing or able to accommodate the diversity of its population.

The question of when collapse occurs is not easily answered. Historical examples show that once a state has entered the spiral of delegitimisation, economic contraction and political repression, collapse can follow within a few years. The Soviet Union’s dissolution took less than three years from the final economic crisis of 1988 to the official end in 1991. Yugoslavia’s collapse began with constitutional disputes in the late 1980s and culminated in violent disintegration by the early 1990s.

The timeline for collapse in the US is likely to be similarly short if current trends continue. The economy, already battered by tariffs and retaliatory measures, will see further contraction as foreign investment dries up and domestic confidence evaporates. Political violence, already simmering, will become more organised as the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on violence wanes.

For those who have long believed that the American system is immune to these forces, it is time to reconsider that assumption. The US has survived grave challenges before, but its survival has always depended on a functioning state that could reconcile competing interests and adapt to new circumstances. Today, that state is being systematically dismantled. The institutions that once checked presidential power are being turned into instruments of that power. The economy, once buoyed by global integration, is being sacrificed to nationalist fantasies. The courts and the press, once the guardians of democratic accountability, are being brought to heel or driven into irrelevance.

There is still room to change course. Historically, states have a narrow window to reverse the downward spiral once it begins. In some cases, a determined opposition or a political realignment can restore legitimacy and rebuild the social contract. In others, collapse proceeds until the state is no longer recognisable and must be rebuilt from the rubble. The examples of Spain in the 1930s, where collapse was narrowly averted but civil war followed, and of Greece in the 1940s, where foreign intervention postponed state failure, show that external shocks and internal realignments can interrupt the cycle of collapse, though at a high human cost.

What lies ahead for the US is not yet written in stone. But the pattern is clear and the examples from history are stark. State failure is not a single moment, but a cascade of failures that begins with the corruption of political institutions and ends with the disintegration of social order. The evidence is already present in the hollowing out of the federal government, the weaponisation of law enforcement, the trade isolation and the embrace of expansionist policies that have no place in the modern world. If these trends are not reversed, the US will become another entry in the long history of states that lost their way and collapsed under the weight of their own contradictions.

Republished from Common Dreams, 9 June 2025

 

https://johnmenadue.com/post/2025/06/is-the-us-on-the-path-to-becoming-a-failed-state/

 

SEE ALSO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTM9kHny4cw

quiet power....

 

Whispering giant: Russia’s quiet power leaves the West in the dust
Global responsibility and Moscow’s foreign policy: Between autonomy and a changing world
By Timofey Bordachev

 

One of the central paradoxes of Russia’s foreign policy is this: while its primary goal has always been to secure full autonomy in its decision-making, success has often hinged on the international environment in which it pursues that aim. Even today, as Russia enjoys a degree of internal stability unmatched in the past 25 years, global shifts are helping shape the country’s ability to resist what can only be described as the increasingly destructive efforts of the collective West.

Chief among these global changes is the unmistakable decline of Western Europe’s centrality in world affairs. Though the region still remains geographically and symbolically important – given its proximity to Russia and its alignment with the United States – it has lost the capacity to act as an independent player in global politics. Simply put, Western Europe no longer matters as much. It is no longer the center of decision-making or initiative, but a stage on which others perform.

The true centers of gravity today are countries like China and India. Their behavior no longer forms the “background noise” of international affairs – it drives global developments. For Russia, this transformation is both a strategic opportunity and a conceptual challenge.

On the one hand, it liberates Moscow from the old and often fruitless task of seeking allies within the West to safeguard its interests, particularly along its most dangerous frontiers. On the other hand, it compels Russia to reconsider the nature of its role in the world. What does global responsibility look like for a nation whose foreign policy has never been driven by messianic ideals or the desire to impose its values on others?

A civilization apart

Historically, Russia’s strategic posture has not been animated by ideological expansionism. Unlike the Western European colonial empires, Russia never pursued dominance over distant territories to extract resources or spread its worldview. Even during the height of its imperial strength, such as in the 19th-century annexation of Central Asia, the Russian Empire did not develop a colonial policy comparable to that of Britain or France. The reason lies not in a lack of capacity, but in a fundamentally different orientation: Russia has always been more concerned with preserving its internal sovereignty and strategic autonomy than with exporting its model.

Even the oft-cited concept of “Moscow as the Third Rome”is misunderstood in the West. It was never a call to global proselytizing. Unlike the United States, which often ties its foreign policy to ideological missions, Russia’s approach is deeply pragmatic and rooted in the idea of national self-preservation.

The Soviet period, of course, was an exception. The revolutionary zeal of 1917 gave Moscow a temporary ideological edge, and during the Cold War, the USSR promoted its values as part of a broader geopolitical confrontation. But even then, ideological outreach was quickly subordinated to the central strategic aim: maintaining national stability in opposition to American-led containment.

Divide and endure

Another consistent feature of Russia’s foreign policy has been the tactical use of divisions within the West. Whether confronting Sweden, Napoleonic France, or Nazi Germany, Russia always benefited from securing at least one Western partner. In the Crimean War of the 1850s and again during the Cold War, Russia suffered political setbacks in part because the Western front was unusually united.

After the Cold War ended unfavorably for Moscow, Russian strategy relied on the hope that the EU would eventually drift from Washington’s orbit and reclaim some degree of autonomy. That, clearly, has not happened. Internal crises, the erosion of elite leadership, and the rise of bureaucratic inertia have left Western Europe politically paralyzed. When the Ukraine crisis escalated into a military confrontation, the region’s powers not only failed to act independently – they leaned even harder on the United States.

This failure of EU emancipation has not strengthened Washington, however. On the contrary, Western Europe’s strategic irrelevance only underscores the West’s shrinking role in global affairs. That chapter of world history – where Europe stood at the helm – is now closed.

A global stage, a national strategy

Today, Russia faces a world where resistance to Western pressure no longer requires fractures within the Western alliance. What matters now is the emergence of a truly global system – one in which power is no longer concentrated in Euro-Atlantic hands. In this environment, Russia’s ability to assert its interests has improved not because the West is weaker per se, but because the world is more balanced.

The failure of the previous US administration to “isolate”Russia is significant not only as a diplomatic defeat for Washington, but as evidence of this wider trend. The global South has not turned against Russia. On the contrary, many emerging powers are increasingly assertive in defining their own paths, free of Western tutelage. This structural shift works to Russia’s advantage.

And yet, this new reality also imposes obligations. In a world that is waiting for Russia’s presence, Russia must now ask: what kind of global actor does it wish to be?

This is not a question of abandoning its historical pragmatism or inward-facing strategic culture. Rather, it is about integrating that realism with the unavoidable demands of global responsibility. Unlike the missionary democracies of the West, Russia does not seek to reshape the world in its own image. But as one of the few nations capable of independent action on the global stage, it must now participate in shaping that world, not simply reacting to it.

This is the conceptual challenge of the coming years. How can Russia remain true to its tradition of self-defined interest while also engaging with a multipolar world that increasingly demands initiative, leadership, and presence?

The answer will not be found in grand ideological blueprints or universalist visions. It will lie, as it always has for Russia, in a careful balancing of national sovereignty with the strategic realities of a changing global order.

 

This article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club, translated and edited by the RT team.

https://www.rt.com/russia/618930-whispering-giant-russias-quiet-power/

 

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crushing russia between a feather and a bubblegum....