Monday 30th of March 2026

instincts and feelings in his bones are not a plan....

 

Some old truths about warfare have been knocking on the door of the Oval Office in the month since US President Donald Trump and Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent US and Israeli warplanes to bomb Iran.

The failure to learn from the past means that Donald Trump now faces a stark choice. If he cannot get a deal with Iran, he can either try to declare a victory that will fool no-one, or escalate the war.

 

Jeremy Bowen: Trump is waging war based on instinct and it isn't working

by Jeremy Bowen

 

The oldest of the old truths comes from the Prussian military strategist Helmuth von Moltke the Elder: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." He was writing in 1871, the year Germany was unified as an empire, a moment that was as consequential for the security of Europe as this war might be for the security of the Middle East.

Maybe Trump prefers the boxer Mike Tyson's modern version: "Everyone has a plan until they get hit." Even more relevant for Trump are the words of one of his predecessors, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the American general who commanded the D-Day landings in 1944 and went on to serve two terms as a Republican president of the United States in the 1950s.

Eisenhower's version was "plans are worthless, but planning is everything". He meant that the discipline and process of making plans to fight a war make it possible to change course when the unexpected happens.

For Trump, the unexpected item has been the resilience of the regime in Iran. It seems that he was hoping for a repeat of the US military's lightning-fast kidnap in January of the President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. They are now in prison in New York, facing trial. Maduro's deputy Delcy Rodríguez replaced him as president and is taking orders from Washington.

Hoping for a repeat of the victory over Maduro suggests a yawning lack of comprehension of the differences between Venezuela and Iran.

Eisenhower's adage on thinking ahead came in a speech in 1957. He had been the man in charge of planning and commanding the largest amphibious military operation in history, the invasion of western Europe on D-Day, so he knew what he was talking about.

He went on to explain that when an unexpected emergency arises "the first thing you do is to take all the plans off the top shelf and throw them out the window and start once more. But if you haven't been planning you can't start to work, intelligently at least".

"That is the reason it is so important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the character of the problem that you may one day be called upon to solve – or to help to solve."

Far from capitulating or collapsing after Israel and the US killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first air strike of the war, the regime in Tehran is functioning and fighting back. It is playing a weak hand well.

In contrast, Trump has given the impression that he is making it up as he goes along. He follows gut instincts, not the pages of intelligence and strategic advice that other presidents have ploughed through.

Trump's end point

Thirteen days into the war, Trump was asked by Fox News Radio when the war would end. He answered that he did not think that the war "would be long". As for ending it, it would be "when I feel it, feel it in my bones".

He relies on an inner circle of advisers who are in their jobs to back up his decisions and make them happen. Speaking truth to power is not, it seems, in their job description. Relying on the president's instincts rather than a well-worked set of plans – even if they must be adapted or discarded – makes it harder to fight a war. The lack of clear political direction blunts the devastating firepower and effectiveness of the US armed forces.

Four weeks ago, Trump and Netanyahu put their faith in a ferocious bombing campaign that killed not just the supreme leader but his closest advisors and has so far killed 1,464 Iranian civilians, according to HRANA, a US-based group that monitors human rights violations in Iran.

The two leaders were expecting a quick victory. Both challenged Iranians to follow up their bombs with a popular uprising to topple the regime.

Iran's obduracy

But the regime in Tehran still stands, still fights back and Trump is finding out why his predecessors were never prepared to join Netanyahu in a war of choice to destroy the Islamic Republic. Opponents of the regime have not risen up. They're all too aware that in January government forces killed thousands of protesters. Official warnings have been broadcast telling anyone thinking of trying to repeat the protests that they will be treated as enemies of the state.

The Iranian regime is an obdurate, ruthless, well-organised adversary. Founded after the 1979 revolution that overthrew the Shah, it was then forged in the deadly misery of the eight-year war with Iraq. The regime is built on institutions, not individuals, and reinforced by iron-clad religious beliefs and an ideology of martyrdom. That means that killing leaders, while undoubtedly shocking and disruptive, does not also become a death sentence for the regime. After January's killings, it will consider the deaths of many more Iranians, either at the hands of the regime's own forces or American and Israeli bombs as an acceptable price of survival

The Iranian regime could not hope to match the firepower of the US and Israel, but like Moltke, Tyson and Eisenhower, it has been making plans. It broadened the war, attacking its Gulf Arab neighbours as well as American bases on their territory and Israel, spreading the pain as widely as possible.

Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow entrance to the Gulf, has cut off roughly 20% of world oil supplies and sent global financial markets into a spin.

 

Iran spent years and billions of dollars building up the network of allies and proxies that Iran called 'the axis of resistance' that included Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank to threaten and deter Israel. The Israelis have hit it very hard and effectively since the Gaza war started with the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023.

But Iran is now demonstrating that a geographical feature, the narrow Strait of Hormuz, can be an even more effective deterrent and threat than its ruinously expensive system of military alliances. Iran can enforce its control of the Strait with cheap drones that can be launched from hundreds of kilometres away in Iran's mountainous interior.

Allies get killed. Geography stays the same. Short of capturing and occupying the cliffs on either side of the Strait, and a big stretch of Iranian land beyond them, the US and Israel – and the rest of the world – are discovering that the Iranian regime will demand a big say in the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

As the former deputy commander of Nato, General Sir Richard Shirreff observed on the BBC Radio 4's Today programme, any war game working through the consequences of an attack on Iran would have shown that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would close the Strait of Hormuz.

That gets back to the importance of planning how to start a war, how to end it and how to deal with the day after. Donald Trump and his inner circle, flushed with the prospect of a quick and easy victory, seem to have skipped those steps.

The 'axis of resistance' also includes the Houthis in Yemen. On Friday they fired a barrage of missiles at Israel for the first time since this war started with the airstrikes on Iran on 28 February. If the Houthis resume their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia would lose its western sea route for oil exports to Asia.

The Red Sea has its own choke point, the Bab al Mandab strait, as important for world trade as the Strait of Hormuz. If the Houthis decide to escalate by attacking shipping in Bab al Mandab and further south, as they did during the Gaza war, they would cut off the route from Asia to Europe through the Suez Canal.

That would create an even worse global economic emergency.

Netanyahu's clarity

Netanyahu, in contrast to Trump, has been thinking in detail about this war since he started the political career that has made him Israel's longest-serving prime minister. On the first full day of the war against Iran, Netanyahu recorded a video statement on the roof of the tower block in Tel Aviv known as the Kirya, which houses Israel's military headquarters. He spoke with a clarity about Israel's war aims that has eluded Trump.

That should not be a surprise. Going to war with Iran is a more straightforward proposition for Israel than the US. The preoccupations of a regional power are different to the much broader global challenges faced by the US.

Netanyahu is convinced that he can ensure Israel's future security by doing as much damage as possible to the Islamic Republic. The war, he said in the video, was "to ensure our existence and our future", Netanyahu has always regarded Iran as Israel's most dangerous enemy. His critics say that preoccupation was one of the reasons for Israel's failure to detect and stop the Hamas attacks out of Gaza on 7 October 2023.

He thanked the US military and Trump for their "assistance" and moved on to the point that for him is the heart of the matter.

"This coalition of forces allows us to do what I have yearned to do for 40 years: smite the terror regime hip and thigh. This is what I promised – and this is what we shall do."

Netanyahu and Israel's military establishment had at different times over his many years in office, looked into ways of going to war with Iran, destroying its nuclear facilities and ballistic missiles, and everything else that made it a threat to them. The conclusion in Israel was always that, while they could do Iran some serious damage, it would only be a setback for the regime. It became accepted wisdom that the only way to smash Iran's military capacity for a generation or more was in alliance with the US.

But that required a president in the White House who was prepared to go to war alongside Israel, something that had never happened despite the two countries' close relationship and Israel's dependence on US military and diplomatic support. Netanyahu could never persuade a US president that it was in America's interests to go to war with Iran – until the second term of Donald J Trump.

Despite America and Iran's bitter and toxic relationship since the Shah, a staunch US ally, was overthrown in 1979, successive US presidents believed that the best way of dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran was to contain it. During America's occupation of Iraq, it did not go to war with Iran even when Tehran was equipping and training Iraqi militias who were killing US troops. The only justification, they calculated, would be an imminent threat, especially information that Iran was close to creating a nuclear weapon.

Trump included a nuclear threat in his evolving list of reasons to go to war. But there is no credible evidence that Iran was about to get a weapon or the means to deliver one. Even the White House still has a statement on its website dated 25 June 2025 under the headline 'Iran's Nuclear Facilities Have Been Obliterated – and Suggestions Otherwise are Fake News.'

Trump is now discovering why his predecessors decided that the risks of choosing to go to war would be just too great.

Asymmetric warfare

The war looks to be turning into a classic example of how a smaller, weaker power can fight an enemy that is bigger and stronger, the kind of conflict that strategists call asymmetric warfare. It is early days, after only a month, to compare it to other wars that on paper the US was winning in terms of enemies killed and bombing raids completed in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. But it is important to remember that after years of bloodshed and killing, they all ended in ways that amounted to defeat for the United States.

The next set of decisions by Trump and Netanyahu could decide whether the war in Iran becomes another major misstep by the US. Trump has now postponed twice his threat to destroy Iran's power network – which as described by him could amount to a war crime. He says that is because Iran is desperate to make a deal to end the war, as the regime has been hit so hard by the damage and death the US has already inflicted and fear that it might do even more.

Contacts between the two sides, via the mediation of Pakistan and others, are taking place. The Iranians deny Trump's assertion that it is a full-blown negotiation.

An official text of the president's 15-point plan for peace has not been published, but leaked versions show a document that is a compilation of all the demands the US and Israel have made of Iran over many years. It reads more like terms of surrender rather than a basis for negotiation. Iran has countered with its own demands, equally unacceptable to the other side, including recognition of its control of the Strait of Hormuz, reparations for war damage, and the removal of American bases from the Middle East.

Unless both sides can make a giant leap into an unexplored middle ground of compromise, it is hard to see a deal being made. It is not impossible. The Iranian regime has a history of negotiation. Arab diplomatic sources have backed up other reports, telling me that Iran was offering a path towards a deal on its nuclear programme when the US abruptly abandoned diplomacy by going to war on 28 February. One source told me: "You know the Iranians were offering everything." That sounds like an over-simplification, and the Americans deny progress was being made, but the signs are there was room for more diplomacy when the US and Israel sent in bombers.

The war is at a critical point. If there is no deal between the Americans and the Iranians, Trump has very few choices. He could declare victory, saying America has destroyed Iran's military, therefore it is mission accomplished, and that opening the Strait of Hormuz is not his responsibility. That could melt down world financial markets and horrify his already disgruntled allies in Europe, Asia and the Gulf. A wounded, angry Iranian regime would have plenty of scope to put more pressure on the world economy.

More likely, Trump would decide to escalate the war. The Americans have more than 4,000 US Marines on ships heading to the Gulf, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne on standby and are discussing further reinforcements.

No-one is talking about a full-scale invasion of Iran, but it is possible the Americans will try to capture islands in the Gulf, including Kharg island, Iran's main oil terminal. That would involve a series of challenging and dangerous amphibious landings. That might even suit Iran, which wants to drag the Americans into a longer war of attrition. Iran calculates that the regime's capacity for pain is greater than Trump's.

Trump has found in Iran that he is coming up against the limits of his power. The Iranian regime has a different definition of victory and defeat than he does. For them, mere survival is victory. 

But now they are hoping for more, believing that control of the Strait of Hormuz gives them new leverage to make demands, perhaps even to make strategic gains. The Iranians have demanded, among other things, a promise not to be attacked in future and recognition of their control of the Strait of Hormuz as a price for opening it to all shipping.

The White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said ‌on Wednesday that "President Trump does not bluff and he is prepared to unleash hell. Iran should not miscalculate again".

"If Iran fails to accept the reality of the current moment, if they fail to understand that they have been defeated militarily, and will continue to be, President Trump will ⁠ensure they are hit harder than they have ever been hit before."

Being defeated in war is not a choice. If Iran had been as badly beaten as Trump and his people say, the regime in Tehran would have collapsed by now. He would not need to threaten them into accepting their fate.

America and Israel can do much more damage and kill many more people in Iran. In Lebanon, Israel is pressing ahead with its offensive against Hezbollah, Iran's main ally.

In the absence of a ceasefire, they calculate that they can raise the level of force until the Iranians have no choice but to yield.

That is far from certain.

The longer the war continues, the greater the consequences for the region and for the wider world. One leading Iran analyst, Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group told me they could be "catastrophic".

In 1956 the United Kingdom and France went to war alongside Israel after the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, a global waterway that was as significant a chokepoint for the world economy as the Strait of Hormuz is now. They attained all their military objectives but were forced to withdraw by President Eisenhower of the United States.

For the British, it was the beginning of the end of their imperial domination of the Middle East.

America is faced by the rise of China. When the history is written of their competition to be the world's strongest power, Trump's badly planned war against Iran might be seen as a turning point, a waystation of decline, as Suez was for the United Kingdom.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y969pnxgvo

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT — SINCE 2005.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

EU gas.....

 

Iran, Qatar and Trump’s New Gas Order: Was Europe’s Gas the Hidden Target?

BY FREDDIE PONTON

 

Ras Laffan burns, Hormuz chokes, and Trump’s envoy tells Europe to sign a $750 billion energy pact or lose its lifeline. Documents show this “shock” was structurally prepared in advance.

Trump did not need to say the quiet part out loud. His ambassador did it for him. As Europe reeled from the war’s shock to global gas markets, Washington warned Brussels that unless the EU passed the Turnberry trade deal intact, it could lose “favourable” access to U.S. liquefied natural gas, the very fuel Europe has come to depend on since the destruction of its old supply order.

That threat came just as Iranian strikes knocked out an estimated 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity at Ras Laffan for three to five years, tearing a hole through one of the world’s most important gas hubs and tightening an already panicked market. At the same time, the Strait of Hormuz crisis exposed how fragile Europe’s post‑Russia energy system had become, with analysts already warning before this phase of the war that any major Gulf disruption would push Europe even deeper into dependence on U.S. LNG.

 

This is the part of the story readers are not supposed to look at. Beneath the language of “deterrence,” “security,” and “stability,” the illegal U.S.–Israeli war on Iran is also functioning as an accelerator for a gas order that was planned long before the first missiles hit. North American LNG expansion was already underway, the EU had already formalised an Eastern Mediterranean gas corridor through Israel and Egypt, and U.S. law had already folded those energy routes into a wider security architecture built around maritime control and critical infrastructure protection.

Those pieces were in place before the first bomb hit Ras Laffan; the war is simply switching them on. What is emerging now is not a chaotic by‑product of war, but a transfer of leverage, from Qatar and the Gulf to U.S. exporters and an Israeli‑linked East Med corridor, from public energy policy to a donor‑backed system of strategic coercion, and from Europe’s already battered consumers to the corporations and political networks cashing in on their dependency.

This article follows the paper trail. It does not rely on slogans or insinuation, but on official projections, signed memoranda, statutory language, corporate contracts, and lobbying records that, when read together, show a replacement architecture waiting for precisely this kind of rupture.

The replacement architecture

Long before the latest U.S.–Israel bombing campaign on Iran, North America was quietly preparing to dominate LNG exports. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projected that North American liquefaction capacity would climb from roughly 11.4 billion cubic feet per day in early 2024 to 28.7 bcf/d by 2029, based on projects already under construction. A roster of U.S. and Canadian terminals, including Plaquemines, Corpus Christi Stage IIIGolden PassPort ArthurRio GrandeCP2, and Woodside Louisiana LNG, was scheduled to come online between 2025 and 2029. This build‑out preceded the current war; it is infrastructure designed on the assumption that the world will need a lot more non‑Russian gas and that North America will sell it.

Ras Laffan’s destruction presented that infrastructure with a brutal opportunity. Iranian strikes on the complex in March wiped out a substantial slice of Qatar’s export capacity, according to QatarEnergy’s own briefings and independent reporting, a loss estimated at 12.8 million tonnes per year (MTPA) for three to five years, or $20 billion a year in lost revenue. Before the war, Qatar supplied roughly a fifth of global LNG. For Europe, which imported significant volumes from Qatar, this is not a marginal disruption, but the sudden removal of a core supplier.

At the same time, the closure and partial re‑opening of the Strait of Hormuz choked off a major route for LNG and oil. European benchmarks spiked, with reports of gas prices doubling as traders priced in the risk that Gulf shipments could halt entirely. Italy, which sourced around a third of its LNG from Qatar (32% of its LNG mix), and other member states immediately faced higher import costs and fears of physical shortage.

None of this was unforeseeable. ACER’s 2024 LNG market report highlighted that LNG had become central to the EU’s security of supply and warned that Europe would remain exposed to LNG price volatility through the decade. A February 2026 analysis by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) warned that Europe’s post‑Ukraine pivot had created a new asymmetric dependency on U.S. LNG; if existing and announced contracts were fully realised, U.S. cargoes could provide up to 80% of EU LNG imports by 2030, and any serious Gulf disruption would harden that dependence.

The EU’s diversification initiative had already designated new sources and routes. Commission documents describe the Mediterranean as a key area for diversification, explicitly pointing to offshore gas in Israel, Egypt and Cyprus and noting that these resources can reach Europe both via pipeline and as LNG. In June 2022, the EU, Israel and Egypt signed a memorandum to export gas from Israel and other regional fields to Europe via Egypt’s LNG terminals. The text commits the parties to “stable delivery,” acceleration of exports, a regulatory roadmap, promotion of European investment in exploration and a safety framework for gas infrastructure.

Even before Ras Laffan went offline and Hormuz became a war zone, Europe’s fallback was clear, promising U.S. LNG as the backbone, and Eastern Mediterranean gas as the flank.

From security law to gas corridor

The Eastern Mediterranean gas route is not just a commercial project, because it is written into the language of security.

Section 2373 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code directs the US administration to support energy cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus, including through backing for gas pipelines and LNG terminals that can help diversify European supply away from Russia. It also calls for U.S. participation in regional dialogue on energy security, maritime security, cybersecurity and the protection of critical energy infrastructure.

By late 2025, this thinking had been translated into the 3+1 format that brings together Israel, Greece, Cyprus and the United States. A joint statement from their November 2025 ministerial in Athens reaffirms the four governments’ “commitment to energy security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean,” endorses existing and planned gas and electricity interconnection projects, and emphasises cooperation to protect critical energy infrastructure from threats.

On the European side, the 2022 EU–Israel–Egypt MoU sits at the intersection of this energy‑security matrix and EU diversification policy. The document foresees “stable deliveries” of gas to the EU via Egyptian LNG plants, commits the parties to explore ways to accelerate exports, and establishes mechanisms for regulatory cooperation, investment promotion and safety. It also includes confidentiality clauses and provisions for regular meetings. This can not be regarded as a symbolic handshake and should be understood as an operational framework.

Analyses from 2022–2025 describe Eastern Mediterranean gas as a tool for European energy security and discuss its role in alliance politics and infrastructure protection. NATO and EU work on critical maritime, transport, and energy infrastructure, particularly after the Nord Stream sabotage, further embeds pipelines and LNG terminals in a broader security mindset.

All this existed before the first wave of U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran in 2026. When the war closed Hormuz and damaged Ras Laffan, it did not create a new strategic interest in Eastern Med gas. It made an existing, security‑branded corridor suddenly more valuable.

The Trump–LNG complex

Overlay this landscape with Trump’s return to power, and the picture becomes even sharper.

In April 2024, Trump invited senior fossil‑fuel executives to Mar‑a‑Lago. Reporting on the meeting describes him asking them to raise $1 billion for his campaign and promising, in exchange, to lift Biden’s pause on LNG export permits “on day one”. Among those present were Mike Sabel, the CEO of Venture Global LNG, and Jack Fusco, CEO of Cheniere Energy, the largest U.S. LNG exporter.

Trump followed through. In March 2025, the Department of Energy approved exports from Venture Global’s CP2 LNG terminal in Louisiana, reversing the earlier pause. Venture Global immediately hailed the decision as a win for “U.S. energy dominance,” pledging to begin delivering LNG from CP2 by 2027 and pointing to contracts with European buyers. The company has since signed a 20‑year deal for 2 mtpa from CP2 with Italy’s Eni and Germany’s SEFE … took a 0.75 mtpa CP2 contract.

Cheniere, for its part, benefited from a different kind of favour. Investigations found that the company received roughly $370 million in “alternative fuel” tax credits under the Trump administration, despite LNG not being what most people would consider an alternative, low‑carbon fuel. Two months after the Mar‑a‑Lago meeting, Cheniere’s CEO made nearly half a million dollars in contributions to Trump‑aligned committees and the Republican National Committee.

Global Witness identified at least 44 fossil‑fuel‑linked donors giving more than $19 million to Trump’s second inaugural fund, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Occidental and gas‑heavy utilities; further reporting shows gas‑heavy utilities also wrote large checks. LNG Allies, a U.S. LNG lobbying group, spent years working with Central and Eastern European governments and U.S. agencies to expand American gas exports to Europe and later pushed hard to weaken EU methane rules that could constrain U.S. LNG.

By mid‑2025, when Trump and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen agreed at Turnberry on a framework committing the EU to buy $750 billion of U.S. energy by 2028, the pieces were in place: a loyal group of LNG CEOs and fossil‑fuel donors and newly approved export projects geared toward Europe.

When Ras Laffan was damaged, and Hormuz became a warzone, Trump’s team did not have to improvise. They had a deal on the table and a set of exporters ready to deliver. In March 2026, ambassador Andrew Puzder repeated the threat in public, telling the Financial Times that if the European Parliament amended or rejected the Turnberry legislation, “the terms may not be as favourable” and there were “other buyers out there.”

Europe’s lock‑in

Europe’s role in this story is not simply that of a victim; it is also an active partner in its own entrapment.

Italy’s Eni has been one of the most aggressive European buyers of U.S. LNG. In July 2025, it signed a 20‑year deal for 2 mtpa from CP2, adding to earlier contracts for Plaquemines and Calcasieu Pass cargoes. Venture Global’s CP2 is now positioned as a major supplier to Europe. Germany’s Securing Energy for Europe GmbH (SEFE), the state‑owned successor to Gazprom Germania, took its own CP2 contract as part of its effort to replace Russian pipeline gas.

Across the continent, utilities and traders, from Engie and RWE to Uniper and Shell’s European arm, have filled their portfolios with long‑term U.S. supply contracts since 2022, feeding gas into a rapidly expanded network of LNG terminals. Rotterdam has become a major hub for transatlantic cargoes. New floating terminals in Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbüttel were rushed into service as “emergency” projects. Greece has pushed new FSRUs in Alexandroupolis and elsewhere as part of a “vertical corridor” to feed the Balkans and Central Europe. ACER’s monitoring reports concede that this strategy has made it possible to survive two winters without Russian pipeline gas, but also that LNG will remain central to EU security of supply through the 2020s and that long‑term contracts are taking a growing share of the market.

IEEFA warns bluntly that the EU is at risk of trading one dependency, on Russia, for another, on U.S. LNG, especially if it locks in large volumes on long timeframes.

Meanwhile, the Eastern Mediterranean diversification route, through Israel, Egypt and Cyprus, comes with its own political cost. The EU–Israel–Egypt MoU was signed while Israel was already deepening its occupation and siege policies; legal and human rights analyses, including one from BADIL, warned at the time that the EU was effectively endorsing the exploitation of Palestinian offshore resources and cementing ties with an apartheid regime in the name of energy security. Today, that corridor is being promoted in think‑tank papers and op‑eds as a way to “reduce reliance on hostile suppliers,” a phrase that covers both Russia and Iran’s allies in the Gulf.

For European households, the stakes are not abstract. After the Iran war escalated and Hormuz was disrupted, benchmark gas prices in Europe jumped sharply; analyses noted more than 100% increases compared to pre‑war levels. Households that had just endured a cost‑of‑living crisis triggered by the Ukraine war now face another spike, even as political leaders in Brussels insist they must accept a transatlantic energy pact as the price of “security.”

Europe has made a series of choices that leave it with fewer options, just as the U.S. and Israel prosecute a war that degrades alternative suppliers. Italian and German contracts with U.S. exporters, EU blessing for East Med gas, and rushed LNG infrastructure together create an environment in which Trump can credibly threaten to turn off the tap.

What we know vs. what remains unknown

The record assembled here allows for clear statements—and shows where honest uncertainty remains.

It is established that North America’s LNG expansion was planned years before the current war and is on track to add enough capacity to cover, on paper, the volumes lost from Ras Laffan and much of the Russian pipeline shortfall. European regulators, analysts and market actors had already mapped a future of deep LNG dependence, and once war tightened supply, Trump’s ambassador openly used that dependence as leverage to force through the Turnberry‑era $750 billion energy commitment. The EU, Israel and Egypt formalised a framework to move East Med gas to Europe via LNG in 2022, complete with mechanisms for acceleration, regulation, investment and safety. U.S. law and 3+1 ministerials fused Eastern Med energy routes with security, infrastructure protection and alliance management well before the Iran war. And Trump is personally connected to CEOs and donors at the heart of the U.S. LNG export boom, as documented in the Mar‑a‑Lago reporting and donor investigations cited above.

This is enough to say that the economic exploitation of the war is not incidental. The beneficiaries, mainly U.S. LNG exporters, their political patrons, and the institutions backing an Eastern Mediterranean corridor, built the machinery to profit from a Gulf shock in advance, recognised Europe’s vulnerability, and have moved aggressively to monetise the crisis.

What remains unknown, because the documents have not yet surfaced, is whether key decision‑makers actively saw war with Iran, or the degradation of Qatar and Hormuz, as a desirable catalyst for this energy order. To move from structural evidence to decision evidence, investigators would need access to pre‑war scenario planning in U.S., Israeli and EU ministries and NATO bodies that explicitly discuss Iran escalation or Hormuz closure not only as a risk but as a catalyst for consolidating U.S./East Med‑centric supply. They would need internal communications between the Trump administration and LNG executives around the time of the Mar‑a‑Lago meeting, CP2 approvals and Turnberry preparations, to see whether conflict in the Gulf was framed as a commercial opportunity. They would also need EU–U.S. diplomatic cables and non‑papers from 2024–2025 that mention Iran, Gulf infrastructure risks and the energy pillar of Turnberry in the same context, and background papers for 3+1 ministerials and Eastern Med summits that connect regional conflict scenarios to the strategic importance of East Med gas exports to Europe. We are confident that WikiLeaks and others would want to explore this further.

These are not fantasy documents. They are the sort of material that parliamentary commissions, investigative journalists and civil society organisations can and should seek through access‑to‑information laws and whistleblower channels. For readers in Europe, the “what next” is not just a call to be outraged at U.S. and Israeli policy; it is a demand to scrutinise their own governments. The European Parliament, national parliaments in Berlin, Rome and Athens, and oversight bodies should demand full transparency on all long‑term LNG contracts signed since 2022, including pricing formulas, destination clauses and termination conditions. They should open inquiries into the role of U.S. and Israeli officials, as well as LNG lobby groups, in shaping EU energy policy during the Turnberry negotiations, and they should press for publication of risk assessments and scenario studies on Hormuz, Ras Laffan and Eastern Med infrastructure prepared before the war.

Until those questions are answered, one conclusion is already justified: the illegal U.S.–Israeli assault on Iran is unfolding inside an energy system that was structured in advance to make such a war profitable for a narrow set of exporters and their political allies. The missiles and drones are instruments of military power, but they are also, whether by design or by opportunism, the enforcement mechanism of a new gas regime, one that asks ordinary Iranians, Qataris and Europeans to pay the price so that a handful of companies and presidents can cash in.

READ MORE EU NEWS AT: 21st Century Wire EU Files

https://www.activistpost.com/iran-qatar-and-trumps-new-gas-order-was-europes-gas-the-hidden-target/

 

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YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT — SINCE 2005.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.