Much western commentary portrays Xi Jinping as a revisionist strongman bent on overturning the global order. A closer reading of Chinese political thought and diplomacy suggests a more complex emphasis on multilateralism, reciprocity and long-term stability.

Ronald C. Keith

Annoyed with the west’s failure to understand Chinese policy, Xi Jinping claims that China’s “openness” challenges zero-sum thinking and has benefited the world. His own given name, “Jinping”, welcomes “approaching peace”. Xi places the national self-determination of states within collective security and UN multilateralism. He calls for “building bridges between different great civilisations to mutually learn and mutually reflect one another.”

He endorses a “global community of shared future” featuring “common development, prosperity and security”.

Contrary western commentary, nevertheless, indicts “rising” China and orchestrates Xi’s negative role in overturning the global order. In a rehash of Greg Sheridan’s June commentary on Australia sleepwalking like “Mr. Magoo”, The Australian headlined on 27 May 2026 Australia’s coming war with China.

Endorsing former defence minister, Linda Reynolds, on educating young Australians in the costs of “appeasement”, the Murdoch national paper declares: “Australia is sleepwalking into war with a China that is encircling our continent and preparing to crush our military capabilities….”

Is this informed analysis or warmongering subterfuge? China’s “rise” does not require another country’s “fall”. Reynolds is about as profound as the Hollywood gunslinger who shouts, “This town ain’t big enough for the two of us, pardner – so one of us rides out, or one of us gets planted.” China has no intention of “planting” the US, or any other sovereign state.

Kevin Rudd’s 2024 On Xi Jinping deals with intention, identifying Xi’s “ideological framing of the world as ‘Marxist-Leninist nationalism’”. Chinese foreign policy has apparently moved “further to the right” in its emphasis on struggle. This does not give enough weight to the following counterpoint.

First, while Mao’s “class struggle is the key link” had attacked tradition, Xi’s Marxism-Leninism has deeply reconciled with Chinese history and culture in its focus on the domestic and international “harmony” of “rejuvenated civilisation”. There is always struggle, but Xi’s concern is achieving “harmony”. Rudd accepts that Xi rarely writes about Leninism. Indeed, the final apocalyptic struggle between the capitalism and socialism has disappeared into history along with Mao’s “Three Worlds” theory.

Second, China is included within the “diversity that makes the world beautiful”. No civilisation is superior to any other. Xi insists that China would not have become what it is today without “constant interactions with other civilisations” and “learning from the strong points of other nations and states”. Cooperation and mutual learning are much more interesting than obsessing over who is “Number One”. Third, Xi’s distinctive diplomatic conduct “draws on [China’s] traditions and accepting the changing times.”

Entwining developmental and security strategy, his diplomacy operationalises the principles of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping – principles which were, themselves, essentially rooted in Chinese culture. China legitimately desires military modernisation, avoids the inordinate cost of imperial overreach, and defines security in terms of the progress of domestic economic development. World domination is immoral and impossibly self-defeating. None of this confirms a definite shift to right-wing nationalism.

Chinese tradition today highlights cooperation, reciprocity and mutual benefit. This is now extended to the relations between states. “Great power politics” are unacceptable. China is a newly powerful state that describes itself as major power rather than as a hegemonic superpower. Having suffered tremendous inequality, China expects respectful reciprocity while exerting new influence within the existing norms of global order. Xi’s inclusive bilateralism fits within, rather than opposes multilateralism and multipolarity.

The intellectual foundations of policy embrace a positive rationality, placing Chinese nationalism within the existing global that so greatly assisted China’s fantastic economic development. Today’s Chinese nationalism is an evolving progressive civilisational moral rationality which defends the existing global order while it challenges western reference to the “rise-and-fall” logic of the so-called “Thucydides Trap” implying China’s inevitable “rise” and the US’ “fall”.

Australia’s leaders are concerned about China’s “rise”. At the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies, Malcolm Turnbull referred to this same Greek “trap”, again identifying China as the “rising” power. In 2018 at the Boao Forum, Xi, raised western leaders’ obsession with China’s “rise” and rebutted: “There is no such thing as a Thucydides trap, but western analysis can create one….” On Trump’s 14 May visit to Beijing, he reiterated that the Thucydides Trap is a western trope.

Has Xi Jinping been misunderstood? He claims a positive “comprehensive, dialectical and long-term view”. “The west’s narrative of China’s rise is unacceptably predicated in misinformed historical analogy, highlighting western experience. The depiction of Xi as Mao, reincarnated, relies on comparing their great personal political power. This does not confirm blanket policy equivalence between Xi and Mao.

Indeed, Xi made important changes in economic policy, but, in the absence of sharp class struggle, he has carried forward “people’s modernisation” into the new era of economic and technological development. Chinese continuity needs proper analysis. “Rejuvenated civilisation” elevates tradition to support China’s new position in the world. On this basis Xi does stand firm, but is ready to adapt. Xi makes no immodest claim to be “The President of Peace”.

He endorses retaining the existing global order. He places Chinese civilisation within human civilisation. Xi climbs higher than Deng’s “low posture”, but he too plays the long game, displays “forbearance” – an interesting Chinese character that pictures a knife dangling above the human heart – and he “keeps [Deng Xiaoping’s] cool head”, avoiding performative theatrics, while confidently talking of ideals and morality as opposed to power politics and preparations for war.

https://johnmenadue.com/post/2026/06/xi-jinping-and-the-wests-unacceptable-narrative-of-chinas-rise/

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