Israel has refused to reassure President Barack Obama that it would warn him of a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure, raising fears that it may be planning an attack as early as the next northern summer.

The US leader was rebuffed when he demanded private guarantees that a strike would not go ahead without White House notification, suggesting that Israel no longer plans to ''seek Washington's permission'', sources said.

The disclosure, by insiders briefed on a secret meeting between America's most senior defence chief and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, comes amid concerns that Iran's progress towards nuclear weapons means Israel has lost hope for a diplomatic solution.

Last week, UN weapons inspectors released their most damning report to date into Iran's nuclear activities, saying it appeared to be building a nuclear weapon. It was with that possibility in mind that US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta flew into Israel last month on what was a routine trip.

Officially, his brief was restricted to the Middle East peace process, but the most important part of his mission was a private meeting with Mr Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak. Once all but a handful of trusted staff had left the room, Mr Panetta conveyed an urgent message from Mr Obama. The President, Mr Panetta said, wanted an unshakable guarantee that Israel would not carry out a unilateral military strike against Iran's nuclear installations without first seeking Washington's clearance.

The two Israelis were notably evasive in their response, according to sources both in Israel and America.

''They did not suggest that military action was being planned or was imminent, but neither did they give any assurances that Israel would first seek Washington's permission, or even inform the White House in advance that a mission was under way,'' one said.

Alarmed by Mr Netanyahu's noncommittal response, Mr Obama reportedly ordered the US intelligence services to step up monitoring of Israel to glean clues of its intentions.

What those intentions might be remains murky. Over the past fortnight, Israel's press has given every impression that the country is on a war footing, with numerous claims that Mr Netanyahu and Mr Barak are lobbying the cabinet to support the military option.

Two weeks ago, Israel tested a ballistic missile capable of reaching Iran, its first such test since 2008. Shortly before, the Israeli air force took part in NATO exercises in Sardinia. A separate exercise around Tel Aviv tested civilian readiness in the event of a missile strike.

In a sign of the febrility of the public mood, many beach-goers apparently mistook the air raid sirens for an attack and fled in panic for their cars. Likewise, there were similar jitters in Iran on Saturday when a vast explosion at an arms dump outside Tehran shook the city.

Speculation about an imminent Israeli military action has been a regular occurrence over the years, but rarely as fevered as now. Last week, a British official even suggested that an attack could come before Christmas.

But most Israelis believe the difficulty of mounting an operation when winter cloud cover hampers aircraft targeting systems means that if military action is being considered, it will not come before the spring or summer of next year.

Israel refuses to alert US over Iran attack

After weeks of hyping intelligence on the military aspects of Iran's nuclear program, the Obama administration's public statements on the recently released International Atomic Energy Agency report are curiously moderate. Off the record, U.S. officials say that not all of America's intelligence findings were included in the I.A.E.A. report - which aims to reflect international consensus. This fact speaks to a larger challenge - that the United States faces a credibility problem. Key countries do not share Washington's assessment of Iran, and thus it's unlikely that the U.S. will disclose more substantial information.

Some administration officials would like to see harder evidence made public - if for no other reason than supporting calls for more "crippling" sanctions on Iran. But U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly oppose more detailed disclosures for fear of jeopardizing intelligence-gathering and sources. The U.S. is therefore unlikely to secure more robust U.N. sanctions when it makes its case to the Security Council.

More important but less understood, however, are two longstanding and increasingly dangerous institutional problems within the U.S. government that this case has brought to the fore: an overreliance on intelligence and under-utilization of diplomatic resources when formulating Iran policy. By treating diplomacy with Iran as a reward to be earned rather than the vital national security tool that it is, American politicians have been administering a self-inflicted wound.

The recent allegations against Iran show the critical role that intelligence can play in helping policymakers gather information and make decisions on the most challenging issues. However, intelligence is not meant to be taken in isolation - and when it comes to America's Iran policy, it almost always is.

While serving in the State Department's Office of Iranian Affairs, I learned the 10 percent rule: intelligence is meant to make up approximately 10 percent of the overall information used to analyze strategic issues. The remaining 90 percent consists of embassy reporting and unclassified, open-source information.

As a whole, this symbiotic process is meant to provide a balanced, broader context to policymakers. Intelligence is supposed to be the missing piece of the puzzle - not the only piece. Overreliance on intelligence to support key policy decisions results in skewed or incomplete analysis that lacks the fuller context needed for sound decision-making. As this information vacuum grows over time, so too does the likelihood of misperceptions, miscalculations and dangerous mistakes.

Intelligence is not a substitute for the critical work of diplomats on the ground - and perhaps no foreign policy issue demonstrates this more forcefully than Iran. Simply put, a vital national security process has been broken for over three decades, and American politicians are exacerbating rather than repairing it.

A diplomatic presence in Tehran is critical to ensuring that America avoids repeating the mistakes of its recent past. Inherent limitations of intelligence make the status quo unsustainable. In Iraq, an overreliance on intelligence and dearth of diplomatic reporting allowed Bush administration officials to make decisions with impunity. They claimed that highly classified, raw intelligence supported their policy, but failed to conduct the standard process of integrating it into the broader context with other reporting. Intelligence that was not properly checked for accuracy led to imbalanced analysis and disastrous decision-making.

America closed its embassy in Baghdad and severed diplomatic ties with Iraq in 1991. For the next 12 years, it operated in an increasingly injurious information vacuum. The inability to complement intelligence with diplomatic reporting led to policymakers cherry-picking raw intelligence that lacked a fuller context. As this information vacuum grew, so did Washington's misperceptions and miscalculations - to the point of choosing to launch a costly war. This proven recipe for disaster has alarming parallels to America's Iran crisis. The only missing piece is the catastrophic miscalculation at the end.

The 30-year freeze in diplomatic relations with Iran has produced a U.S. government that knows precious little about a country that is integral to stabilizing American national security interests in nonproliferation, terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, energy security and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Still, diplomatic relations are a two-way street. With the Iranian government operating an Interest Section in Washington, it would almost certainly have to reciprocate an American request to establish a similar diplomatic presence in Tehran - lest Iran's leaders risk appearing even more obstinate. They do care about their international image, if only to avoid greater global consensus against them.

During my tenure at the State Department, we tried twice to push the idea of sending U.S. diplomats to Tehran. Both the Bush and Obama administrations decided against it.

My former State Department colleagues are now building a cadre of Iran-focused diplomats for an eventual on-the-ground presence. Nevertheless, the 10 percent rule remains precariously imbalanced because America is trying to gauge the intentions of a country with which it has little direct contact - a situation that it rarely replicates elsewhere.

Things do not have to be this way. Diplomatic relations are not a gift to the Islamic Republic that will entrench a government with declining popular appeal. Naysayers need not look far for compelling evidence. Ambassador Robert Ford's shrewd diplomacy in Syria firmly pursued U.S. national interests, engaging with the Syrian government while also showing support for protesters seeking their universal rights - a demonstrably more effective approach than any amount of bluster or sanctions that Damascus would inevitably ignore.

Politicians like to opine on foreign policy, but they change with election cycles. Career diplomats and intelligence officials are often left to clean up the mess elected officials and political appointees leave behind. No foreign policy issue better demonstrates this self-defeating principle than Iran. The executive and legislative branches must stop politicizing diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran, and let diplomats do their job. More than any new sanctions legislation, this is how politicians can truly act in pursuit of America's vital national security interests.

Reza Marashi is director of research at the National Iranian American Council and a former Iran desk officer at the State Department.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/americas-real-iran-problem.html?pagewanted=1&ref=global

The first question in last Saturday night's Republican debate on foreign policy dealt with Iran, and a newly published report by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report, which raised renewed concern about the "possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran," struck a darker tone than previous assessments. But it was carefully hedged. On the debate platform, however, any ambiguity was lost. One of the moderators said that the I.A.E.A. report had provided "additional credible evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon" and asked what various candidates, upon winning the Presidency, would do to stop Iran. Herman Cain said he would assist those who are trying to overthrow the government. Newt Gingrich said he would coördinate with the Israeli government and maximize covert operations to block the Iranian weapons program. Mitt Romney called the state of Iran's nuclear program Obama's "greatest failing, from a foreign-policy standpoint" and added, "Look, one thing you can know ... and that is if we reëlect Barack Obama Iran will have a nuclear weapon." The Iranian bomb was a sure thing Saturday night.

I've been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker for the past decade, with a focus on the repeatedly inability of the best and the brightest of the Joint Special Operations Command to find definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons production program in Iran. The goal of the high-risk American covert operations was to find something physical-a "smoking calutron," as a knowledgeable official once told me-to show the world that Iran was working on warheads at an undisclosed site, to make the evidence public, and then to attack and destroy the site.

The Times reported, in its lead story the day after the report came out, that I.A.E.A. investigators "have amassed a trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a 'credible' case" that Iran may be carrying out nuclear-weapons activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as declaring that "the level of detail is unbelievable.... The report describes virtually all the steps to make a nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of those steps. It reads likes a menu." The Times set the tone for much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on the I.A.E.A. report noted, more cautiously, that "it is true that the basic allegations in the report are not substantially new, and have been discussed by experts for years.")

But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings? The I.A.E.A. said it had continued in recent years "to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program" and, as a result, it has been able "to refine its analysis." The net effect has been to create "more concern." But Robert Kelley, a retired I.A.E.A. director and nuclear engineer who previously spent more than thirty years with the Department of Energy's nuclear-weapons program, told me that he could find very little new information in the I.A.E.A. report. He noted that hundreds of pages of material appears to come from a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance could not be established. Those materials, and others, "were old news," Kelley said, and known to many journalists. "I wonder why this same stuff is now considered 'new information' by the same reporters."

A nuanced assessment of the I.A.E.A. report was published by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.), a nonprofit whose mission is to encourage public support for effective arms control. The A.C.A. noted that the I.A.E.A. did "reinforce what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but continued others." (The American intelligence community reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007 estimate.) The I.A.E.A.'s report "suggests," the A.C.A. paper said, that Iran "is working to shorten the timeframe to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable." Greg Thielmann, a former State Department and Senate Intelligence Committee analyst who was one of the authors of the A.C.A. assessment, told me, "There is troubling evidence suggesting that studies are still going on, but there is nothing that indicates that Iran is really building a bomb." He added, "Those who want to drum up support for a bombing attack on Iran sort of aggressively misrepresented the report."

Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a disarmament group, who serves on Hillary Clinton's International Security Advisory Board, said, "I was briefed on most of this stuff several years ago at the I.A.E.A. headquarters in Vienna. There's little new in the report. Most of this information is well known to experts who follow the issue." Cirincione noted that "post-2003, the report only cites computer modelling and a few other experiments." (A senior I.A.E.A. official similarly told me, "I was underwhelmed by the information.")

The report did note that its on-site camera inspection process of Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment facilities-mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory-"continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material." In other words, all of the low enriched uranium now known to be produced inside Iran is accounted for; if highly enriched uranium is being used for the manufacture of a bomb, it would have to have another, unknown source.

The shift in tone at the I.A.E.A. seems linked to a change at the top. The I.A.E.A.'s report had extra weight because the Agency has had a reputation for years as a reliable arbiter on Iran. Mohammed ElBaradei, who retired as the I.A.E.A.'s Director General two years ago, was viewed internationally, although not always in Washington, as an honest broker-a view that lead to the awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. ElBaradei's replacement is Yukiya Amano of Japan. Late last year, a classified U.S. Embassy cable from Vienna, the site of the I.A.E.A. headquarters, described Amano as being "ready for prime time." According to the cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent representative to the I.A.E.A., said, "Amano reminded Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77 [the group of developing countries], which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on every strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program." The cable added that Amano's "willingness to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy ... bodes well for our future relationship."

It is possible, of course, that Iran has simply circumvented the reconnaissance efforts of America and the I.A.E.A., perhaps even building Dick Cheney's nightmare: a hidden underground nuclear-weapons fabrication facility. Iran's track record with the I.A.E.A. has been far from good: its leadership began construction of its initial uranium facilities in the nineteen-eighties without informing the Agency, in violation of the nonproliferation treaty. Over the next decade and a half, under prodding from ElBaradei and the West, the Iranians began acknowledging their deceit and opened their enrichment facilities, and their records, to I.A.E.A. inspectors.

The new report, therefore, leaves us where we've been since 2002, when George Bush declared Iran to be a member of the Axis of Evil-with lots of belligerent talk but no definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons program

Iran and the IAEA

It's a weird irony that Iranians know the history of Anglo-Persian relations better than the Brits. When the newly installed Ministry of Islamic Guidance asked Harvey Morris, Reuters' man in post-revolutionary Iran, for a history of his news agency, he asked his London office to send him a biography of Baron von Reuter - and was appalled to discover the founder of the world's greatest news agency had built Persia's railways at an immense profit. "How can I show this to the ministry?" he shouted. "It turns out that the Baron was worse than the fucking Shah!" Of which, of course, the ministry was well aware.

Britain staged a joint invasion of Iran with Soviet forces when the Shah's predecessor got a bit too close to the Nazis in World War Two and then helped the Americans overthrow the democratically elected Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 after he nationalised Britain's oil possessions in the country.

This was not a myth but a real, down-to-earth conspiracy. The CIA called it Operation Ajax; the Brits wisely kept their ambitions in check by calling it Operation Boot. MI6's agent in Tehran was Colonel Monty Woodhouse, previously our Special Operations Executive man inside German-occupied Greece. I knew "Monty" well - we co-operated together when I investigated the grim wartime career of ex-UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim - and he was a ruthless man. Woodhouse brought weapons into Iran for a still non-existent "resistance" movement and he eagerly supported the CIA's project to fund the "bazaaris" of Tehran to stage demonstrations (in which, of course, hundreds, perhaps thousands, died) to overthrow Mossadegh.

They were successful. Mossadegh was arrested - by an officer assiduously done to death in the 1979 revolution - and the young Shah returned in triumph to impose his rule, reinforced by his faithful SAVAK secret police whose torture of women regime opponents was duly filmed and - according to the great Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal - circulated by CIA officers to America's allies around the world as a "teaching" manual. How dare the Iranians remember all this?

The mass of US secret documents found after the American embassy was sacked following the Iranian revolution proved to the Iranians not only Washington's attempts to subvert the new order of Ayatollah Khomeini but the continued partnership of the American and British intelligence services.

The British ambassador, almost to the end, remained convinced that the Shah, though deeply flawed, would survive. And British governments have continued to rage about the supposedly terrorist nature of the Iranian government. Tony Blair - even at the official inquiry into the Iraq war - started raving about the necessity of standing up to Iranian aggression.

Anyway, the Iranians trashed us yesterday and made off, we are told, with a clutch of UK embassy documents. I cannot wait to read their contents. For be sure, they will soon be revealed.

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-sanctions-are-only-a-small-part-of-the-history-that-makes-iranians-hate-the-uk-6269812.html

On 22 May 2007, the Guardian’s front page announced: "Iran’s secret plan for summer offensive to force US out of Iraq." The writer, Simon Tisdall, claimed that Iran had secret plans to defeat American troops in Iraq, which included "forging ties with al-Qaeda elements." The coming "showdown" was an Iranian plot to influence a vote in the US Congress. Based entirely on briefings by anonymous US officials, Tisdall’s "exclusive" rippled with lurid tales of Iran’s "murder cells" and "daily acts of war against US and British forces." His 1,200 words included just 20 for Iran’s flat denial.

It was a load of rubbish: in effect a Pentagon press release presented as journalism and reminiscent of the notorious fiction that justified the bloody invasion of Iraq in 2003. Among Tisdall’s sources were "senior advisers" to General David Petraeus, the US military commander who in 2006 described his strategy of waging a "war of perceptions … conducted continuously through the news media."

The media war against Iran began in 1979 when the west’s placeman Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, a tyrant, was overthrown in a popular Islamic revolution. The "loss" of Iran, which under the shah was regarded as the "fourth pillar" of western control of the Middle East, has never been forgiven in Washington and London.

Last month, the Guardian’s front page carried another "exclusive": "MoD prepares to take part in US strikes against Iran." Again, anonymous officials were quoted. This time the theme was the "threat" posed by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon. The latest "evidence" was warmed-over documents obtained from a laptop in 2004 by US intelligence and passed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Numerous authorities have cast doubt on these suspected forgeries, including a former IAEA chief weapons inspector. A US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks describes the new head of the IAEA, Yukiuya Amano, as "solidly in the US court" and "ready for prime time."

The Guardian’s 3 November "exclusive" and the speed with which its propaganda spread across the media were also prime time. This is known as "information dominance" by the media trainers at the Ministry of Defense’s psyops (psychological warfare) establishment at Chicksands, Bedfordshire, who share premises with the instructors of the interrogation methods that have led to a public enquiry into British military torture in Iraq. Disinformation and the barbarity of colonial warfare have historically had much in common.

Having beckoned a criminal assault on Iran, the Guardian opined that this "would of course be madness." Similar arse-covering was deployed when Tony Blair, once a "mystical" hero in polite liberal circles, plotted with George W. Bush and caused a bloodbath in Iraq. With Libya recently dealt with ("It worked," said the Guardian), Iran is next, it seems.

The role of respectable journalism in western state crimes — from Iraq to Iran, Afghanistan to Libya — remains taboo. It is currently deflected by the media theater of the Leveson enquiry into phone hacking, which Daily Telegraph’s Benedict Brogan describes as "a useful stress test." Blame Rupert Murdoch and the tabloids for everything and business can continue as usual. As disturbing as the stories are from Lord Leveson’s witness stand, they do not compare with the suffering of the countless victims of journalism’s warmongering.

The lawyer Phil Shiner, who has forced a public inquiry into the British military’s criminal behavior in Iraq, says that embedded journalism provides the cover for the killing of "the hundreds of civilians killed by British forces when they had custody of them, [often subjecting them] to the most extraordinary, brutal things, involving sexual acts … embedded journalism is never ever going to get close to hearing their story." It is hardly surprising that the Ministry of Defense, in a 2000-page document leaked to WikiLeaks, describes investigative journalists — journalists who do their job — as a "threat" greater than terrorism.

In the week the Guardian published its "exclusive" about the Ministry of Defense planning for an attack on Iran, General Sir David Richards, Britain’s military chief, went on a secret visit to Israel, which is a genuine nuclear weapons outlaw and exempt from media opprobrium. Richards is a highly political general who, like Petraeus, has worked the media to considerable advantage. No journalist in Britain revealed that he went to Israel to discuss an attack on Iran.

Honorable exceptions aside — such as the tenacious work of the Guardian’s Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor — our increasingly militarized society is reflected in much of our media culture. Two of Blair’s most important functionaries in his mendacious, blood-drenched adventure in Iraq, Alastair Campbell and Jonathan Powell, enjoy a cozy relationship with the liberal media, their opinions sought on worthy subjects while the blood in Iraq never dries. For their vicarious admirers, as Harold Pinter put it, the appalling consequences of their actions "never happened."

On 24 November, International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the feminist scholars Cynthia Cockburn and Ann Oakley attacked what they called "certain widespread masculine traits and behaviors." They demanded that the "culture of masculinity should be addressed as a policy issue." Testosterone was the problem. They made no mention of a system of rampant state violence that has rehabilitated empire, creating 740,000 widows in Iraq and threatening whole societies, from Iran to China. Is this not a "culture," too? Their limited though not untypical indignation says much about how media-friendly identity and issues politics distract from the systemic exploitation and war that remain the primary source of violence against both women and men.

John Pilger, renowned investigative journalist and documentary film-maker, is one of only two to have twice won British journalism's top award; his documentaries have won academy awards in both the UK and the US. In a New Statesman survey of the 50 heroes of our time, Pilger came fourth behind Aung San Suu Kyi and Nelson Mandela. "John Pilger," wrote Harold Pinter, "unearths, with steely attention facts, the filthy truth. I salute him." www.johnpilger.com

Once Again, War Is Prime Time And Journalism’s Role Is Taboo

The map tells the whole story. Each star represents a U.S. military base. In the middle, in blue, is Iran. Iran has no military bases outside its borders. Just north of Iran is Georgia that has essentially become a U.S./NATO base. Turkey belongs to NATO. Iran has been checkmated. North of Georgia is Russia. Can there be any wonder why Russia is so alarmed about an attack on Iran?

Imagine if we saw a map of the U.S. with Russian or Chinese military bases throughout Canada and Mexico along with their warships just off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The American people would be going ballistic. But when we do it to others, no one even blinks an eye.

Following the recent spy drone fiasco over Iran the U.S. has been working hard to justify these flights. In an Associated Press story yesterday it was reported that the covert operations in play are "much bigger than people appreciate," said Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser under George W. Bush. "But the U.S. needs to be using everything it can." Hadley said that if Iran continues to defy U.N. resolutions and doesn't curb its nuclear ambitions, the quiet conflict "will only get nastier."

Hadley's statement "But the U.S. needs to be using everything it can" has the sound of immanent danger, of desperation. But after looking at this map where does the danger really lie? Iran is actually no danger to anyone. The real danger is that the U.S./NATO/Israel have their itchy fingers on the war trigger and could attack at any time.

One last thing is Mr. Hadley himself. Unknown to the public at large, Stephen Hadley carried on a quiet career in the shadow of Brent Scowcroft and Condoleeza Rice. A business lawyer convicted of fraud, he became the counselor for the largest arms manufacturer in the world, Lockheed Martin. He advised the candidate George W. Bush, helped write the U.S.'s new aggressive nuclear doctrine, helped create the Department of Homeland Security, supervised new entries into NATO, and helped sell the invasion of Iraq. Ever faithful, he protected Bush the father from the Irangate scandal and Bush the son from the lies of the Iraq war. He found himself rewarded by becoming George W. Bush's National Security Advisor.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Mr. Steven Hadley ran an insurance fraud of close to $1.1 million. He was discovered, found guilty by a court in Iowa, and forced to reimburse the money. To erase any trace to his crime, he changed his name to Stephen John Hadley.

When Ronald Reagan took the White House, Mr. Hadley stayed in the private sector. However, in 1986, the Irangate scandal broke. President Reagan appointed a commission of three wise men to "investigate". It was composed of the Texan Senator John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft who called Stephen J. Hadley to his side. In spite of the evidence, the commission concluded that President Reagan and Vice-President Bush were innocent.

They found that the financing of the Contras in Nicaragua through the trafficking of drugs and illegal weapons sales to Iran was a secret initiative of over-zealous members of the National Security Council, put into place without the knowledge of their superiors. No big heads rolled.

As lawyer for Lockheed Martin, Hadley worked with the directors of the firm, including Lyne Cheney (wife of Dick). He became close with Bruce P. Jackson, the vice-president of the firm in charge of creating new markets. Together they initiated the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO into which they brought Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. The Committee engineered the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO in 1999. Then that of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Each time, the leaders of the new member states were solicited to bring their armies up to the scale (interoperability) with NATO, in other words, to purchase new military hardware from Lockheed Martin.

Global Network board member Karl Grossman reported 10 years ago that Hadley was also instrumental in helping Donald Rumsfeld write his report calling for U.S. control and domination of space. "Space is going to be important. It has a great future in the military," Hadley told the Air Force Association Convention in a 2001 speech. Introduced as an "adviser to Governor George W. Bush," Hadley said that Bush's "concern has been that the [Clinton] Administration...doesn't reflect a real commitment to missile defense." In 1998 Rumsfeld's commission reversed a 1995 finding by the nation's intelligence agencies that the country was not in imminent danger from ballistic missiles acquired by new powers, declaring that "rogue states" did pose such a threat. The answer? Missile defense.

It is obvious that Hadley has been at this game a very long time. His connections to Lockheed Martin, and even the Bush administration, have been long forgotten. So when he is quoted in a current news story few see the irony of him defending CIA spy drone flights over Iran. It is good that we take a moment though and remember the real "his-story" otherwise we are likely to repeat the terror and carnage of past U.S. snake oil invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Bruce K. Gagnon