from Crikey ….

Howard: another old white man claiming credit for the Arab Spring

BERNARD KEANE

One of the grubbiest moments of John Howard's long public life has come some years after his removal from politics, with his effort this week to justify and explain away his government's participation in the illegal and disastrous attack on Iraq.

Whether Howard committed Australia knowing that the justification for the attack, that Saddam Hussein possessed and was willing to use weapons of mass destruction, was an outright lie won't be known unless Australia undertakes a similar investigation to the Chilcot Inquiry instigated by Gordon Brown in the UK. We already know, ahead of that committee's final report, that British PM Tony Blair was told by Foreign Office lawyers that the attack was an illegal war of aggression and by MI6 that the weapons of mass destruction threat from Iraq was "very, very small" and far less significant than that posed by Libya.

That is, Blair knowingly led the UK into an illegal war based on a lie. But until such an investigation here, Howard can be given the benefit of the doubt on that issue.

But in seeking to justify an attack that led to the death of at least 100,000 Iraqis, and probably two or three times that number, trillions of dollars of wasted US expenditure and the disastrous abandonment of the allied effort against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Howard resorted to the neoconservatives' now favoured trick of claiming the attack on Iraq led to the Arab Spring. An "Arab Spring" before the overthrow of Saddam was "unthinkable" Howard said. "It is implausible that the events we now know as the Arab Spring bear no relationship of any kind to the overthrow of Saddam's regime in 2003," he claimed, adding that he agreed with the view "that the Arab Spring was triggered by a self-immolating street trader in an obscure Tunisian town is just not credible".

It's disgusting enough that Howard dismisses the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, which instigated the protests that toppled Tunisian strongman Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, as a "self-immolating street trader", but of course he goes much further in seeking to exploit the hundreds of deaths in Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt, the thousands of deaths in Libya and the tens of thousands of deaths in Syria as postfactum justification for the attack on Iraq.

The argument doesn't stand up, as more realistic supporters of the attack admit. As Peter Maass wrote this week, Iraq repelled Arabs across the Middle East, rather than inspired them - inspired them, allegedly, to sit and wait the best part of a decade before taking action.

"The asinine claims that 'social media caused the Arab Spring' or 'WikiLeaks caused the Arab Spring' merely lent a high-tech edge to the patronising of Arab communities."

But it's more fundamental than using the brave sacrifice of thousands of Arab men and women to justify an illegal war. In doing so, Howard reflects the same mindset that both led the Anglophone nations into the Iraq disaster and guided Western policy toward the Middle East for decades: that Arab people have no capacity to decide their future for themselves, and that they are merely passive communities subservient to local strongmen and awaiting the intervention of Western elites, the old white men running the Anglosphere, to gift them free markets and democracy - though of course only to the extent that it suits Western interests.

This is only one variant on a broader Western attitude of condescension toward Arabs. The reflexive invocation of "the Arab Street" -- perennially poised to "explode" - by Leftist commentators reduces Arab people across vastly different societies to a monolithic, inchoate vat of anger, Islamic Rage Boy multiplied a millionfold. The asinine claims that "social media caused the Arab Spring" or "WikiLeaks caused the Arab Spring" merely lent a high-tech edge to the patronising of Arab communities. But none of those came with the price tag of the Iraq War, the slaughter of hundreds of thousands, the war crimes, the strategic blunders, the ongoing and horrific legacy in places like Fallujah.

But let's take Howard at his word and accept that the Iraq War played an important role in the overthrow of the dictatorships of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi, among others.

It's a little odd that Howard is now boasting of their overthrow as the splendid fruits of his government's participation in the attack on Iraq. In 2004, Alexander Downer boasted of re-establishing a diplomatic mission to Gaddafi's Libya and visited the country. Downer was eager to meet with the Colonel himself, but apparently couldn't quite secure a meeting. In doing so, Downer was merely following the leader of Blair, who had enthusiastically (and literally) embraced Gaddafi.

Then there's the Mubarak government. Its overthrow, as well, is something Howard wants reflected credit for. But Howard was happy for an Australian citizen, Mamdouh Habib, to be rendered to Egypt to be tortured by the Mubarak government's intelligence agencies. Despite persistent denials at the time from the Howard government that it knew where Habib was, Egyptian officials have since confirmed that at least one Australian official was present when Habib was being abused - a revelation that led to the Gillard government immediately agreeing to settle Habib's litigation against the government for a secret payout.

But again, the Blair government had led the way on that front - MI6 helped arrange the abduction in Hong Kong of an opponent of Gaddafi's regime and the return of him and his family to Libya, where he was tortured for years. The British government recently paid out over 2 million pounds in compensation for that.

For anyone associated with the attack on Iraq to claim any credit for the removal of monsters like Gaddafi is beyond wrong. It's sickening.

from Crikey ….

Former prime minister John Howard's justification this week on why we went to war against Iraq in 2003 obfuscates some issues.

I was the secretary to the federal parliamentary intelligence committee from 2002 until 2007. It was then called the ASIO, ASIS and Defence Signals Directorate committee - which drafted the report Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. Howard refers to this committee in his speech justifying our involvement in the war.

The reason there was so much argument about the existence of such weapons before the war in Iraq 10 years ago was that to go to war on any other pretext would have been a breach of international law. As Howard said at the time: ''I couldn't justify on its own a military invasion of Iraq to change the regime. I've never advocated that. Central to the threat is Iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons and its pursuit of nuclear capability."

So the question is what the government knew or was told about that capability and whether the government ''lied'' about the danger that Iraq posed. At the time, Howard and his ministers asserted that the threat to the world from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was both great and immediate.

On February 4, 2003, he said Saddam Hussein had an ''arsenal'' and a ''stockpile'' and the ''illegal importation of proscribed goods ha[s] increased dramatically in the past few years". ''Iraq had a massive program for developing offensive biological weapons - one of the largest and most advanced in the world.''

On March 18, 2003, foreign minister Alexander Downer told the House of Representatives: ''The strategy of containment [UN sanctions] simply has not worked and now poses an unacceptable risk.''

In his speeches at the time, Howard said: ''Iraq has a usable chemical and biological weapons capability which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents; Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons. All key aspects - research and development, production and weaponisation - of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War in 1991.''

None of the government's arguments were supported by the intelligence presented to it by its own agencies. None of these arguments were true.

Howard this week quoted the findings of the parliamentary inquiry, but his quotation is selective to the point of being misleading.

What was the nature of the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction provided to the government? The parliamentary inquiry reported on the intelligence in detail. It gathered information from the Defence Intelligence Organisation and the Office of National Assessment. It said:

1. The scale of threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was less than it had been a decade earlier.

2. Under sanctions that prevailed at the time, Iraq's military capability remained limited and the country's infrastructure was still in decline.

3. The nuclear program was unlikely to be far advanced. Iraq was unlikely to have obtained fissile material.

4. Iraq had no ballistic missiles that could reach the US. Most if not all of the few SCUDS that were hidden away were likely to be in poor condition.

5. There was no known chemical weapons production.

6. There was no specific evidence of resumed biological weapons production.

7. There was no known biological weapons testing or evaluation since 1991.

8. There was no known Iraq offensive research since 1991.

9. Iraq did not have nuclear weapons.

10. There was no evidence that chemical weapon warheads for Al Samoud or other ballistic missiles had been developed.

11. No intelligence had accurately pointed to the location of weapans of mass destruction.

There were minor qualifications to this somewhat emphatic picture.

It found there was a limited stockpile of chemical weapon agents, possibly stored in dual-use or industrial facilities. Although there was no evidence that it had done so, Iraq had the capacity to restart its chemical weapons program in weeks and to manufacture in months.

The committee concluded the ''case made by the government was that Iraq possessed WMD in large quantities and posed a grave and unacceptable threat to the region and the world, particularly as there was a danger that Iraq's WMD might be passed to terrorist organisations.

''This is not the picture that emerges from an examination of all the assessments provided to the committee by Australia's two analytical agencies.''

Howard would claim, no doubt, that he took his views from overseas dossiers. But all that intelligence was considered by Australian agencies when forming their views.

They knew, too, of the disputes and arguments within British and US agencies. Moreover, Australian agencies as well as the British and US intelligence agencies also knew the so-called ''surge of new intelligence'' after September 2002 relied almost exclusively on one or two unreliable and self-serving individuals.

They knew that Saddam 's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid, who had defected in 1995, had told Western agencies the nuclear program in Iraq had failed, chemical and biological programs had been dismantled and weapons destroyed.

There are none so blind as those who will not see.

Howard Ignored Official Advice On Iraq's Weapons & Chose War

Interesting that 93% of Australians polled in the most recent survey believe that “rattus” lied about the justification for taking Australia to war in Iraq; but then, we all know that not even the politicians believe the bullshit that pours incessantly from their own mouths!!

John Howard's decision to commit Australia to the 2003 Iraq war remains as indefensible as it was 10 years ago. The former prime minister's recent reflections on the anniversary of the invasion only reiterate that his reasons for dismissing alternative strategic and legal options remain unconvincing.

Two key policy alternatives were advocated at the time and each dismissed by Howard. Evaluating why he chose war is important, as this was the most costly option in blood, treasure, and the global standing of Australia's key ally. The first alternative was to continue supporting the ''realist'' policy of containing Iraq through economic sanctions, weapons inspections, and the maintenance of no-fly zones. The second was to allow for military action, but subject to explicit United Nations Security Council authorisation in conformity with international law.

They may seem unlikely bedfellows, but the dictates of political realism and international law converge in many of the great global decisions about war and peace. Such was the case in the Persian Gulf War when the realist world view of president George Bush aligned with the legal authority of the UN to authorise military force in driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

Both frameworks for guiding foreign policy are centred on the principle of global order based on respect for sovereign states. The tradition of political realism, associated with statesmen from Machiavelli to Henry Kissinger, emphasises the importance of prudence and the avoidance of conflicts that disrupt order. Likewise international law prohibits the use of force except in cases of self-defence or Security Council authorisation.

Howard's first critique of the ''realists'' is that containment had failed, evidenced by Saddam's continued intransigence. Yet as the father of Cold War containment George Kennan argued, unless a hostile power poses an imminent threat, it is wiser to contain its power and influence than pre-emptively defeat it. The UN inspections failed to find weapons of mass destruction which could have established an existential threat. Yet even if they did there is no evidence Saddam would have used them and thereby assured his own destruction. Bellicose language represented the only threat with global reach left in his arsenal precisely because of containment's success.

Howard's second critique is that realism took insufficient account of the ''huge psychological shift in American attitudes'' following the attacks of September 11, 2001. This produced a ''profound vulnerability'' that rendered containment too ''passive''. This completely misses the point of realism, as it is precisely in these circumstances that it is incumbent on political leaders to exercise sound judgment borne not of fear but a realistic appraisal of national interests. To devise strategy from a reactive sense of vulnerability is an abdication of leadership.

The dismissal of international law is similarly incoherent. Howard asserts the war's legality by adopting the American argument that UN resolutions authorising force in 1990 were revived 13 years later by Iraq's ''material breach'' of obligations. On this novel interpretation the role of the Security Council dissolves, and is substituted by powerful states deciding unilaterally when to ''enforce'' international law.

Legal interpretation is more than merely rearranging doctrines until they align with political interests. Rules on the use of force are read against the purposes of the UN system in upholding a framework for global order and stability. It is clear Howard never recognised such authority in UN law. He characterises then opposition leader Simon Crean's insistence on Security Council authority as ''outsourcing'' Australian foreign policy to the veto power of Russia and France. Howard viewed the UN system as primarily a political tool, with his claims of legality no more than diplomatic rhetoric.

What instead shaped Howard's thinking was a shared sense of the American experience of vulnerability. This is a shaky substitute for the rational guidance provided by principles of statecraft and international law. The forces of realism and law converged for a second time on the eve of an Iraq invasion, but on this occasion to oppose military force. Howard's dismissal of these alternatives to war ensured strategic incoherence, and the unmooring of Australian policy from the foundations of international peace and security.

Howard Fails In His Defence Of Road To War