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We have already mentioned "geoengineering" on this site to deal with the warming planet. And for no small reason, we've come to the conclusion that it's a stupid idea. Not only stupid but it's dangerous like throwing a few icebergs in hell to annoy Mr Devil. But some scientists still push for "studying the feasability of throwing a blanket" on the planet, like we use one when the chips are on fire in the frying pan. Here, "we can smell the colour of money". In the 12 November 2021 issue of SCIENCE, Edward A. Parson, a fellow with a million more qualifications than Gus-in-the-Spectrum-Guy, tells us without a hint of irony:

As alarm about climate change and calls for action intensify, solar geoengineering (SG) is seeing increased attention and controversy. Views on whether it should or will ever be used diverge, but the evidentiary basis for these views is thin. On such a high-stakes, knowledge-limited issue, one might expect strong support for research, but even research has met opposition. Opponents’ objections are grounded in valid concerns but impossible to fully address, as they are framed in ways that make rejecting research an axiom, not a conclusion based on evidence.

Supporters of SG research argue that it can inform future decisions and prepare for likely future calls for deployment. A US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) report earlier this year lent thoughtful support to this view. Opponents raise well-known concerns about SG such as its imperfect climate correction, its time-scale mismatch with greenhouse gases (GHGs), and the potential to over-rely on it or use it recklessly or unjustly. They oppose research based on the same concerns, arguing that usage can never be acceptable so research is superfluous; or that sociopolitical lock-in will drive research toward deployment even if unwarranted. Both support and opposition are often implicit, embedded in debates over additional governance of SG research beyond peer review, program management, and regulatory compliance.

At present, potential SG methods and claimed benefits and harms are hypothetical, not demonstrated. The strongest objections to research invoke potential consequences that are indirect, mediated by imprudent or unjust policy decisions. Because the paths from research to these bad outcomes involve political behavior, claims that these “could” happen cannot be fully refuted. Understanding and limiting these risks require the same research and governance-building activities that opponents reject as causing the risks.

To reject an activity based on harms that might follow is to apply extreme precaution. This can be warranted when there is risk of serious, unmitigable harm and the alternative is known to be acceptable. That is not the case here. Rejecting SG research means taking the alternative trajectory of uncertain but potentially severe climate impacts, reduced by whatever emissions cuts, GHG removals, and adaptation are achieved. But these other responses needed to meet prudent climate targets carry their own risks: of falling short and suffering more severe climate change, and of collateral environmental and socioeconomic harms from deployment at the required transformative, even revolutionary, scale.

Suppressing research on SG might reduce risks from its future use, but this is not assured: Rather than preventing use in some future crisis, blocking research might make such use less informed, cruder, and more dangerous. Even if these risks are reduced, this would shift increased risks onto climate change and crash pursuit of other responses. Total climate-related risk may well increase—and be more unjustly distributed, because the largest benefits of SG appear likely to flow to the most vulnerable people and communities.

Yet the concerns that motivate opposition to research are compelling. SG use would be an unprecedented step, affecting climate response, international governance, sustainability, and global justice. Major concerns—about reckless or rivalrous use, or over-reliance weakening emissions cuts—are essential to address, even if they cannot be avoided with certainty. A few directions show promise for doing so. Research should be in public programs, in jurisdictions with cultures of public benefit and research accountability. The NASEM call for a US federal program is sound. Other national programs should be established. Research governance should be somewhat stronger than for less controversial research, including scale limits on field experiments and periodic program reassessments. Exploration of governance needs for larger-scale interventions should begin well before these are considered. Research and governance should seek broad international cooperation—promptly, but not as a precondition to national programs. Broad citizen consultations are needed on overall climate response and the role of SG. These should link to national research and governance programs but not have veto power over specific activities.

Precaution is appropriate, even necessary. But precaution cannot selectively target risks from one climate response while ignoring its linkages to other responses and risks. Suppressing SG research is likely to make the harms and injustices that opponents fear more likely, not less.

Read more:

SCIENCE • 11 Nov 2021 • Vol 374, Issue 6569

Meanwhile:

Even a limited nuclear war would inject enough smoke and dust into the atmosphere to threaten the survival of our species.

The impact of the Cretaceous-Paleocene asteroid 66 million years ago released enough dust and debris to cloud large parts of the planet, causing the mass extinction of some 80 per cent of animal species. When Turco et al. (1983) and Carl Sagan (1983) warned the world about the climatic effects of a nuclear war, they pointed out that the amount of carbon stored in a large city was sufficient to release enough aerosols, smoke, soot and dust to block sunlight over large regions, leading to a widespread failure of crops and extensive starvation.

The current nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia could potentially inject 150 teragrams of soot from fires ignited by nuclear explosions into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere (Coupe et al., 2019), lasting for a period of 10 years or longer, followed by a period of intense radioactive radiation over large areas.

Even a “limited” nuclear war, such as between India and Pakistan, would release enough aerosols to affect large regions, killing millions or billions through starvation. As stated by Robock et al. (2007):

“The casualties from the direct effects of blast, radioactivity, and fires resulting from the massive use of nuclear weapons by the superpowers would be so catastrophic … the ensuing nuclear winter would produce famine for billions of people far from the target zones.”

With the global arsenal of nuclear warheads at around 13,000 – 90 per cent of which are held by Russia and the US – a regional conflict such as in Ukraine or Taiwan would threaten to spill worldwide. As the clock of atomic scientists is set at 100 seconds to doomsday, the rising probability of an intended or inadvertent nuclear war, against the background of rising global warming, indicates an hour of truth for our species – a choice between the defence of life on earth and global suicide.

While the inhabitants of the planet are preoccupied with the 24-hour news cycle, media hype, a deadly virus, economic issues and sports games, the hair-trigger nuclear gun loaded by the powers-that-be, east and west, is threatening all life on earth.

A release of 5 teragrams of smoke from nuclear explosions has been modelled to lower the average global temperature by about 1.5 degrees Celsius (Robock et al. 2007), although over the continents the cooling is likely to be more abrupt.

Inherent in nuclear war strategy is a “use them or lose them” approach, namely hitting the enemy’s air and missile launch pads before the weapons can be launched, which virtually ensures that many or most nuclear warheads would be potentially used. Given the size of the world’s nuclear warheads inventory, this would guarantee a global catastrophe.

Such an extreme event would arrest global warming for 10 years or longer, possibly in part analogous to the consequences of a less abrupt flow of polar ice melt into the oceans, as modelled by Bronselaer et al. (2018).

When Sagan and colleagues published their nuclear winter scenario as a warning to humanity, Sagan was painted as an alarmist by many and he faced extensive criticism not just from pro-nuclear conservatives but also from scientists who resented him leveraging his fame to advocate what some regarded as political views. A similar situation occurs today in regard to accelerating global warming and the nuclear threat, as confirmed by the warning by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Time is running out.

Read more:

https://johnmenadue.com/the-threat-of-nuclear-winter-hangs-over-our-warming-planet/

MEANWHILE:

In May, within four months, the new nuclear bomb B61-12 large-scale production will begin in the United States: this announcement was made by the National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States Department of Energy (NNSA is part of the US Department of Energy). As they leave the factory, the new nuclear bombs will be delivered to the US Air Force, which will install them in US bases in Italy and other European countries replacing the B61s.

The B61-12 is a new nuclear weapon replacing three of the current B61 variants (3, 4, and 7). It has a nuclear warhead with four selectable power options according to the target to destroy. It does not drop vertically like the B61, but at distance from the target to which it is directed, and guided by a satellite system. It can penetrate underground, exploding deep to destroy command center bunkers to "behead" the enemy nation in a nuclear first strike. For this attack the US Air Force also has the fourth variant of the B61 bomb, the penetrating B61-11 was modernized in 2001. The B61-12, NNSA confirmed, can be launched from both B-2A stealth bomber and future B-21 aircraft, both conventional and nuclear dual-capable fighters. These aircrafts include the US F-16C / Ds deployed in Aviano and the Italian PA-200 Tornadoes deployed in Ghedi. The F-35A fighters, already operational in the Italian Air Force, are even more suitable for a nuclear attack with the B61-12.

NNSA announced that "all the needed production of B61-12s" will be completed in the fiscal year 2026. The program foresees the construction of 500 bombs at a cost of about 10 billion dollars (each bomb costing twice as much if it were built entirely of gold). Their actual number, however, remains secret as their geographical location is largely secret. It is the determining factor in the offensive capacity of the B61-12 nuclear bombs. If they were all located in US territory, ready to be transported with strategic bombers, this would not constitute a substantial modification of the current strategic assets. The B61-12 will instead be located in other countries, especially close to Russia, ready to be transported and launched with F-35s and other fighters.

Aviano and Ghedi bases have been restructured to accommodate the F-35A fighters armed with the new nuclear bombs. Thirty Italian F-35A fighters can be deployed in Ghedi, ready to attack under US command with 60 B61-12 nuclear bombs. It is not excluded that they will also be located in other bases on the Italian territory. In addition to being located in Germany, Belgium, and Holland, they could be also deployed in Poland, whose air forces have been participating for years in NATO nuclear warfare exercises. It is not excluded that they could be located in other Eastern countries. The NATO fighters located in the Baltic republics, close to Russia, can also be armed with the B61-12s. It is not excluded that the new nuclear bombs can also be deployed in Asia and the Middle East against China and Iran. Despite being classified as "non-strategic nuclear weapons", close to target the B61-12 bombs have offensive capabilities similar to those of strategic weapons (such as the nuclear warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles). They are therefore destabilizing weapons, which will cause a chain reaction and accelerate the nuclear arms ra

The 5 nuclear powers permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom - affirmed in a joint declaration (January 3, 2022), that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought ”and that “we remain committed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of to nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”.

The US should therefore commit not to deploy the new B61-12 nuclear bombs in other countries, even better not to produce them at all.

Manlio Dinucci

Source

Il Manifesto (Italy)

Read more:

https://www.voltairenet.org/article215294.html

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