Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro has accused the US of "fabricating a new war", after it ordered the world's largest warship to be sent to the Caribbean.

The USS Gerald R Ford can carry up to 90 aircraft and its deployment marks a massive increase in US firepower in the region.

The US has conducted 10 air strikes on vessels in the area as part of what it says is a war on drug traffickers. 

US President Donald Trump has accused Maduro of being the leader of a drug-trafficking organisation, which he denies, and there are fears in Venezuela that the US military build-up is aimed at removing the long-time opponent of Trump from power.

The US is among many nations that do not recognise Maduro as Venezuela's legitimate leader, after the last election in 2024 was widely dismissed as neither free nor fair. Opposition tallies from polling stations showed its candidate had won by a landslide.

Venezuela plays a relatively minor role in the region's drug trade.

• What's Trump's endgame in Venezuela?

The Pentagon said on Friday that the USS Gerald R Ford carrier would deploy to the US Southern Command area of responsibility, which includes Central America and South America, as well as the Caribbean. 

The additional forces "will enhance and augment existing capabilities to disrupt narcotics trafficking and degrade and dismantle transnational criminal organisations", spokesman Sean Parnell said.

Maduro accused the US of seeking "a new eternal war" in his address.

"They promised they would never again get involved in a war, and they are fabricating a war," he told state media.

The carrier's deployment would provide the resources to start conducting strikes against targets on the ground. 

Trump has repeatedly raised the possibility of what he called "land action" in Venezuela, saying earlier this week that the US is "looking at land now" after getting "the sea very well under control".

"We stopped all drugs from coming in by sea. I will stop all drugs from coming in by land very shortly. You'll see that starting," he told reporters at the White House on Saturday before departing for a trip to Asia.

The US has also bolstered its air presence in the region. BBC Verify has identified a number of US military aircraft across Puerto Rico.

It comes as CNN reports Trump is considering targeting cocaine facilities and drug trafficking routes inside Venezuela, but is yet to make a final decision.

Military analysts have pointed out that intercepting drugs at sea does not require a force as big as the current US one.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c891gzx7xn4o

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Venezuela and the CIA exposed by Trump himself
The pretext of fighting drug trafficking in order to invade is not new and has been used by several U.S. presidents. It is impossible to count the number of times the CIA has embarked on actions such as those ordered by Trump against Venezuela in front of the cameras.

President Donald Trump has just launched an attack on the CIA. Yes, because that is what can be inferred from his announcement to the world that he is ordering covert operations, which he should rather have called "overt" operations, within the sovereign territory of Venezuela. There are many ways to approach this issue.

Let's start by insisting that no international law allows the U.S. government to take actions that contribute to altering the sovereignty of another state. Unfortunately, this, which is a truism, is worth remembering in light of the chaos in which the world is functioning.

Secondly, and again based on the rules of civilized coexistence, it is unacceptable for any country's intelligence service to propose the assassination of a human being; that is, an extrajudicial execution, plain and simple. We already know they do it, but for the president to calmly admit it crosses every red line.

And as for the secret or covert nature of the operation, it is better not to go into detail. Imagine an undercover CIA agent anywhere, conspiring, and suddenly the president of the government that sent him publicly acknowledges the purpose of his presence in that country. In short, the spy's situation, already complex, becomes practically untenable.

But Trump's disdain for the CIA is nothing new. One day before taking office for his first term, on January 27, 2017, the new president expressed "disparaging" opinions about the work of this institution in the Langley lobby, a position he took on subsequent occasions. Imagine again the undercover agents who learn from the press that their dangerous service is being discredited by their top boss, the president.

During Trump's current term, Elon Musk, then director of DOGE, visited Langley in April 2025. What was discussed there was not disclosed, but it did leave a trail of concern about his efforts to cut back on, and even close, those structures whose usefulness is in doubt according to President Trump's vision.

THE CIA AND THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS AGAINST VENEZUELA

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this story is that Trump seeks to normalize not only the colossal lie that Venezuela is responsible for drug trafficking into the United States, but also, based on this lie, that the U.S. government has the right to kill people in third countries, according to Marco Rubio's suggestions.

In reality, the U..S president is not as clumsy as one might think at this point. No. The threat to use the sinister CIA to assassinate or eliminate alleged Venezuelan enemies is part of a plot to generate panic and, eventually, betrayals within the Venezuelan people and Chavismo in particular.

For all the above reasons, Trump's statements are fundamentally a media ploy. The CIA will not carry out covert operations in the future; the CIA already operates in Venezuela, and has done so since its inception. Yes, because where there is abundant oil, the CIA has to be there, especially if there is a profound revolution like the Bolivarian one.

Experts describe this type of maneuver as part of cognitive warfare. They bet that it is enough to frantically generate verbal threats or deploy troops to demobilize the victims and, in doing so, achieve the desired regime change at a very low cost, from a military standpoint and in terms of their marines not being wiped out.

Following this logic, the aggressors know that it is not possible for any invasive variant to succeed, even if limited to a surgical strike, as they call it, without first or during the process creating an internal situation that contributes to breaking the unity or defensive response capacity of those attacked, whose minds and emotions have been previously manipulated.

ALWAYS THE CIA 

It is impossible to count the number of times the CIA has embarked on actions such as those ordered by Trump in front of the cameras. One of its most recent directors, the scoundrel Mike Pompeo, boasted at the University of Texas in 2019 that the CIA had lied and stolen; he only failed to admit that they had murdered.

Equally despicable was the implementation of what became a program of flagrant human rights violations on a universal scale during the "war on terror" in the Bush era. In that context, the CIA engaged in kidnapping and setting up torture facilities in several distinguished European nations, calling them "enhanced interrogation techniques."

Some of the victims ended up in the illegally occupied territory of Guantanamo Bay, at the famous base, the only place in Cuba where such "excesses" have been practiced since the fall of the Batista tyranny.

The CIA is always involved in every coup d'état in Our America; behind the many forms of fascism and military dictatorships in South America, including Plan Condor, is the CIA; state terrorism against Cuba was entirely organized by the CIA; more recently, in the judicialization of politics in the region and the media lynching of leftist and progressive leaders, the CIA was behind the scenes.

When it comes to drug trafficking, the CIA also appears in a "covert" form; remember its involvement in the trafficking of opioids during the invasion of Vietnam, in Afghanistan, in post-Gaddafi Libya, or during the war of the "contras" in the Sandinista Revolution; all indelible traces of the unspeakable objectives of the "Company," as it is often called in film versions that seek to whitewash this apparatus.

But they should warn Trump that south of the Rio Grande, there is no "fear" of the "Company." Their failures are there for all to see, for example, the many times they tried to assassinate Fidel, to mention just one thing that has become legendary, like everything else concerning the historic leader of the Cuban Revolution.

In 2008, Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist Tim Weiner published an anthology about the Langley headquarters, entitled Legacy of Ashes, which lists a series of errors and limitations and predicts that, if they do not change, they are doomed to a state of endemic failure.

An interesting fact: the phrase "legacy of ashes" is said to have been used by Eisenhower in response to Kennedy when the latter expressed interest in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency upon taking office. The poor opinion of the "Company" seems to go back a long way.

What happens now in Venezuela could confirm Weiner's prediction. All it would take is for the Chavista authorities to catch and expose some of these killers, previously announced/denounced by their top boss, for a scandal to erupt in Washington. It would probably even contribute to the collapse of the entire anti-Venezuelan operation.

A question is going viral on social media after Trump admitted to ordering covert operations abroad that include assassinating people: can any other country therefore do the same in the United States? Perhaps, in their response, Americans will understand the danger of this issue.

https://en.granma.cu/mundo/2025-10-24/venezuela-and-the-cia-exposed-by-trump-himself

UNFORTUNATELY, THE USA ONLY UNDERSTANDS ONE PHILOSOPHY: FORCE, COERCION, BULLYING....

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Mish: What does the US risk with $40 billion bailout of Argentina?

Grok: The $40 billion bailout package for Argentina, announced by the Trump administration in October 2025, consists of a $20 billion direct currency swap from U.S. taxpayer funds (via the Exchange Stabilization Fund) and an additional $20 billion facilitated through private sector sources like banks and sovereign wealth funds. The aid aims to stabilize Argentina’s peso, support President Javier Milei’s fiscal reforms, and prevent economic unrest ahead of the country’s October 26 midterm elections. While framed as advancing U.S. geopolitical interests by bolstering a pro-market ally in Latin America, the package carries several significant risks for the United States, spanning financial, economic, political, and geopolitical dimensions.

Will Trump’s $20 Billion Backing Help Milei Change Argentina’s Fortunes?

A Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) by Brad Setser addresses the question Will Trump’s $20 Billion Backing Help Milei Change Argentina’s Fortunes?

Argentina has already gone through more than $50 billion in IMF funds. Despite the assurances of U.S. officials, there is skepticism that Argentina can achieve a different result with this currency swap.

The U.S. Treasury has announced that it is providing Argentina with a $20 billion currency swap, essentially an emergency credit line that constitutes the first large-scale rescue financed directly by the United States since the Bill Clinton administration provided Mexico with a $20 billion loan in 1995. Lending through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been much more common, as it poses far fewer risks to the United States.

This unusual credit line—and even more unusual decision to use U.S. foreign exchange reserves to buy the Argentine peso last week—seeks to support the battered currency of South America’s third-largest economy, officials with President Donald Trump’s administration said. There is concern, however, that Argentina lacks a clear path to repaying both the United States and the already over-exposed IMF. Critics argue U.S. taxpayer dollars are being put at risk to provide Javier Milei, Argentina’s unorthodox and fiscally conservative president, a political lifeline weeks ahead of legislative elections on October 26.

Why does Argentina need help now?

The details of Argentina’s economic crisis are complex, but the bottom line is simple: Argentina needs help because it is running out of hard currency.

It has gotten into financial trouble this year even as its fiscal accounts improved because its external accounts have deteriorated. The current account—a measure of the broad trade balance that includes interest payments of foreign debt—moved into a deficit. The government has also wanted to keep its currency, the peso, relatively strong to help fight against inflation. But doing so required Argentina to dip into its foreign exchange reserves. When those reserves got to be critically low, Argentina sought—and obtained—the ability to borrow foreign exchange reserves from the United States.

Without an infusion of fresh foreign exchange reserves, Argentina would have been forced to abandon its currency band and allow a big fall in the peso, and it would have struggled to come up with the roughly $4 billion needed to make contractual payments on its external debt in early January.

How much foreign exchange does Argentina have left?

Argentina’s reported foreign exchange reserves are more than $30 billion, excluding modest gold reserves. But not all those reserves are available to prop up the peso in the foreign exchange market.

Of Argentina’s $33 billion in reported foreign exchange reserves, $13 billion are in Chinese yuan and cannot really be used without a new deal with China’s central bank. Several years ago, Argentina received an $18 billion currency “swap” line from the People’s Bank of China to bolster its reserves. Over time, Argentina was permitted to use $5 billion of those reserves—largely to repay the IMF—but the balance is still part of the country’s reported reserves.

Another $12 billion of Argentina’s reserves come from dollars put on deposit at the central bank by domestic banks. Those reserves are in dollars and could be used in a real emergency. But using the dollars set aside by the banks to pay their own depositors runs the risk of triggering a loss of confidence in the domestic banks, and the last thing Argentina needs now is a run on the banks. As a result, the usable reserves of the central bank are estimated to be as low as $10 billion. That is a very low number. And it is a surprisingly low sum considering that Argentina received a $14 billion loan from the IMF earlier this year.

Where is the U.S. Treasury getting the money it is lending to Argentina?

The U.S. Treasury has a pool of funds, known as the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), that has been set aside to finance U.S. intervention in the foreign exchange market and to provide crisis lending. That pool of funds is always available to the secretary of the Treasury, even during a government shutdown. It was designed to be used in an emergency, such as the run on U.S. money market funds during the 2008 financial crisis.

The ESF has, according to its last report, around $22 billion that are immediately available, which is just enough to cover a $20 billion credit line. And the details matter here: Argentina might not be able to access all of the promised funds immediately.

However, there is another, more creative way the Treasury could raise dollars. The ESF holds around $170 billion of the IMF’s reserve currency, known as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and there are reports that the Treasury is considering making use of these funds. For the SDRs to come into play, the Treasury would first need to use them as a form of collateral to borrow dollars at the Federal Reserve. That is completely legal, but it also would be a novel move. Past rescue loans have been financed using the ESF’s standard hard currency reserves, not its SDRs.

Is this a bailout?

Yes, an emergency extension of credit to Argentina would meet all the standard definitions of a bailout.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has tried to draw a distinction between a bailout and a swap, as the proposed $20 billion rescue is being structured as a swap with Argentina’s central bank, not a direct credit line to the government. In a swap, Argentina’s central bank receives dollars and credits the ESF account with an equal amount of pesos. But the United States doesn’t really want Argentina’s currency. It expects to be repaid in dollars, so it would be a massive failure if the swap was never unwound and the U.S. Treasury was left holding a slug of pesos. There is a reason why most countries don’t want to them as part of their international reserves.

It is important to note that these kinds of Treasury swaps are fundamentally different from those done by the Federal Reserve with other central banks. The Fed’s liquidity swaps are intended to allow the central banks of the other large, advanced economies to act as dollar lenders of last resort to their own banks. The ESF swaps are designed to help troubled emerging economies make payments and finance intervention in the foreign currency market.

The United States has also taken the unusual step of directly buying pesos in the foreign exchange market. That isn’t technically a bailout, which normally describes emergency lending, but it is in fact much riskier than just lending Argentina money because the ESF stands to lose money if the peso falls. This is the first time the U.S. has intervened in the foreign exchange market since Japan’s 2011 earthquake, and the first time in a very long time that the U.S. has bought the currency of an emerging economy.

Why is the Treasury taking these risks?

That is a good question. Argentina isn’t a U.S. treaty ally or on any geopolitical fault line. Argentina’s financial troubles aren’t likely to trigger a “systemic” financial crisis either, as there is no sign that Argentina’s deteriorating finances have spilled over to other emerging and frontier markets. In fact, most other emerging markets have done well financially this year.

The Treasury’s argument is that the United States has an interest in the success of Milei’s agenda, as his commitment to the unfettered market is setting an important example for the rest of the region. That is debatable. Argentina’s commitment to tight fiscal policy is commendable and necessary given it doesn’t have access to international markets. But Buenos Aires did miss critical IMF program targets this summer and had to get a waiver to receive the second tranche of IMF funding earlier this year. The United States doesn’t typically reward a country that missed IMF targets with an unconditional credit line.

Bessent’s argument is that the trading band around the peso is only under pressure because of concerns that Milei may lose control of Argentina’s economic policy path after the October 26 legislative elections. His party performed poorly in a September election in Buenos Aires, Argentina’s biggest province, creating doubts about the political sustainability of his fiscal cuts and pro-market policies.

The counterargument is that the peso was under pressure well before the provincial election. Milei’s government has been drawing on its reserves all year, and the only reason why reported reserves haven’t fallen is that Argentina got a big cash infusion from the IMF. There are also other signs that the peso is now overvalued. Argentine tourists are spending heavily abroad, for example, and there are reports that Buenos Aires itself has become a very expensive city. Per the Buenos Aires Times in March, the city boasted the world’s second-most expensive Big Mac at $7, and Latin America’s priciest cup of coffee at $3.50.

As economist Paul Krugman notes, exchange rate-based disinflation programs have a long history of collapsing in Latin America. A strong currency helps lower inflation, but it also starves the economy of foreign exchange—and that shortage of foreign exchange eventually becomes a problem. The U.S. Treasury is betting this time will be different.

How will we know if U.S. intervention succeeded?

A successful financial rescue is one that is no longer needed. This plan will succeed if Argentina either doesn’t need to draw on its credit line, or if it quickly repays any dollars it borrows.

I suspect we will have a good idea whether this rescue is on its way to success by the end of the year. One signal would be a peso that naturally trades inside the current exchange rate band even after the upcoming election, with enough market demand for pesos that Argentina can start buying back a few dollars and rebuilding its reserves.

Conversely, a peso that trades right at the edge of the band is a problem, as it would imply that Argentina is selling more reserves, including those borrowed from the United States. Argentina has already gone through—across two right-leaning governments—more than $50 billion in IMF funds. It needs to show that the new $20 billion credit line from the United States will produce a different result.

Trump Says Argentina Bailout Depends on Milei’s Party Winning Elections

The Wall Street Journal reports Trump Says Argentina Bailout Depends on Milei’s Party Winning Elections

President Trump directly tied the $20 billion lifeline the U.S. is extending to Argentina to President Javier Milei’s success in the coming midterm elections.

“If he loses, we are not going to be generous with Argentina,” Trump said, sitting across a table at the White House from the visiting South American leader, who he also endorsed for re-election in 2027. “If he doesn’t win, we’re gone.”

Trump’s remarks came days after the U.S. said it purchased Argentine pesos and wrapped up the framework for a $20 billion currency swap with the cash-strapped country’s central bank in an effort to stabilize markets and shore up the economy. Argentina is holding a midterm congressional election Oct. 26 that is widely seen as a referendum on Milei’s policies.

Milei is hoping to increase support in Congress, where his Freedom Advances party currently has less than 15% of the seats, to advance his free-market overhaul. Trump didn’t specify what he would consider a “win” for Milei’s party in the legislative elections.

Is Bessent a Liar?

Yes.

This is a bailout, not just an ordinary swap.

Grok outlines financial risks, geopolitical risks, and economic risks.

If Milei loses, the US would take an immediate loss on the basis of Trump’s statement “If he doesn’t win, we’re gone.”

Of course, that assumes Trump would do what he said.

Related Posts 

October 18, 2025: Trump Tiptoes Away from Reciprocal Tariffs with Many New Exemptions

Trump silently modifies tariff policy, brushing aside the trade war hawks.

October 18, 2025: Zero Progress on the Reducing the Deficit Despite Tariff Revenue

For fiscal year 2025, the deficit is $1.8 trillion, similar to 2024.

https://mishtalk.com/economics/trumps-40-billion-bailout-of-argentina-hurts-us-farmers/

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